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ABSTRACT
Due to the fundamental role of asymmetric information in economic relations, during
the past decades contracts have flourished and dedicated to how the information asym-
metry and incentives induce strategic behavior among economic agents in a number of
directions. One branch of contracts focuses on bilateral contract between one principal
and one agent, in which the agent’s hidden information and hidden action lead to the ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems, respectively. There is a simple and widely
used menu of contracts, which consists of two types of contracts: the fixed-price contract
in which the payment is fixed regardless of the realized cost, and the cost-reimbursement
contract in which the payment equals the realized cost.
By allowing for a more reasonable property that the optimal effort is monotone in the
agent’s type, we show that the performance of the optimal FPCR contract relies crucially
on the cost function: when the marginal is relatively large, the gain of the optimal FPCR
menu is very close to the fully optimal contract. Otherwise the optimal FPCR menu be-
haves arbitrarily close to a cost-reimbursement contract.
To quantify the renegotiation cost without commitment in a two-period setting, we
nonparametrically identify and estimate the model primitives, including the agent’s cost
function and disutility function of effort, the distribution of innate, agents’ bargaining
power and the intertemporal preference. The empirical evidence shows that the nonlin-
earity of agents’ cost function implies different empirical results about the distribution of
welfare gains between firms and taxpayers.
The second branch of bilateral contracts between one principal and multiple agents
emphasizes the externalities generated by the dependence of one agent’s payoff on other
agents’ contracts, while the first branch of contracts involves no externalities due to the set-
ii
ting of one principal and one agent. To quantify the payment effect of bargaining power,
I nonparametrically identify and estimate the model primitives, including the manufac-
turer’s cost function, the hospitals’ payoff function, the joint distribution of hospitals’
payoff-shocks, and hospitals’ bargaining power. And, we conduct counterfactual analysis
of the effect of the bargaining power on the price.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the fundamental role of asymmetric information in economic relations, during
the past decades contracts have flourished and dedicated to how the information asym-
metry and incentives induce strategic behavior among economic agents in a number of
directions. Two of widely used contracts are fixed-price-cost-reimbursement (FPCR) con-
tracts and one-principal-multiple-agents contracts with externalities.
The FPCR contract is a bilateral contract between one principal and one agent, in
which the agent’s hidden information and hidden action lead to the adverse selection and
moral hazard problems, respectively. There is a simple and widely used menu of contracts,
which consists of two types of contracts: the fixed-price contract in which the payment is
fixed regardless of the realized cost, and the cost-reimbursement contract in which the pay-
ment equals the realized cost. The seminal paper [1] demonstrates that when the agent’s
innate cost is uniformly distributed, a simple menu of contract (FPCR menu) captures at
least three-fourths of the surplus that a fully optimal contract proposed in [2] achieves.
Nevertheless, the powerful conclusion of [1] is based on the assumption of agents’ cost
function being an identity, as also imposed in many other studies of contracts, e.g., [2] and
[3]. While such a restriction simplifies the theoretical analysis, more realistic cost func-
tions are preferable and have been considered in the contract theory. The influential work
[4] assumes a strictly convex cost function, and more recently [5] adopt the same setting
of cost function. Moreover, the constant effort level for agents with different innate costs
is inconsistent with some empirical evidence. For example, [6] estimate the firms’ effort
to be increasing in their innate cost using the urban transport data in France. By allowing
for a more reasonable property that the optimal effort is monotone in the agent’s type,
we show that the performance of the optimal FPCR contract relies crucially on the cost
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function: when the marginal is relatively large, the gain of the optimal FPCR menu is very
close to the fully optimal contract. Otherwise the optimal FPCR menu behaves arbitrarily
close to a cost-reimbursement contract.
Besides, in reality the FPCR contracts are sign for more than two periods, and there
exists renegotiation of contract among the multiple periods. In theory, the renegotiation
leads to loss of social welfare, and the magnitude of this loss is important for policy im-
plications. To quantify the renegotiation cost without commitment in a two-period setting,
we nonparametrically identify and estimate the model primitives, including the agent’s
cost function and disutility function of effort, the distribution of innate, agents’ bargaining
power and the intertemporal preference. The empirical evidence shows that the nonlin-
earity of agents’ cost function implies different empirical results about the distribution of
welfare gains between firms and taxpayers.
The second branch of bilateral contracts between one principal and multiple agents
emphasizes the externalities generated by the dependence of one agent’s payoff on other
agents’ contracts, while the first branch of contracts involves no externalities due to the
setting of one principal and one agent. We consider the contracting with externalities de-
veloped by [7]. In the model, the principal simultaneously makes one offer to each agent,
and then agents simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject their own offers. Be-
cause those offers are private in the sense that each agent only observes his own offer, it
is a dynamic incomplete-information game. In actuality, the model has found wide ap-
plications in various economic situations, including vertical contracts in which profits of
downstream firms depend on all downstream firms’ contracts with the upstream firm ([8];
[9]); exclusive dealing in which payoffs of agents rely on the number of agents who sign
exclusive contracts with the principal ([10]; [11]); network externalities ([12]; [13]); and
among others. Despite the wide use of contracting with externalities in various sectors
such as medical device industry and publishing industry, there are few empirical studies
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on the incomplete-information contracting game with externalities. This paper constitutes
the first effort on the rigorous econometric analysis of contracting with externalities. To
quantify the payment effect of bargaining power, I nonparametrically identify and esti-
mate the model primitives, including the manufacturer’s cost function, the hospitals’ pay-
off function, the joint distribution of hospitals’ payoff-shocks, and hospitals’ bargaining
power. And, we conduct counterfactual analysis of the effect of the bargaining power on
the price. By applying the model to coronary stents contracts between the manufacturer
and hospitals in the United States, we find that passive beliefs fit the dataset better than
symmetric beliefs. More relevantly, the counterfactual result shows that if the bargaining
power of hospitals increases, under passive beliefs the stent’s price decreases by some
reasonable amount, while under symmetric beliefs the decrease of price is unreasonable.
3
2. SIMPLE MENUS OF COST-BASED CONTRACTS WITH CONVEX COST
FUNCTIONS
2.1 Introduction
Since the influential work [2] on the principal-agent model of procurement and regula-
tion, a vast literature has been devoted to studying the performance of simple mechanisms
in Laffont-Tirole type principal-agent models. The seminal paper [1] demonstrates that
when the agent’s innate cost is uniformly distributed, a simple menu of contract (FPCR
menu) captures at least three-fourths of the surplus that a fully optimal contract achieves.
The FPCR menu consists of two simple contracts: a fixed-price (FP) contract where the
payment to the agent is a fixed price, regardless of the agent’s realized cost, and a cost-
reimbursement (CR) contract where the agent is reimbursed exactly the realized cost.
The simple contracts in [1] are of great practical importance because the fully optimal
contract proposed in [2] is too complex to be implemented in practice, whereas the afore-
mentioned much simpler menu at least in some cases, secures a substantial share of the
surplus that a fully optimal menu can secure. Nevertheless, the powerful conclusion of [1]
is based on the assumption of agents’ cost function being an identity, as also imposed in
many other studies of contracts, e.g., [2] and [3]. While such a restriction simplifies the
theoretical analysis, more realistic cost functions are preferable and have been considered
in the contract theory. The influential work [4] assumes a strictly convex cost function, and
more recently [5] adopt the same setting of cost function. Moreover, the constant effort
level for agents with different innate costs is inconsistent with some empirical evidence.
For example, [6] estimate the firms’ effort to be increasing in their innate cost using the
urban transport data in France.
Motivated by both the existing theoretical work and the empirical evidence, we relax
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the assumption of identity cost function in the model of FPCR menu and investigate how
the performance of the optimal FPCR menu would be impacted by a convex cost function.
We provide an important observation for the optimal FPCR menu when the agent’s innate
cost is uniformly distributed: the performance of the optimal FPCR contract relies cru-
cially on the cost function: when the marginal cost (relative to marginal disutility) is large,
the performance is very close to that of the fully optimal contract. On the other hand, if
the marginal cost is small and firms’ innate costs are dispersed then the performance of the
optimal FPCR menu is arbitrarily close to a CR contract. Our result is in contrast with that
of [1], where the FPCR menu captures at least three-fourths of the surplus that a fully opti-
mal contract achieves. The main force that leads to the discrepancy is that under a convex
cost function, the optimal cost-reducing effort exerted by an agent is strictly increasing in
her innate cost and a cost function with higher marginal cost induces larger cost-reducing
effort for given innate cost. By contrast, an identity cost function implies that the optimal
cost-reducing effort is a constant, regardless of the innate cost of the agent. Our finding
suggests that in designing an optimal FPCR contract it is important for the principal to take
into account the cost structure of the agents: when the marginal cost of agents is large, the
FPCR menu is especially preferable. When the marginal cost is small and agents’ innate
costs are dispersed, the menu is less appealing or even arbitrarily close to a CR contract.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section2 presents the basic model
and some of its properties. Section 3 compares the performance of the optimal FPCR
menu with the fully optimal contract. Section 4 concludes and proofs are included in the
Appendix.
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2.2 The Model
A principal wishes to procure a project by offering a menu of contracts to a firm
(agent).1 The firm’s realized cost of the project is c = H(θ − e), where θ and e are the
agent’s innate cost and cost-reducing effort, respectively, and θ − e > 0. Exerting effort e
incurs disutility ψ(e), thus the total cost of the agent for the project is H(θ − e) + ψ(e).
Let t(c) be the payment from the principal to the agent in a FPCR menu, then t(c) = b
for FP contracts and t(c) = c for CR contracts, where b is the fixed-price and c is the
realized cost. A firm who accepts the CR contract only gets the realized cost c reimbursed,
hence this firm exerts no effort and makes zero profit, whereas a firm who chooses the FP
contract makes profit pi ≡ b−H(θ − e)− ψ(e) .
Assumption 1. (i) Both cost and disutility functions are quadratic. Specifically, H(θ) =
βθ2, β > 0 and ψ(·) is normalized to be ψ(e) = e2. (ii) A firm’s innate cost θ is uniformly
distributed on its support [θ, θ¯] ⊂ R+.
Both H(·) and ψ(·) are standard cost functions in economics (e.g., [4] and [3]). Note
that the convex cost β(θ − e)2 if effort is exerted also implies that the effort e ≥ 0,
otherwise, exerting effort increases the firm’s cost. Under the CR contract, the firm’s cost
is reduced to c = H(θ) and the profit pi = c− c− ψ(0) must be zero for any realized cost
c by the noting the assumption that ψ(0) = 0. The assumption of uniform distribution for
firms’ innate costs is imposed for comparison with [1].
Define e∗ as the optimal positive cost-reducing effort exerted by a firm who accepts the
FP contract. By employing the firm’s first-order condition H ′(θ − e∗) = ψ′(e∗), i.e., the
marginal cost reduced by the effort equals the marginal disutility of exerting the effort, we
obtain the optimal cost-reducing effort e∗(θ) = βθ/(β + 1) with the strict monotonicity
of cost-reducing effort 0 < e∗′ < 1. On the one hand, the optimal FPCR menu induces
1We use “firm" and “agent" exchangeably.
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less efficient firms (with a larger θ) to exert more cost-reducing effort. In existing studies
on the FPCR menu, however, the optimal effort e∗ is a constant. This is because the cost
H(·) is an identity function (e.g., see [1] and [14]), thus the first order condition of the
firm ψ(e∗) = 1 is independent from θ. Intuitively, an identity cost function implies that
the marginal benefit of exerting the same effort is the same for firms with different innate
costs. Therefore, a firm has no incentive to exert more effort than others. However, when
the cost is convex a firm with a higher innate cost enjoys a larger reduction of cost than a
lower-innate cost firm by exerting the same effort, and this explains the strict monotonicity
of cost-reducing effort in firms’ innate cost. On the other hand, for a given innate cost θ,
the larger β the higher level of optimal effort. This result can be explained as follows. A
larger β implies higher marginal benefit from exerting the same effort, i.e., the marginal
benefit 2β(θ− e) is increasing in β, whereas the marginal disutility 2e does not depend on
β. Therefore, the firm will exert more effort to minimize the cost if β is larger.
We now turn to the problem of the principal. Suppose that the principal offers the
fixed-price b such that the cut-off type is θ∗, i.e., the firm with θ∗ ∈ [θ, θ¯] is indifferent
between choosing the FP and the CR contract. The profit of the firm with type θ = θ∗ pi =
t(c)−H(θ∗−e∗(θ∗))−ψ(e∗(θ∗)) is zero. Considering that dpi/dθ = −2βθ/(1+β) < 0 ,
all the firms with type θ ≤ θ∗ choose the FP contract and make positive profit; whereas
those with θ > θ∗ choose the CR contract and earn zero profit. For the FPCR menu with
θ∗ being the cut-off type, the principal’s expected cost for the project is:
C(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[H(θ − e∗(θ)) + ψ(e∗(θ))] dF (v) +
∫ θ¯
θ
H(v)dF (v), (2.1)
where F (v) = (v−θ)/(θ¯−θ) is the cdf of firms’ type θ. The two terms on the right-hand-
side of the second equality are the payment to firms accepting the FP and the CR contract,
respectively.
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Define γ ≡ θ¯/θ ∈ (1,∞), then a larger γ implies a higher average innate cost and
more dispersed distribution. The optimal FPCR is stated as following.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 hold, in an optimal FPCR contract, the principal offers
a fixed-price such that: (i). If 0 < β < 2(γ− 1)/γ, all the firms with θ ≤ θ∗ = 2θ/(2−β)
choose the FP contract and the remaining firms choose the CR contract. The fixed-price
is b = 4βθ
2
(2−β)2(β+1) . (ii). If 2(γ − 1)/γ ≤ β, then θ∗ = θ¯. All the firms choose FP contract,
and the fixed-price is b = β
β+1
θ¯2.
Lemma 1 states that when β is small it is optimal for the principal to offer a FPCR menu
that only induces some firms (those with lower innate costs) to choose the FP contract.
When β is large, the optimal menu is such that all the firms choose the FP contract.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is provided in the discussion after Assumption 1: a
larger β means a higher marginal benefit from exerting the same effort, and this provides
incentives for inefficient firms to exert more effort to reduce the cost. The optimal FPCR
menu in Lemma 1 is a response to such impacts of β.
2.3 Comparison of Performance
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the optimal FPCR menu by comparing
its surplus with the fully optimal contract (Laffont and Tirole, 1986, 1993) in a similar way
to [1] and [14]. First, we conduct an analysis of the fully optimal contract with a convex
cost function. [2, 4] characterize the fully optimal mechanism that can be implemented by
the principal offering a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts. We follow the
standard practice in their seminal work to obtain the cost-reducing effort e∗(θ) in Lemma
2.
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, the optimal level of cost-reducing effort e∗(θ) in the fully
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optimal contract is:
e∗(θ) =

0, if θ ≥ θ/(1− β) and β ≤ 1.
(β−1)θ+θ
β+1
, if θ ≤ θ/(1− β) and β < 1, or β ≥ 1.
(2.2)
Lemma 2 states that under the fully optimal contract there also exists a cut-off type
such that only those more efficient types than the cut-off one exert effort. This result is
similar to that of the optimal FPCR contract in Lemma 1. Specifically, only some firms
exert effort when β is small, but when β is large all the firms minimize cost by exerting
positive effort. Nevertheless, a comparison between two lemmas demonstrates that the
cut-off types induced by the two contracts are different. Moreover, from Lemma 2 we
have e∗′(θ) = (β − 1)/(β + 1) ≤ 0 when β ≤ 1. This is consistent with the conclusion in
[2] but opposite to the optimal FPCR menu. For the case of β > 1 both the fully optimal
contract and the optimal FPCR one induce strictly increasing effort in firms’ innate cost.
Let GF ≡ C(θ) − C(θ∗) denote the reduction in the principal’s expected cost under
the optimal FPCR contract relative to the CR contract, and GO is defined similarly for the
fully optimal contract. We focus on the analysis of the ratio GF/GO, which describes the
performance of the optimal FPCR menu relative to the fully optimal one.
Theorem 1. For any given γ > 1, (i). If 0 < β ≤ (γ−1)/γ, GF/GO is strictly decreasing
in β and GF/GO < 3/4. (ii). If (γ − 1)/γ < β < 2(γ − 1)/γ, GF/GO decreases to its
minimum then increase in β. (iii) If β ≥ 2(γ − 1)/γ, GF/GO is strictly increasing in β
and limβ→∞GF/GO = 1.
As expected, the performance of the FPCR contract depends on both the distribution
parameter γ and the cost parameter β. To visualize the findings in Theorem 1, we illustrate
the relationship between GF/GO and β for γ = 3 in panel (a) of Figure 2.1. The function
consists of three segments: for β ∈ (0, (γ−1)/γ], the ratioGF/GO strictly decreases in β,
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starting from 3/4; in the second segment, β ∈ ((γ − 1)/γ, 2(γ − 1)/γ), GF/GO declines
first to reach the minimum, and then rises again. When β ≥ 2(γ−1)/γ, GF/GO increases
to one as β is getting large. In summary, as β increases the performance of the optimal
FPCR contract is getting worse first, then reaching the lowest level, and finally catching up
the fully optimal contract. Especially, when β is large, the optimal FPCR contract secures
almost all the gain secured under the fully optimal contract.
To better understand the results in Theorem 1, we explore the economic reasonings
of the patterns shown in pane (a) of Figure 2.1. The declining segment of GF/GO for
β ∈ (0, (γ − 1)/γ] can be understood as follows. Note that a larger proportion of firms
exerting effort in the fully optimal contract than the FPCR one for any fixed β in this
segment. Further, as β goes up, the difference between proportions of firms exerting effort
in two menus rises, though firms under both menus will exert more effort. Specifically,
under the fully optimal and the optimal FPCR contracts, the proportions of firms who exert
cost-reducing effort are [θ, θ/(1 − β)] and [θ, 2θ/(2 − β)], respectively, where the latter
is a subset of the former. As β goes up, both sets are larger while θ/(1 − β) increases
at a faster rate than 2θ/(2 − β). The more effort-incentive essence of the fully optimal
contract, therefore, could enlarge the welfare difference (a smaller GF/GO for a larger β)
between these two menus. It is also worth noting that in the declining segment of GF/GO,
the upper bound of the gain secured by the optimal FPCR is 3/4 of the fully optimal one
for any γ, which is the lower bound in [1].
When β is large, both the optimal FPCR and the fully optimal contract provide strong
incentives such that all firms exert effort. More precisely, for any given θ the optimal cost-
reducing effort induced by the optimal FPCR contract e∗(θ) = βθ/(β+ 1) is closer to that
of the fully optimal contract e∗(θ) = (β − 1)θ/(β + 1) + θ/(β + 1) as β increases. Thus
the performance of the optimal FPCR contract approaches the fully optimal one and such
a conclusion does not depend on the distribution of innate cost since for large β eventually
10
all the firms exert some positive effort.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of performance
Theorem 2. For any given β ∈ (1−1/γ, 2−2/γ), GF/GO is strictly decreasing in γ and
limγ→∞GF/GO = 0.
The result in Theorem 2 describes the effects of γ on the efficiency of the FPCR menu.
The finding is of special interest because it implies that for any given β ∈ (1−1/γ, 2−2/γ)
and for any  > 0, there exists a γ0 > 1 such that for any γ ≥ γ0, GF/GO ≤ , i.e., if
the firms’ innate costs are sufficiently spread, the efficiency of the FPCR menu would be
arbitrarily close to that of a CR contract. Theorem 2 is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 2.1,
where the pattern of GF/GO is similar across different γ but the line is lower for a larger
γ. This result can be interpreted using the conclusion in Lemma 1, which implies that the
ratio of the proportion of firms choosing CR contracts to the one choosing FP contracts is
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(2/β − 1)γ − 2/β. The ratio is strictly increasing in γ, and this indicates that if agents’
innate costs are sufficiently dispersed, the firms choosing CR contracts would dominate
and the performance of the FPCR contract would be close to a CR contract.
Our result is in contrast with that of [1], where the ratio GF/GO is bounded below at
3/4 for any given γ.2 The main force that leads to this discrepancy is that under a convex
function, the optimal cost-reducing effort exerted by the agent is strictly increasing in her
innate cost and a cost function with higher marginal cost induces larger cost-reducing
effort for a given innate cost of the agent. If cost function is an identity, however, the
optimal cost-reducing effort is a constant, regardless of the innate cost of the agent. The
results in Theorems 1-2 are of particular importance for the principal to design a FPCR
menu. It suggests that the FPCR menu is preferable when the marginal cost of agents
is sufficiently large relative to the marginal disutility, whereas the menu is less appealing
when the marginal cost is small and agents have more dispersed innate costs.
By further exploring the impacts of γ on GF/GO, we find that the minimizer and the
minimum of GF/GO are strictly increasing and decreasing in γ, respectively. Unfortu-
nately, a tractably analytical expression of the minimizer and minimum are not available,
we instead employ numerical results to illustrate how they vary with γ, as shown in panels
(c) and (d).
2.4 Conclusions
We extended the FPCR menu to allow firms’ cost to be convex in their types and found
that the performance of the optimal FPCR contract relies crucially on the cost function. On
the one hand, the expected surplus can be very close to that of the fully optimal contract
if the marginal cost is large. On the other hand, if the marginal cost is small and firms
are diverse in their innate costs then the optimal FPCR menu behaves arbitrarily close to
2The parameter γ in [1] is defined as the ratio of θ¯ − θ to a constant.
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a cost-reimbursement contract. Our findings suggest that the information on cost structure
of firms is essential to the principal when the powerful FPCR is implemented.
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3. ECONOMETRICS OF MULTI-PERIOD SIMPLE CONTRACTS
3.1 Introduction
Due to the fundamental role it plays in the studies of informational asymmetries and
incentives, contract theory has attracted much attention from economists during the past
three decades (see [15]; and [16]). One branch of the contracts are the complex optimal
contracts in the spirit of [2] where the optimal payment to agents is a nonlinear function
of both agents’ unobserved type and their observed cost. Nevertheless, recent studies
argue that another branch, the simple menus of contracts which oftentimes specify the
payment only as a function of the agents’ observed cost or even as a constant, could be
more useful in practice (e.g., see [17]). Theoretical and empirical evidence show that these
simple menus could capture a substantial proportion of the surplus that complex optimal
nonlinear contracts would achieve ([1]).
Despite the importance of simple contracts and their wide use in various sectors, rigor-
ous econometric analyses on this large class of contracts are largely missing in the litera-
ture. In actuality, rigorous identification results were developed only recently for complex
optimal nonlinear contracts in [3, 5]. However, the methodology for complex contracts
do not directly apply to simple contracts. This is because simple menus of contracts have
different implications from complex contracts on how asymmetric information and incen-
tives govern the relationship between a principal and an agent (e.g., see [1]; [14]). The
fact that simple contracts are often implemented for multiple periods ([18]) imposes fur-
ther challenges to rigorous econometric analysis for multi-period simple contracts because
renegotiation and information revelation complicate the relationship between observables
and model primitives.
This paper provides the first set of results on rigorous identification of multi-period
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simple contracts by focusing on a widely-used menu “fixed-price-cost-reimbursement (FPCR)"
of simple contracts.1 This menu consists of a fixed-price (FP) contract, in which the
payment to the agent is a fixed price, regardless of the agent’s realized cost; and a cost-
reimbursement (CR) contract, in which the agent is reimbursed exactly for all the realized
cost. A multi-period FPCR contract may be implemented in two forms: a contract under
renegotiation, which allows the principal and the agent to renegotiate on the initial con-
tract at certain time during the implementation, or a contract under commitment, which
prohibits any adjustment during implementation. A FPCR contract can be understood as a
special case of a linear cost-sharing-cost-reimbursment (LCSCR) contract which has two
options: a CR contract and a linear cost sharing (LCS) contract that specifies a lump-sum
payment and a single fraction κ ∈ [0, 1], of realized costs for which the agent would be
reimbursed.
3.1.1 Model and Identification
We propose a general theoretical model for two-period FPCR contracts by extending
the work of [18], which provides a simple framework for dynamic FPCR contracts. At
the beginning of the first period, an agent chooses the most profitable contract from the
FPCR menu provided by the principal for two periods. The agent is allowed to renegotiate
with the principal and make changes to his initial choice at the end of the first period if
the contract is renegotiable; whereas under commitment the agent has to stick to his initial
choice. We derive the equilibrium conditions for the models under both commitment and
renegotiation, where there are two and three segments of agents, respectively, and the
agents within a segment make the same choice of contracts. In general, more efficient
firms choose fixed-price contracts and exert cost-reducing effort while less efficient firms
1For example, many local authorities in France use this menu to contract with firms to provide the trans-
port service. Other examples include the Indian customized software industry studied by [19], U.S. Air
Force engine procurement considered in [17], and so on.
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prefer cost-reimbursement contracts.
To conduct a rigorous econometric analysis of the model above, we provide construc-
tive arguments to nonparametrically identify the structural elements in contracts under
renegotiation. The argument is readily carried over to the commitment setting. Specifi-
cally, we show that the equilibrium conditions implied by the model, together with some
exclusion restrictions to agents’ types, enable us to nonparametrically identify the model
primitives (if firms exert effort) from the observed information in a typical dynamic FPCR
contract, i.e., the joint distribution of agents’ choices of contracts, their realized costs,
received payments from the principal. The model primitives include agents’ cost and
disutility functions, distribution of types, and two scalar parameters characterizing agents’
bargaining power and the intertemporal preference.
Our identification argument takes several steps. First, by using the recently developed
methodology in measurement errors ([20]) we recover the distribution of the unobserved
optimal effort exerted by agents from the joint distribution of two covariates correlated
with the effort. The one-to-one mapping between agent’s observed cost and optimal effort
implied by the equilibrium conditions further enables us to back out the (pseudo) opti-
mal effort corresponding to each of the observed cost. Second, we rely on an exclusion
restriction, i.e., the existence of some exclusive variables that directly affect the optimal
effort but not the distribution of innate costs (types) to identify the cost structure of agents.
The identification is achieved by exploiting variations of the quantiles for the cost when
the exclusive variables change while the quantiles of the type remain the same. Third, we
construct the pseudo innate costs from the identified cost function as well as the structural
link between innate cost and optimal effort. Thus the distribution of innate cost is recov-
ered. We then employ the structural elements identified above and the observed payment
to the agent to recover the two parameters that characterize agents’ bargaining power and
intertemporal preference. Using the identification argument above, we also provide semi-
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parametric identification results for the model if firms who do not exert effort are included
in the model. Our identification results for multi-period FPCR contracts are without loss
of generality and can be readily extended to LCSCR contracts or even some more general
menus. The identification procedure also applies to FP and CR contracts since the FPCR
contracts nests FP and CR ones as special cases. Based on the argument of identification,
we also propose feasible procedures to estimate the model.
3.1.2 Preview of Empirical Findings
We apply our method to study the dynamic transport procurement contracts in France.
The objective of the empirical study is to estimate the cost and disutility functions of
agents, and other parameters of the local governments’ (principal) and agents’ preference.
More importantly, we utilize these estimates to conduct a counterfactual analysis on the
welfare comparison between FPCR contracts under renegotiation and under commitment.
Our empirical results reveal that both cost and disutility functions of agents are convex
respectively in innate cost and effort, while identity cost function is generally assumed
in the existing literature. We then employ the estimates to conduct an important counter-
factual analysis for the purpose of comparing the welfare of FPCR contracts under com-
mitment and under renegotiation. Our estimate shows that contracts under commitment
achieve significant welfare gains comparing with those under renegotiation, this confirms
the existing results in [18]. More importantly, we find new empirical evidence that both
parties of the contract are welfare gainers: about sixty percent of the gains would accrue to
taxpayers (the principal), whereas the firms (the agents) obtain the remaining forty percent.
This is in contrast to [18], where only firms are welfare gainers.
Our new empirical evidence is mainly attributed to the convexity of firms’ cost func-
tion since it implies that the marginal benefit of effort is increasing in innate cost, and
in turn those inefficient firms (with higher innate costs) have stronger incentives to exert
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cost-reducing effort if they choose FP contracts. Besides, the empirical results show that
a larger portion of firms choose FP contracts under commitment than under negotiation.
Thus it is very likely that if we take both periods into account there would be more firms
exerting cost-reducing effort under commitment and this creates higher welfare gains. In
summary, our empirical findings indicate that it is crucial to take into account the func-
tional form of firms’ cost functions when one investigates the efficiency of contracts with
incentives.
3.1.3 Relation to Existing Literature and Contributions
This paper contributes to a broader literature on the identification of contract models.
There are few studies on the rigorous identification of contract models. Notable exception
is [3], which show the nonparametric identification of a static complex contract model
tailored from the seminal paper [2]. The identification argument in [3] does not apply
to the simple contracts considered in this paper for the following reasons. First of all,
the observed payment is (agents’) type-specific in their complex contracts. Such payment
mechanism provides richer variations for identification than the simple contracts, in which
payments are oftentimes constant regardless of agents’ type. Second, the model in our
paper is multi-period. Renegotiation and information revelation in such contracts further
complicate the behaviors of the principal and agents. It is not clear how one extends the
identification results in [3] for a static model to its multi-period counterparts.
The identification in [3] relies on a one-to-one mapping between the observed price
of the product and the private type of the agent, whereas such relationship does not exist
in our model. Instead, we take advantage of newly developed results in measurement
errors to recover the distribution of the unobserved optimal effort, and then identify the
model structure by using an exclusion restriction. Identifying structural models through
measurement errors has been widely in the literature, e.g., [21] and [22] provide general
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identification results for nonlinear models with misclassification and measurement error,
respectively. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to employ the
results in measurement errors to identify of contract models. In actuality, our identification
argument developed for the two-period FPCR regulatory contracts could apply to a broader
class of moral hazard and adverse selection models where agents with continuum of types
are only offered a few simple contracts by the principal, e.g., labor contracts and insurance
models.
In addition, our paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on contract theory
(e.g.,[6] and [18]). [18] use the same source of data as ours to estimate the structural
elements of dynamic FPCR contracts and compare the welfare of contracts under renego-
tiation and commitment. As described before, we estimate a richer model using different
methods and find new empirical evidence on FPCR contracts. The significant convexity of
the cost function implies that a linear cost specification in prior literature might be mislead-
ing. More importantly, we find that the convexity of firms’ cost may lead to quantitatively
different performance of FPCR contracts.
3.1.4 Roadmap
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the general dynamic FPCR
model. In section 3 we establish the main identification results, and provide some dis-
cussions on the feasible estimation procedure. Section 4 analyzes the French transport
procurement contracts. Section 5 concludes. Proofs, figures and tables are collected in the
appendix.
3.2 The Model
A risk-neutral principal wishes to procure a project from a risk-neutral agent by offer-
ing a two-period menu consisting of two types of contracts in each period: a cost sharing
(CS) contract in which the payment is dependent upon the agent’s realized cost; and a
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cost-reimbursement (CR) contract in which the agent is reimbursed exactly for the real-
ized cost. The essential difference between these two types of contracts lies in that CS
contracts are high-powered incentive for cost reduction from efforts exerted by agents,
while CR contracts are low-powered and provide no incentives for cost reduction.
The two-period setting introduces dynamics in terms of commitment and renegotiation.
Obviously, the selection in the first contracting period partially reveals information on the
firm’s type: the choice of a CS contract signals that the firm is more efficient; the choice
of a CR contract, however, conveys the information that the firm is less efficient. Under
commitment, both parties are not allowed to renegotiate the initial contract or re-sign a new
one even though new information is available. In the absence of commitment, however,
both parties may be better off by exploiting these new information to renegotiate the initial
contract. This lessens the parties’ ex ante incentives when the prospect of renegotiation
is perfectly anticipated in the contract design stage, thus eventually keeping parties from
securing the efficiency that could have been obtained under commitment (e.g., [23]; and
[24]).
At the beginning, nature randomly assigns the agent’s innate cost (or “type”) θ, which
is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F (·), with a density f(·) on
a support [θ, θ¯] ⊂ R. The agent observes its private value of θ, and the principal only has
the knowledge of F (θ). The cost structure of realizing the project is
ct = H(θ − et), t ∈ {1, 2}
where ct is the realized cost in period t, the innate cost θ represents the firm’s management
and production skills, which is invariant during two periods, and the private effort et ≥ 0
which is unobserved by the principal, captures firm’s actions taken to reduce cost ct. The
cost functionH(·) takes a general form and nests the commonly assumed identity function
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as a special case.2 The exerted effort et incurs some disutility according to a disutility
function ψ(et).
Given the principal’s payment specification pt(ct), the informational rent (profit) of the
agent (firm) with type θ in period t ∈ {1, 2} is defined as
Ut = pt(ct)− ct − ψ(et) = pt ◦H(θ − et)−H(θ − et)− ψ(et), (3.1)
where ◦ denotes the composition of two functions. The firm’s intertemporal profit is U =
rU1 + (1− r)U2, where the weight r is defined as r = 1/(1 + δ) with δ being the standard
discount factor. The goal of the agent is to maximize U by choosing a contract from the
CS-CR menu and then exerting the optimal effort et.
The principal designs the optimal menu of contracts by specifying the optimal form
pt(ct) for CS contracts in each period to maximize the expected social welfare Eθ[SW (θ)],
where the expectation operator Eθ is taken with respect to θ, and SW (θ) is the social
welfare generated by the agent with innate cost θ:
SW (θ) ≡ S − (1 + λ)[rp1 + (1− r)p2] + α[rU1 + (1− r)U2], (3.2)
In the definition above, the dependence of the right side of (3.2) on θ is through the de-
pendence of both U1 and U2 on θ. S is the gross surplus generated by the procured service
and assumed to be sufficiently large to guarantee the desirability of the project. The cost
of public funds λ > 0 captures some dead-weight loss due to a distortionary taxation for
raising subsidies with the principal’s intertemporal payment rp1 + (1 − r)p2. The pa-
rameter α is the weight assigned to firms’ profits by the principal ([25]; [26]), which can
reflect the extent of the political pressure imposed by the agents on the political principals
2[4] also assume a general cost function in a monopoly model with regulation.
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([27]) and therefore can be interpreted as firm’s bargaining power against the principal in
negotiation. We maintain that α < 1 + λ, which captures the relevant trade-off between
extracting profit and inducing efficient cost-reducing effort. Intuitively, the optimal menu
of contracts offered by the principal trades off efficiency and rent extraction: CS contracts
with large subsidy would induce the first-best effort while leaving much information rent
to more efficient agents; CR contracts, however, nullify this rent without any incentive for
agents to make cost-reducing effort.
In the following we assume that all related functions are at least twice continuously
differentiable and that integration and differentiation can be interchanged. For a generic
function a(·) with more than one argument, we denote its derivative with respect to the
k-th argument by ak(·).
Assumption 2. (i) The random type θ is distributed according to F (·) with a density
f(·) > 0 on its support [θ, θ] ⊂ R, θ < θ. (ii) H(·) ≥ 0, H ′(·) > 0, H ′′(·) > 0. (iii)
ψ(·) ≥ 0, ψ′(·) > 0, ψ′′(·) > 0, ψ(0) = 0.
Assumption 2 is standard in the procurement contract literature (e.g., [4]). Part (ii)
suggests that an agent with a lower innate cost is more efficient, while an agent with a
larger innate cost is less efficient. Part (iii) implies that the optimal effort under the CR
contract is always zero. This is because under the CR contract, a firm is only reimbursed
c = H(·) and H(θ) > H(θ − et) for any et > 0, the optimal choice for the firm is to
exert no effort. Therefore, its cost function reduces to c = H(θ) with the corresponding
profit of firms being zero. Thus we focus mainly on the analysis of the CS contracts below
whenever effort is involved.
Without loss of generality, in this paper we analyze a linear payment schedule, which
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is widely studied in the literature (e.g., [14]),
pt = p0 + κct, κ ∈ [0, 1]. (3.3)
Such a linear cost sharing (LCS) contract specifies a lump-sum payment p0 and a single
fraction κ ∈ [0, 1] of realized cost for which the agent would be reimbursed. A special case
of LCS contracts is the fixed-price (FP) contract in which the agent is paid a fixed-price p0
whenever the principal specifies κ = 0 in equation (3.3). These FP contracts have not only
attracted attention from theoerists (e.g., [1]; [14]; and [28]), they are also commmonly
used in practice (e.g. [19]; and [17]). To accommodate our empirical application, we will
discuss the theoretical properties and nonparametric identification for FPCR contracts (the
principal provides a FP or CR contracts for an agent to choose from).
To begin with, we first consider the commitment setting as a baseline model. As is
well known, commitment prevents both parties from renegotiating and thereby promotes
efficient outcomes ex ante. As proved in [24], the equilibrium outcome under commitment
is just the twice-repeated version of that in one-period (static) settings. Hence, we will
focus on the analysis for the one-period contract and omit the period subscript t below.
3.2.1 Commitment
First, we consider the firm’s problem. A firm with innate cost θ who chooses the
FP contract maximizes its one-period profit by exerting the optimal effort e∗, which is
determined by the first-order condition3
H ′(θ − e∗(θ)) = ψ′(e∗(θ)), (3.4)
3Following [2] we assume that there exists a unique optimal effort for each innate cost.
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that is, at the optimal level of effort the marginal benefit of exerting effort equals its
marginal disutility. Moreover, the derivative of (3.4) with respect to θ on both sides leads
to ψ′′(e∗(θ))e∗′(θ) = H ′′(θ− e∗(θ))(1− e∗′(θ)), which implies that 0 < e∗′(θ) < 1 for all
types θ who choose the FP contract under Assumption 2.
By incentive compatibility, if one type prefers a fixed-price contract, so do the more
efficient types. This can be justified by the fact that dU/dθ = −H ′(θ − e∗(θ)) < 0.
Accordingly, the support of firms’ innate cost θ can be divided into two segments: more
efficient agents choose the FP contract and less inefficient ones prefer the CR contract.
Suppose the fixed price designed by the principal is bC , the unique cut-off type θ∗ is just
indifferent between the two contracts such that
bC = H(θ∗ − e∗(θ∗)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗)).
We next analyze the principal’s problem. The goal of the principal is to maximize the
expected social welfare by setting the unique best fixed price bC
bC ≡ argmax
b∈R+
Eθ[SW (θ, b)], (3.5)
where
Eθ[SW (θ, b)] = S − (1 + λ)
(
bF (θ∗(b)) +
∫ θ¯
θ∗(b)
H(θ)dF (θ)
)
+α
∫ θ∗(b)
θ
[b−H(θ − e∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ))]dF (θ),
with the first-order condition
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
=
H(θ∗)− bC
H ′(θ∗ − e∗(θ∗)) .
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The following proposition summarizes the optimal outcome of a two-period contract model
under commitment.
Proposition 1. In the economic environment under commitment, under Assumption 2, the
two-period optimal fixed-prices (bC1 , b
C
2 ) satisfy b
C
1 = b
C
2 ≡ bC with the corresponding
cut-off type θ∗ such that
bC = H(θ∗ − e∗(θ∗)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗)), (3.6)(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
=
H(θ∗)− bC
H ′(θ∗ − e∗(θ∗)) . (3.7)
In both periods more efficient firms (θ ≤ θ∗) choose the same FP contract, while less
efficient firms (θ > θ∗) operate under CR contracts. The optimal effort e∗(θ) associated
with the FP contract satisfies 0 < e∗
′
(θ) < 1.
The property 0 < e∗′(θ) < 1 implies that less efficient firms will exert more effort. This
is in contrast to the constant optimal effort e∗ for any type θ in most of the existing studies
on the FPCR menu. Intuitively, an identity cost function implies that the marginal benefit
of effort is the same for firms with different innate costs. Therefore, a firm, no matter what
its innate cost is, has no incentive to exert more effort than others. Nevertheless, when
H(·) is non-identity, say convex, a firm with a higher innate cost enjoys a larger reduction
of cost than a lower-innate cost firm by exerting the same effort. Indeed, our empirical
evidence lends support to the convexity of cost function.
3.2.2 Renegotiation
Unlike in the contracts under commitment, the revelation principal fails under renego-
tiation due to the fact that after private information is revealed at the end of the first period,
as in [29], the principal can offer a new contract by renegotiation which may ex-post ben-
efit both parties. To analyze the equilibrium of dynamic contracts under renegotiation, we
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resort to the renegotiation-proof principal by following the related literature.4
As opposed to the two-period dynamic contracts under commitment where the optimal
choices of contracts are either (bC , bC) (FP contracts with the same payment bC in both
periods) or (H(θ), H(θ)) (CR contracts with the same payment H(θ) in both periods), an
optimal choice of contracts under the renegotiation case may involve an additional option,
i.e., a CR contract in the first period followed by a FP contract in the second period. That is,
the agent may renegotiate to change the choice of contract made at the beginning of the first
period. Taking into account the possibility of renegotiation, the principal provides three
options for the firms: A two-period FP contract CR1 ≡ (bR1 , bR2 ), denoted by FF contract,
a first-period CR contract followed by a second-period FP contract CR2 ≡ (H(θ), bR3 ), de-
noted by CF contract, and a two-period CR contract CR3 ≡ (H(θ), H(θ)), denoted by CC
contract, where bRj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the optimal fixed price in the corresponding options,
andH(θ) indicates the CR contract.5 By using the renegotiation-proof principal, we obtain
the following proposition that characterizes the equilibrium outcome of the renegotiation-
proof menu of contracts CR ≡ (bR1 , bR2 , bR3 ).
Proposition 2. In the economic environment under renegotiation, under Assumption 2,
the optimal renegotiation-proof menu of two-period contracts CR = (bR1 , b
R
2 , b
R
3 ) satisfy
bR1 = b
R
2 ≡ bR and bR3 ≡ b¯R with two cut-off types (θ∗1, θ∗2) such that θ∗1 < θ∗2 and
b¯R = H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)) + ψ(e(θ∗2)), (3.8)
bR = r[H(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗1))] + (1− r)b¯R, (3.9)
4Renegotiation-proof principal: if a contract is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which renegotiation oc-
curs in equilibrium, then there exists a renegotiation-proof contract that achieves the same outcome. In other
words, any long-term agreement which is renegotiatable could be replaced by another long-term contract
with a second-period continuation equal to the renegotiated offer.
5The choice consisting of a first-period FP fixed price contract followed by a second-period CR contract
is never optimal for a firm. This is because the profit from a FP contract is strictly positive almost surely
while the profit with CR contracts is always zero.
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(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F (θ∗2)− F (θ∗1)
f(θ∗2)
=
H(θ∗2)− b¯R
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
. (3.10)
The most efficient types within the lower subinterval [θ, θ∗1] choose C
R
1 ; the intermediate
efficient ones within the intermediate subinterval (θ∗1, θ
∗
2] chooseC
R
2 ; and the least efficient
ones within the larger subinterval (θ∗2, θ¯] choose C
R
3 . In particular, the optimal effort e
∗(θ)
associated with the FP contract satisfies 0 < e∗
′
(θ) < 1 in each period.
Most of the equilibrium outcomes under renegotiation are analogous to that under
commitment, e.g., type-dependent effort. In particular, under renegotiation CR1 is more
powered-incentive thanCR2 due to the fact thatC
R
2 includes only one-period effort-incentive
FP contract. Moreover, b¯R has the identical functional form as bC , and bR is a weighted
sum of a real fixed price b¯R and a seeming “fixed price" H(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗1)) with
weights 1 − r and r, respectively. Combining the facts that H ′(θ − e∗(θ))(1 − e∗(θ)) +
ψ′(e∗(θ))e∗
′
(θ) > 0, r > 0, and θ∗2 > θ
∗
1, we obtain b¯
R > bR, which extends a similar rela-
tionship in [18] to our general model. The intuition behind bR < b¯R can be ascribed to the
fact that fixed prices must be raised sufficiently to induce those intermediate efficient firms
with the initial choice of CR contracts to switch to FP contracts when the information on
the agent’s innate cost is revealed after the first period, whereas most efficient firms would
choose FP contracts at the beginning even they are paid a relatively low fixed price bR in
both periods.
3.3 Nonparametric Identification
This section presents the identification of the model primitives under renegotiation,
and the insight of identification naturally carries over to the commitment setting. Here-
after in the paper, we use capital and small letters to indicate random variables and their
realizations, respectively except for θ to follow the convention in the literature.
The data report realized cost C ∈ [c, c¯], two fixed prices (BR, BR), and two binary
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choices D1, D2 indicating the choice of FF or CF contract, respectively. Consequently the
binary variable 1−D1−D2 indicates the choice to CC contracts. The fact that the realized
costs are associated with different contracts allows us to divide the support [c, c¯] into two
subintervals [c, cH ] and [cL, c¯] with cL ≤ cH . The two subintervals cover the costs of firms
who choose FP contracts either in FF contracts for two periods or in CF contracts for the
second period, and who choose CR contracts either in CC contracts for two periods or in
CF contracts for the first period, respectively. Specifically, the model in Section 2 implies6
c = H(θ − e∗(θ)), cL = H(θ∗1), cH = H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)), c¯ = H(θ¯).
We also observe a vector of exogenous variables Y ≡ (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yd) ∈ Rd that charac-
terize the principal, firms, and/or contract. For example, in our empirical application of
transport procurement contracts, Y can be local government’s political preference, firms’
number of employee, and the size of the transport lines, etc. All the model primitives may
depend on Y or its subvector. For a given Y = y, our model primitives can be summa-
rized as the innate cost distribution F (·|y), the cost functionH(·, y), the disutility function
ψ(·, y), the weight a principal puts on firms’ profit α(y), the principal’s cost of public
funds λ(y), and the intertemporal weight of firms r = 1/(1 + δ), which is independent of
Y . Since our identification argument will be conditional on Y = y, we suppress y when-
ever there is no ambiguity and denote our model structure as S ≡ [F (·), H(·), ψ(·), α, r],
where λ is not included for reasons that will become clear. We maintain that the observed
data are generated from the model primitives S and the equilibrium conditions presented
in the preceding section are satisfied .
We first note that the parameters α and λ cannot be separately identified. The intuition
lies in that only the ratio α/(1 + λ) matters directly for the optimal FPCR menu designed
6The condition cL ≤ cH , or equivalently θ∗1 ≤ θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2) is directly testable from observed costs in the
data.
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by the principal (r.f. (3.7) and (3.10)).7 Next, we show that at best we can identify the
model up to scale of the innate cost θ. Intuitively, the fact that both the cost function H(·)
and innate costs θ are unknown suggests that a transformation of H(·) of θ may lead to
the same observed data. The lemma as follows justifies this conjecture by showing that an
alternative model structure S˜ ≡ [F˜ , H˜, ψ˜, α, r] where F˜ (·) = F (·/ξ1), H˜(·) = H(·/ξ1),
and ψ˜(·) = ψ(·/ξ1) for some positive scalar ξ1 is observationally equivalent to the structure
S in the sense that they both lead to the same joint distribution of (C,BR, BR, D1, D2).
Lemma 3. (Observational Equivalence) Suppose two structures S ≡ [F,H, ψ, α, r] and
S˜ ≡ [F˜ , H˜, ψ˜, α, r] both satisfy Assumption 2, then S and S˜ are observationally equivalent.
The proof of Lemma 3 is in the Appendix. Intuitively, the observational equivalence
arises from the fact that both the cost function H(·) and it argument (type) θ are unob-
servables. A linear transformation of the original type θ into a new type θ˜ = ξ1θ for some
nonzero parameter ξ1 together with an appropriate transformation of H(·) leads to the
same realized cost. Analogously, we may adjust other model primitives correspondingly
to rationalize other observables (BR, B
R
, D1, D2). This lemma suggests that we need to
impose at least some normalization of the type in order to identify the model. In what
follows, we normalize the lower bound of the type θ = θ0, which is formally stated in
Assumption 4 below. From now on, we denote the support of θ by [θ0, θ¯], which is di-
vided into three subintervals [θ0, θ∗1], [θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2] and [θ
∗
2, θ¯], where firms with type in the first
two subintervals choose FF and CF contracts, respectively, whereas the ones in the last
subinterval choose CC contracts.8
7The separate identification of α and λ maybe impossible even under stronger parametric restrictions,
e.g., [18].
8Note that both the location and scale need to be normalized for the type θ in the analysis of a static
monopoly contract model by [3], while in our model only a scale normalization is necessary. This discrep-
ancy is due to the fact that our contract model is essentially different from theirs in the sense that the FPCR
menu includes two types of contracts and the variation of firms’ choices provides additional information for
identification of their type θ.
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3.3.1 Identification of Optimal Effort
The first challenge of identification concerns the unobserved optimal effort and the
existing identifying strategies of contract theory, such as [3], do not apply to our model.
Specifically, the identification of static monopoly contract model in [3] also involves the
unobserved effort. Nevertheless, in addition to the observed cost more observables (i.e.,
output and price) are available for identification. By contrast, the directly related data in
our model only consist of one observed continuous random cost variable and two binary
choice variables. Acknowledging this difficulty, we adopt a newly developed method in
measurement error, i.e., [20] to back out the distribution of the optimal effort nonparamet-
rically.
Assumption 3. There exists a subvector of Y , denoted by (Y1, Y2) without loss of gener-
ality, that is related to the optimal effort E∗:
Y1 = E
∗ + V1,
Y2 = m(E
∗) + V2,
wherem(·) is an unknown function and (E∗, V1, V2) are mutually independent with EV1 =
EV2 = 0.
In the assumption above, the observable Y1 can be understood as a normalization of
the unobserved effort level and Y2 can be chosen very flexibly since m(·) can be a very
general function. This assumption is much less restrictive than the existence of double
measurements of a latent variable required in the identification of many structural models,
e.g., in [30], where m(·) has to be an identity function. The optimal effort or “hidden
action" in contract theory is generally unverifiable, but firms’ effort-related performance is
oftentimes measurable which can be further used as measurements for the optimal effort.
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For example, [31] discusses the plausibility of employing cost-related variables to infer
firms’ effort. In general, the multi-dimensional measurement of firms’ R&D would be a
good example of Y1 and Y2.
Lemma 4. (Schennach and Hu, 2013) Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then under some
regularity conditions, both m(·) and the distribution of E∗, FE(·) are nonparametrically
identified from the joint distribution of Y1 and Y2.
Theorem 1 in [20] proves that m(·) and FE(·) are both nonparametrically identified
from the joint distribution of Y1 and Y2 if (1) m(·) is not a linear function, or (2) m(·) is
linear but E∗ is not normally distributed. In addition to Assumption 3, several additional
regularity conditions are required for the identification. Nevertheless these conditions im-
pose no further restrictions to our model. The main idea of the identifying strategy is to
investigate the higher-order moments (characteristic functions) for the joint distribution of
Y1 and Y2, which provides sufficient information to secure identification of the function
m(·) and distribution FE(·). We omit the proof of this lemma and refer the interested
readers to [20] for details.
Recall that the optimal effort is increasing in firms’ innate cost 0 < e∗′(θ) < 1 for
any θ ∈ [θ0, θ∗2]. The inverse function theorem implies that the innate cost is a strictly
increasing function of the optimal effort with θ′(e∗) > 1. Consequently, the argument
θ − e∗(θ) in H(·) is strictly increasing in the optimal effort e∗ since d(θ − e∗)/dθ =
1 − e∗′(θ) > 0. With a slight abuse of notation, let L(e∗) ≡ θ(e∗) − e∗ and then the
observed cost for firms who choose FF or CF contracts, c = H(θ(e∗)−e∗) can be rewritten
as
c = H(L(e∗)) ≡ L˜(e∗), (3.11)
with L˜′(·) = H ′(·)L′(·) > 0. A direct implication of this result is the existence of a one-to-
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one mapping between the cost and the optimal effort. Therefore, we obtain the following
important structural link:
FC(c) = Pr(L˜(e
∗) ≤ c) = Pr(e∗ ≤ L˜−1(c)) = FE(L˜−1(c)) = FE(e∗), (3.12)
where FC(·) is the cumulative distribution function of cost C. This relationship together
with the identified distribution function of effort FE(·) enables us to obtain the pseudo
optimal effort for any corresponding observed cost c,
e∗ =

F−1E (FC(c)), if c ∈ [c, cH ],
0, if c ∈ (cL, c¯],
(3.13)
where we utilize all the fixed-price contracts in the identification above, including fixed-
price contracts for both periods in FF contracts and fixed-price contracts for the second
period in CF contracts.
3.3.2 Identification of Cost Function
In this step of identification, we recover the cost function by using an exclusion restric-
tion. First, we assume that the vector of characteristics Y = (Z,W ) ⊂ (Rd1 ,Rd2), d =
d1 + d2, where Z are variables that could be correlated with firms’ type θ (of course affect
firm’s effort, too) and other variables W do not affect θ but enter the disutility function
directly, thus influencing the effort and cost of firms who choose FP contracts. By con-
struction, the vector of measurement for effort (Y1, Y2) could be in Z. To emphasize the
difference between Z and W , we include W in those model primitives whenever neces-
sary while still suppressing Z provided there is no ambiguity. Without loss of generality
(wlog), we assume d2 = 1, i.e., W is a scalar.
Assumption 4. Assume that (i) There exists a variable W such that F (θ|W ) = F (θ),
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whereas W affects disutility function ψ(·,W ). (ii) The cross derivative of ψ satisfies
ψ12(e
∗(θ0,W ),W ) = 0 and ψ12(e∗(θ,W ),W ) < 0, for any θ ∈ (θ0, θ∗2].
Part (i) requires the existence of an exclusive variable, that is, the distribution of the
innate cost does not rely on the variable W (as will be shown W can be continuous or
discrete given it takes at least two values), but the disutility function does, which cap-
tures the heterogeneity of the disutility across firms when cost-reducing effort is exerted
though firms may be similar in their managerial ability (type). As a result, the optimal
effort would rely on W and hence the firm’s “productivity" θ − e varies with W . In our
empirical application of French public transport contracts, a suitable choice of W can be
a dummy indicating whether a firm is publicly or privately owned: the ex ante managerial
ability of both types of firms does not depend on the ownership. However, the disutility
of exerting cost-reducing effort might be higher in a publicly owned firm because work-
ing extra hours in such a firm may get paid higher due to regulations of labor union, etc.
The first requirement of Part (ii) presents a normalization condition. It implies that the
marginal disutility of effort at the lower bound of innate cost is constant across W . The
second requirement of Part (ii) is standard in the theoretical literature on contracts, e.g., in
[32] the marginal disutility of effort is assumed to be strictly decreasing with W .
The approach of exclusion restriction has been widely used in identifying structural
models. For example, [33] use such an approach to nonparametrically identify first-price
auctions with risk-averse bidders. In actuality, the existence of such an exclusive variable
W may be empirically testable in our model using the result in the lemma below. Wlog,
suppose our sample of contracts is classified into two subsamples based on two different
realizations w1 and w2 of W with w2 > w1. Let FCj(·) be the distribution of the realized
cost C in the subsample j corresponding to wj, j = 1, 2. Then we have the following
results regarding the relationship between FC1(·) and FC2(·).
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Lemma 5. Suppose Assumptions 2-4. Then the distribution FC1(·) strictly first-order
stochastically dominates FC2(·). That is, FC1(c) < FC2(c) for all c ∈ (c, cH,1], where
cH,1 ≡ H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2, w1)) is the cost of the least efficient firm with W = w1 who
chooses FF or CF contracts. In addition, cH,1 > cH,2 ≡ H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2, w2)), c1 ≡
H(θ − e∗(θ, w1)) = H(θ − e∗(θ, w2)) ≡ c2 = c.
The proof of this lemma is incorporated in the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix.
Lemma 5 provides a link between the observed costs of the two subsamples conditional
on two different realizations of the exclusive variable W . The link is especially useful be-
cause the stochastic dominance of cost distributions indicates the existence of relationship
between the two underlying values of W after controlling for other characteristics.
We now turn to the nonparametric identification of H(·). The main idea is to employ
the exclusion restriction to exploit variations of the quantiles for the cost when W changes
while the corresponding quantiles of the innate cost distribution are unchanged. Recall
that the observed cost C = H(θ − e∗(θ,W )) for θ ∈ [θ0, θ∗2], thus we have
θ = e∗(θ,W ) +H−1(C). (3.14)
Let us further suppressW whenever there is no ambiguity. The equation above implies that
for any τ ∈ [0, 1], we have θ(τ) = e∗(θ(τ),W )+H−1(C(τ)), where θ(τ) denotes the τ -th
quantile of type distribution F (·), C(τ) denotes the τ -th quantile of cost distribution FC(·).
For W = wj, j = 1, 2, let ej(τ) ≡ e∗(θ(τ), wj) and Cj(τ) be the τ -th quantile of FC(·)
corresponding to wj . The exclusion restriction condition implies the key compatibility
condition
θ(τ) = e1(τ) +H
−1(C1(τ)) = e2(τ) +H−1(C2(τ)). (3.15)
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Rearranging terms leads to
H−1(C1(τ)) = H−1(C2(τ)) + e2(τ)− e1(τ) = H−1(C2(τ)) + ∆e(τ),
where ∆e(τ) ≡ e2(τ) − e1(τ). By iterating these ∆e(·) for a monotone sequence of τ ,
we can identify H(·) on the support [θ0 − e, θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2, w1)], where e ≡ e1(θ0, w1) =
e2(θ0, w2). Specifically, H(θ0 − e) = c, and H−1(x) = θ0 − e +
∑∞
t=0 ∆e(τt) for any
x ∈ (c, cH,1], where the unique sequence {τt}∞t=0 is constructed as follows. Due to the
the continuity and the strictly increase of cost function, there exists a unique τ0 ∈ (0, 1]
such that C1(τ0) = x. Since x = C1(τ0) > C2(τ0) > c, similarly there exists a unique
τ1 ∈ (0, τ0) such that C1(τ1) = C2(τ0). Continuing such a construction gives rise to a
unique sequence {τt}∞t=0 such that it is strictly decreasing with 0 < τt ≤ 1 and satisfies the
nonlinear recursive relation C1(τt+1) = C2(τt) with the initial condition C1(τ0) = x.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumptions 2-4 hold. Then the cost function H(·) is identified
on [θ0 − e, θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2,W1)].
This proposition constitutes the first effort to provide a positive identification result of
cost function H(·) in a dynamic cost-based contract model. By contrast, [5] show that the
cost function H(·) in a static monopoly contract model can not be identified. Our positive
result is due to (i) the innovative result on identification of effort’s distribution FE(·) and
(ii) then existence of an exclusion restriction.
3.3.3 Identification of Type Distribution and Other Parameters
Having identified the cost function H(·) on [θ0 − e, θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2,W1)] by using all the
fixed-price contracts, we now present the identification of innate cost distribution F (·),
the ratio α/(1 +λ), the disutility function ψ(·) and firms’ discount factor δ or equivalently
their intertemporal weight r with r = 1/(1 + δ).
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The first step is to recover the pseudo-innate cost from its relationship with realized
costs C. The basic idea is to construct a one-to-one mapping between θ and C by us-
ing C = H(θ − e∗(θ)), where H(·) is identified and e∗ can be recovered for any given
c ∈ [c, cH ] from (3.13). Recall that both FF and CF contracts are considered in the iden-
tification of H(·), the corresponding innate costs are on [θ0, θ∗2]. For all firms with innate
costs in this interval, we combine (3.12) with (3.14) to get the pseudo-innate cost θ for the
corresponding realized cost c,
θ = H−1(c) + e∗ = H−1(c) + F−1E (FC(c)), c ∈ [c, cH ], (3.16)
where we dropped the variable W for ease of notation. Using the identified pseudo innate
cost θ above, it is readily to recover a distribution G(·) and density function g(·) of θ on
the interval [θ0, θ∗2]. Such an approach of identification has been widely used to identify
structural models, e.g., in [34] the distribution of bidders’ valuations are recovered from
observed bids using a similar method. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that g(·) and
G(·) are not the density function and CDF of firms’ innate costs on [θ0, θ∗2] yet, instead we
have the following relationship between g(·) and f(·),
g(θ) ≡ f(θ|θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗2) =
f(θ)
F (θ∗2)
,∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ∗2], (3.17)
where F (θ∗2) = Pr(θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗2) is just the probability that a firm chooses FF or CF
contracts. Therefore, F (θ∗2) = E(D1 +D2), where D1 is defined as a binary variable indi-
cating whether FF is chosen, andD2 is defined similarly for CF contracts. The distribution
of innate costs on the support [θ0, θ∗2] can be recovered as
f(θ) = g(θ)E(D1 +D2), F (θ) = G(θ)E(D1 +D2);∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ∗2]. (3.18)
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Next we focus on identifying the ratio α/(1 + λ) which describes the relative weight the
principal puts on firms’ profit and social cost. Since the principal’s optimization problem
involves both firms who choose fixed-price contracts and those choose cost-reimbursement
ones, identification of the ratio requires information from all firms. We utilize the first-
order-condition of the principal’s problem (3.10) for identification. Note that H ′(θ∗2 −
e∗(θ∗2)), F (θ
∗
2) and f(θ
∗
2) on the right-hand-side are identified,
9 it remains to to recover
F (θ∗1) and H(θ
∗
2). First off, F (θ
∗
1) = Pr(θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ∗1) is just the probability that a firm
chooses FF contracts, thus F (θ∗1) = ED1. Our analysis of the theoretical model in Section
2 shows that a firm with innate cost θ∗2 is indifferent between FP and CR contracts because
both choices lead to zero profit.
b¯R −
(
H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)) + ψ(e(θ∗2))
)
= mc−H(θ∗2) = 0, (3.19)
where mc denotes the payment (realized cost) to the firm with innate cost θ∗2 and it is the
lower bound of the realized costs for all firms who choose CC contracts since their innate
costs are on [θ∗2, θ¯] and H
′(·) > 0. Combining all the pieces above, we are able to identify
the ratio α/(1 + λ).
α
1 + λ
= 1− mc− b¯
R
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
f(θ∗2)
ED2
. (3.20)
Now we turn to the identification of the disutility function of effort ψ(·). Recall that we
recovered the optimal effort as a function of realized costs in (3.13) for those costs in
[c, cH ], i.e.,
e∗ = F−1E (FC(c)), c ∈ [c, cH ].
9Due to the continuity of H(·), the derivative of H ′(·) at the end point θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2) can be identified as
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)) = lim
→0−
H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2) + )−H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))

.
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By combining this relationship with (3.16), we obtain a one-to-one mapping between the
optimal effort e∗ and firms’ type θ, e∗ = e∗(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ∗2]. This mapping enables us
to identify the derivative of disutility function ψ′(·) from the first-order-condition of firms
who exert optimal effort, i.e., ψ′(e∗(θ)) = H ′(θ − e∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ∗2]. An initial
condition for this differential equation can be obtained using the first-order-condition (3.8),
i.e.,
ψ(e)|e=e∗(θ∗2) = b¯
R −H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)).
Thus the solution of ψ(·) is
ψ(e) = b¯R −H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))−
∫ e∗(θ∗2)
e
H ′(e∗−1(v)− v)dv, e ∈ [e, e∗(θ∗2)], (3.21)
The last step is to identify firms’ discount factor δ from (3.9),
δ =
bR −H(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1))− ψ(e∗(θ∗1))
b¯R − bR , (3.22)
where θ∗1 is identified as θ
∗
1 = F
−1(ED1). The discount factor is a crucial objective
to study agents’ behavior and consequently conduct counterfactual or policy analyses.
Nevertheless, a static or multi-period contract model with commitment does not allow us
to recover δ. This can be clearly seen from (3.6) and (3.7) where agents’ intertemporal
behavior does not present. Actually, the discount factor oftentimes can not be identified in
dynamic models. For example, [35] show that decision makers’ discount factor in dynamic
discrete choice models can not be identified.
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumptions 2-4 hold. Then the principal’s relative ratio α/(1 + λ)
and firms’ discount factor δ are identified. The distribution of firms’ innate cost F (·),
disutility function ψ(·) and cost function H(·) are nonparametrically identified on [θ0, θ∗2],
[e∗(θ0), e∗(θ∗2)] and [θ0 − e∗(θ0), θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)], respectively.
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Theorem 3 shows that the two-period FPCR model is nonparametrically identified for
firms who exert effort at least in one period. The results can be readily applied to LCSCR
contracts where the fixed-price contract is replaced by the linear cost-sharing contract.
This is intuitive because LCS contracts provide additional variation of payments (pt =
p0 +κct) by comparing with FP contracts where the payment is a constant and independent
of cost. In practice of procurement, a principal may only offer fixed-price contracts. In
this case, our identification result applies directly, too. This is because our identification
mainly relies on firms’ incentives (effort), and excluding cost-reimbursement contracts
does not affect our main argument of identification.
Now we consider the identification of CC contracts. Notice that the distribution of
innate costs and cost function for firms who choose CC contracts are not identified in
Theorem 3. This is because for firms who choose CR contracts in both periods, the only
relation implied by the model is c = H(θ) where c is observed but both H(·) and θ are
unknown. Furthermore, by nature of the FPCR contract, the firms’ type is independent and
so do their choices. Thus the model implications for FP contracts do not help us identify
type distribution and cost function for CR contracts.
We show identification of the cost function H(·) on (θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2), θ¯] and distribution of
innate cost F (·) on (θ∗2, θ¯] through imposing additional restrictions to the model. One of
the choices for the restrictions is to parametrize the cost function H(·) while keeping F (·)
and ψ(·) nonparametric. Specifically, we assume H(·) is known up to a finite dimensional
parameter %0 ∈ RL, L ≥ 1, denoted by H(·; %0) on its support. Under this parametric
assumption, we modify the identification argument of Proposition 3 slightly to recover
%0. We pick a sequence of quantiles τk ∈ (0, 1], k = 1, 2, · · · , K,K ≥ L to construct a
nonlinear system
H−1(C1(τk); %0)−H−1(C2(τk); %0)−∆e(τk) = 0, k = 1, 2, · · · , K, (3.23)
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with further restrictions on the parameter H ′(·; %0) > 0, H ′′(·; %0) > 0. Theorem 7 in
[?] provides sufficient conditions under which global identification of %0 can be acheived.
We skip the details and summarize the identification results in the following corollary by
assuming %0 is globally identified.
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and %0 is globally identified. Then the princi-
pal’s relative ratio α/(1 + λ) and firms’ discount factor δ are identified. The distribution
of firms’ innate cost F (·) and disutility function ψ(·) are nonparametrically identified on
[θ0, θ¯] and [e∗(θ0), e∗(θ∗2)], respectively.
An alternative method to identify the full model is to parameterize only the distribution
of firms’ innate costs as F (·; ζ0). In this case, we follow the identification argument in
Theorem 3 and the parameter ζ0 would be identified after we recover the pseudo innate
costs θ using (3.16). To identify the cost function H(·) on (θ∗2− e∗(θ∗2), θ¯], we consider the
realized costs for firms who choose CR contracts at least for one-period, i.e., cL < c < c¯,
FC(c|cL < c < c¯) = Pr(H(θ) < c|cL < c < c¯) = Pr(θ < H−1(c) | θ∗1 < θ < θ¯)
= F (H−1(c); ζ0 | θ∗1 < θ < θ¯)
=
F (H−1(c); ζ0)
1− F (θ∗1, ζ0)
. (3.24)
Considering that H(·) is strictly increasing, the equation above allows us to identify H(θ)
on (θ∗1, θ¯].
Note that the identification arguments in both Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 can be readily
applied to FPCR contracts under commitment. Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier the
discount factor r can not be identified.
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3.3.4 Discussion on Estimation
The identification procedure of Theorem 1 is constructive and one may estimate the
model following the identification steps. Nevertheless, a fully nonparametric estimating
strategy is known to be data-demanding and thus could be of less interest in empirical
studies.10 Instead, we exploit the identification results of Corollary 1 to propose a semi-
parametric procedure to estimate the model primitives in several steps, and leave the com-
prehensive analysis of asymptotic properties of estimators for future research.
Suppose our sample contains n contracts and nf of them are FF and CF, the remaining
nc contracts are CC. We observe firms’ realized costs ci, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, two measure-
ments of effort y1,i and y2,i, i = 1, 2, · · · , nf , two fixed-prices b¯R and bR, and the exclusion
variable W taking values of w1 and w2. Among the nf contracts, n1 and n2 of them have
W = w1 and W = w2, respectively.
First, we adopt a sieve maximum likelihood estimator proposed in [?] to estimate the
density function of the optimal effort:
(fˆE, fˆv1 , fˆv2 , mˆ) = argmax sup
(fE ,fv1 ,fv2 ,m)
1
nf
nf∑
i=1
ln
∫
fv1(y1,i − v)fv2(y2,i −m(v))fE(v)dv,
(3.25)
where the max and sup are taken over suitably restricted sets of functions; fv1(·), fv2(·),
and fE(·), respectively, denote the densities of error terms v1, v2 and optimal effort e∗. The
optimization is subject to some restrictions which consist of constraints that the densities
integrate to one and zero-mean constraints on the error densities fv1(·) and fv2(·). All
four unknown functions m(·), fv1(·), fv2(·), and fE(·) are chosen in an appropriate sieve
space constructed by truncated series such as Hermite orthogonal series with the number
of terms in the series increasing with the sample size.
10The essential step of the nonparametric estimation is to estimate the cost function H(·) nonparametri-
cally. This can be done by following the procedure proposed in [33].
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With the estimate of fE(e∗), one can obtain the estimate of FE(e∗) by integral
F̂E(e
∗) =
∫ e∗
e
f̂E(u)du.
Then we estimate the corresponding optimal effort for all c ∈ [c, cH ] by
ê∗i = argmin
e∈R+
∣∣∣F̂E(e)− F̂C(ci)∣∣∣, (3.26)
where F̂C(·) is the empirical CDF of cost C. Applying the procedure above conditional
on W = w1 and W = w2, we obtain F̂E(·|wj), j = 1, 2 and shorten them as F̂E,1 and
F̂E,2. The corresponding pseudo efforts are denoted ê∗i,1, i = 1, 2, · · · , n1 and ê∗i,2, i =
1, 2, · · · , n2. Analogously, we obtain F̂C1(·) and F̂C2(·) and denote the realized costs in
the two subsamples as ci,1 and ci,2.
Next, we discuss how to estimate the parameter %0 following the identification argu-
ment in Section 3.2. Deviating slightly from the identification, we parametrize H−1(·) as
H−1(·; %0) for the purpose of exposition. For the first subsample with W = w1, we con-
struct n1 quantiles {τi,1}, i = 1, 2, · · · , n1 using the realized costs ci,1: τi,1 = F̂C1(ci,1).
The corresponding sequence of effort ê∗i,1 is obtained from ci,1 by using (3.26) for i =
1, 2, · · · , n1. By plugging these quantiles to F̂E,2, we obtain a sequence of pseudo effort
{e˜∗i,2} such that τi,1 = F̂E,2(e˜∗i,2), , i = 1, 2, · · · , n1. Next, we proceed to construct n1 cor-
responding costs c˜i,2 for the second subsample such that τi,1 = F̂C2(c˜i,2). We use e˜
∗
i,2 and
c˜i,2 to emphasize that they are not necessarily in the sample. The identification argument
provides the following nonlinear equations
H−1(ci,1; %0)−H−1(c˜i,2; %0) = e˜∗i,2 − ê∗i,1. (3.27)
Analogously, we start from the second subsample to construct {τi,2}, {ê∗i,2}, {e˜∗i,1} and
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{c˜i,1}, i = 1, 2, · · · , n2. Consequently we have n2 more equations similar to (3.27). The
parameter %0 is estimated using a nonlinear least square estimator:
%̂0 = argmin
%0∈RL
{
1
n1
n1∑
i=1
(
H−1(ci,1; %0)−H−1(c˜i,2; %0)− e˜∗i,2 + ê∗i,1
)2
+
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
(
H−1(c˜i,1; %0)−H−1(ci,2; %0)− ê∗i,2 + e˜∗i,1
)2}
. (3.28)
It follows that θ̂i = H−1(ci; %̂0) + ê∗i for FF and CF contracts, and that θ̂i = H
−1(ci; %̂0)
for CC contracts. Using the estimates {θ̂i}ni=1, we can get a kernel estimator of f(·) and
an empirical estimator of F (·), denoted by f̂(·) and F̂ (·), respectively.
To estimate the parameters α/(1 + λ) and r, it is necessary to estimate the boundary
points θ∗1 and θ
∗
2. We exemplify the estimation using θ
∗
2 where all the firms with innate
costs θ < θ∗2 choose FP contract at least in one period. Thus the probability Pr(θ <
θ∗2) = F (θ
∗
2) can be approximated by the ratio nf/n and this implies the estimator θ̂
∗
2 =
arg minθ
∣∣F̂ (θ) − nf/n∣∣. The point θ̂∗1 can be analogously estimated. Using a minimum
distance estimator, we obtain the estimates for α/(1 +λ) and the weight r by plugging the
estimates above into (3.10) and (3.9), respectively.
Lastly, we can estimate ψ(·) by the first-order condition H ′(θ − e∗; %0) = ψ′(e∗).
Due to the nonparametric relationship between the optimal effort and type, we need to
approximate the integral of H ′(·; %̂0) over a continuous interval by summation over a fi-
nite sequence of grids for the interval. To be specific, for any e ∈ [e, ̂¯e], where ̂¯e ≡
ê∗(θˆ∗2), we split the interval [e, ̂¯e] into k > 1 (k can vary with e) subintervals evenly
[e, e1], [e1, e2], · · · , [ek−1, ek] with ek = ̂¯e. For each j = 1, · · · , k, one obtains the corre-
sponding estimate of cj by ĉj = arg minc∈R+ |F̂E(ej)−F̂C(c)| as well as the corresponding
estimate of θj by θ̂j = H−1(ĉj; %̂0) + ej . Based on the identification result (3.21), we can
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estimate ψ(e) as
ψ̂(e) = b¯R − ĉm −
̂¯e− e
k
k∑
j=1
H ′(θ̂j − ej; %̂0), (3.29)
where ĉm = maxi=1,2,··· ,nf{ci} is an estimator of H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)) and H ′(H−1(·), %ˆ0) =
1/H−1′(·; %ˆ0).
3.4 Empirical Application
In this section we apply our method to analyze transport procurement contracts in
France. As in the theoretical model, the local authority (the principal) provides FP and
CR contracts to procure public transport service from firms (agents). Regulatory rules
require that these contracts must be renegotiated every five years between the two parties.
Thus the dataset is particularly suitable for our model. [18] use the same source of data to
analyze the dynamic FPCR contracts and conduct a welfare comparison between contracts
under commitment and renegotiation. In addition to different estimation strategies, our
application is also different from [18] in that we allow both agents’ cost function and
disutility function to be nonlinear while their cost function is simplified as an identity
function and consequently disutility is constant across innate costs. Our empirical findings
show that the nonlinearity of agents’ cost function is crucial to the welfare analysis of
FPCR contracts.
3.4.1 Data
The dataset includes 543 two-period contracts implemented from 1987 to 2001. Among
these contracts, 281 observations are two-period fixed-price contracts (FF), 88 observa-
tions are CR contract in the first period followed by one FP contract in the second period
(CF), and the remaining 174 ones are a two-period CR contracts (CC). For each contract,
the dataset reports the type of contract, the realized cost, the subsidy (payment from the
principal, i.e., the fixed prices in the FP regime), the network size (defined as the length
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of transport network specified in a contract), the labor fee, the political preference of local
governments (a dummy variable with 1 indicating right-wing and 0 left-wing), and some
characteristics of firms: the number of employees, the number of drivers, the size rolling
stock (measured by the number of vehicles), and the groups that own the firms.
Table 3.1 provides a summary statistics of our data. On average the cost is about 17
million euros and the subsidy is approximately 19 million per contract, thus indicating on
average the firms are profitable. The average labor fee is 10.7 million and accounts for
64 percent of the total cost, suggesting that reducing the labor fee is critical to increase
the firm’s profit. The average number of employees is 413, thereby implying the intensive
labor of transport industry. The network size ranges from 58km to 1184km with average
203km and median 236km, thus showing the symmetry of the distribution of this covariate.
The major four groups owning most of transport firms are: Connex (25 percent), Agir
(20 percent), Transdev (19 percent), and Keolis (30 percent) with their respective market
shares in parenthesis. Others in Table 3.1 are the small groups accounting for the rest 5
percent of firms which are not included in our data. A local government is classified as
right- and left- wing according to its political preference. From the data, 52 percent of the
local governments are right-wing, implying that the distribution of political preference is
highly symmetric, which may result from some political equilibrium.
3.4.2 Empirical Strategy
The two primary goals of our application are (1) to estimate the cost and disutility
functions and test the commonly imposed restrictions on them in the existing literature;
(2) to assess the welfare gains that would be achieved if both parties commit to long-
run contracts, as well as the distribution of those gains between the principal and firms.
The estimation takes three steps: First, we estimate the parameters in the cost and disutility
functions. Second, we recover the two cut-off types which are modeled to be dependent on
45
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
# of Contracts 543
# of FF 281
# of CF 88
# of CC 174
Cost 16860 15954 2397 10347 93993
Subsidy 18794 18236 2265 12039 114483
Number of employees 413 364 68 267 1772
Labor fee 10740 10241 716 6650 53178
Rolling stock 165.48 121.41 33 83.5 724
Drivers 278.16 215.51 47 144.2 1181.5
Network size 294 203 58 236 1184
Connex 0.20
Agir 0.20
Tran 0.27
Keolis 0.28
Others 0.05
Right wing 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
∗All variables are real terms. The units of cost, subsidy, and labor fee are 1000 euros.
firms’ characteristics. Finally, we estimate the distribution of the innate cost and bargain-
ing powers. Recall that the identification argument in Section 3 is presented conditional
on given characteristics. In comparison, we consider in the current section a general en-
vironment that allows rich heterogeneity among the principal and firms. Acknowledging
the limited sample size, we adopt a parametric specification of model primitives to make
estimation feasible.
3.4.2.1 Cost and Disutility Functions
Recall that we presented in Section 3 a nonparametric approach to recover the pseudo
innate cost by first estimating the distribution of effort through the joint distribution of two
related variables. A practical issue of such a nonparametric approach in our application
is that a large sample size is required due to the slow rate of convergence for the sieve
estimator f̂E(·) in (3.25).11 Thus we take the alternative approach by parameterizing the
11Please see [22] for the detailed asymptotic properties for the estimator.
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model primitives.
We specify the cost function under the FP scheme by taking into account firms’ het-
erogeneities
c = HF (θ − e∗, z) = β1(θ − e∗) + β2(θ − e∗)2 + z′β3. (3.30)
where z is a vector capturing the characteristics of the principal, the firms as well as the
contract, and adopt the following homogenous disutility function ψ(·).
ψ(e) = γ1e+ γ2e
2, (3.31)
which satisfies the normalization conditionψ(0) = 0. This normalization has been adopted
by related empirical studies on cost-based contracts, such as [6]. As noted, the covariate
W is not included in the disutility function as required in our identification. This is mainly
because our parametric specifications greatly relax the restrictions imposed for nonpara-
metric identification and the dependence on W is not necessary any more. According to
the specifications above and the equilibrium condition in Section 3.2, the optimal effort is
e∗(θ) =
β1 − γ1
2(β2 + γ2)
+
β2
β2 + γ2
θ, (3.32)
with e∗′(θ) ∈ (0, 1).
Under the parametric specification, we need only one measurement for the optimal
effort to identify the model parameters instead of two measurements for optimal effort in
the nonparametric identification. Suppose there is a measurement x for the unobserved
optimal effort through x = d0 + d1e∗ + η, where η is an i.i.d. error with conditional zero
mean E[η|x, z] = 0 and unknown constant variance σ2η (to simplify exposition, we drop
the index of observation i in the notation). The functional form of e∗(θ) in (3.32) implies
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that following relationship between firm’s innate cost θ and the measurement x:
θ = ρ˜0 + ρ˜1x+ η˜ (3.33)
where ρ˜0 = [d1(γ1 − β1) − 2d0(β2 + γ2)]/(2d1β2), ρ˜1 = (β2 + γ2)/(d1β2), and η˜ =
−(β2 + γ2)η/(d1β2). The relationship between x and θ in (3.33) can apply to both FP
and CR contracts based on the one-to-one mapping between the optimal effort and the
innate cost. The approach of measurement has strong empirical support, at least for the
transport industry in France, where the number of employee is found to be one of the most
significant input to measure firms’ efficiency (e.g., [36]. In our data, the average labor
fee is about 64 percent of the total cost, which also indicates the importance of number of
employees to measure firms’ efficiency. Following these results, we choose the number of
employees as the measurement for optimal effort (and hence innate cost).
Analogously, the cost function under the CR scheme is specified as
c = HC(θ, z) = β1θ + β2θ
2 + z′β4, (3.34)
where we allow for possibly different marginal costs of characteristics by introducing two
parameter vectors β3 and β4 in (3.30) and (3.34), respectively. By plugging (3.33) into 3.34
it is easy to show that (ρ˜0, ρ˜1, β1, β2, β4) can not be identified. Then we can normalize ρ˜0 =
0 and ρ˜1 = 1 based on the intuition that this can be interpreted as normalization of innate
costs.12 Indeed, the normalization of innate costs is also necessary in the nonparametric
12This normalization implies that d0 = (γ1 − β1)/(2β2) and d1 = (β2 + γ2)/β2.
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identification. Then by substituting x for θ in (3.34), we obtain13
c = β˜0 + β1x+ β2x
2 + z′β4 + ε1, (3.35)
where β˜0 = β2σ2η , and the composite error ε1 ≡ β1η + 2β2xη satisfies E[ε1|x, z] = 0
under E[η|x, z] = 0. Similarly, by substituting this measurement for optimal effort into
(3.30) gives rise to the realized cost for FP contracts:
c = γ˜0 + γ˜1x+ γ˜2x
2 + z′β3 + ε2, (3.36)
where the composite parameters (γ˜0, γ˜1, γ˜2) are explicitly parametric functions of the
primitive parameters (β1, β2, γ1, γ2) and the details including the composite error ε2 are
provided in the appendix. Under the assumption E[η|x, z] = 0, it follows E[ε2|x, z] = 0.
The parameters (β1, β2, β3, β4, γ1, γ2) are estimated as follows. We first use the CC
contracts to estimate the parameters in (3.35), and then use CF (the fixed-price contracts,
i.e., the second period) and FF contracts to recover parameters in (3.36). By combing these
estimates, we obtain (βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, βˆ4, γˆ1, γˆ2).
3.4.2.2 Distribution of Innate Costs
Employing the equilibrium conditions (3.8) and (3.9), we are able to express the ob-
served fixed prices b¯R and bR in CF and FF contracts, respectively, as follows.
b¯R = ρ0(γ1, γ2, β1, β2; θ
∗
2, z) + z
′β3 + ε3,
bR = ρ1(γ1, γ2, β1, β2, r; θ
∗
1, z) + z
′β3 + ε4, (3.37)
13Our cost specification here does not involve the interaction terms z′θ, since none of these interaction
terms when added into the cost specification is significant at the 10 percent level. Hence, the marginal cost
of each element in z does not rely on its type θ.
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where θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 are the cut-off types in proposition 2. The expression of ρ0(·) and ρ1(·)
are provided in the appendix. We introduce some structural errors ε3 and ε4 to account for
other unobserved factors that may affect the fixed prices, and parametrize θ∗k, k = 1, 2 as
θ∗k = z
′
pik to model their dependence on characteristics. Then we use observations for CF
and FF contracts to estimate the parameters pi1, pi2, and r by a linear regression, where the
estimates (βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, γˆ1, γˆ2) are from the previous step.
Next we specify the distribution of firms’ type θ as a normal with mean µ(z) and
variance σ2, where µ(z) ≡ z′φ. As stated earlier, the parameter α reflects firm’s bargaining
power in renegotiation with the local governments, who have different political preferences
(left-wing or right-wing); and rightists may be more prone to favor private firms than
leftists ([37]). To capture such ideological effects, we assume α(right;κ) = κ0 +κ1right,
where right is a binary variable taking value 1 for right-wing government and 0 otherwise.
Nevertheless, recall that α and the cost of public funds λ are not separately identified since
only the ratio α/(1 + λ) appears at the equilibrium conditions in (3.7) and (3.10). The
empirical studies suggest that λ is in the interval [0.15, 0.40] in an efficient tax systems
([38]). We choose λ = 0.3 as in [18].
Define ω ≡ (κ0, κ1, σ2, ϕ), which includes the parameters in the distribution of in-
nate cost and firms’ bargaining power. The equilibrium equation (3.10) provides us with
moment conditions that can be used to estimate ω. Specifically,
ω̂ = argmin
ω
(
n−1
n∑
i=1
ςi
)
, (3.38)
where n is the sample size, i.e., the total number of CF and FF contracts, and ςi is defined
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as:
ςi =
{[
1− α(righti;κ)(1 + λ)−1
]
[F (θ̂∗2(zi);µ(zi), σ
2)− F (θ̂∗1i;µ(z˜i), σ2)]
× (2β̂2γ̂2θ̂∗2(zi) + β̂1γ̂2 + β̂2γ̂1)− [H(θ̂∗2(zi), zi)− b¯Ri ]f(θ̂∗2(zi);µ(zi), σ2)(β̂2 + γ̂2)
}2
.
It is worth noting that the fixed price b¯Ri is not reported for FF contracts, and they are
estimated by plugging estimates (βˆ1, βˆ2, βˆ3, γˆ1, γˆ2, pˆi1, pˆi2) and the covariates vector z of
FF contracts into the first equation of (3.37). Alternatively, we may estimate ω, pi1, pi2,
and r together using (3.38). However, our results show that the estimates of such an
approach are relatively noisy because more parameters are involved than our multiple-step
procedure.
3.4.2.3 Welfare Gains of Commitment
To estimate the welfare gains of contracts under commitment relative to those under
renegotiation, we first use the previously estimated parameters to simulate the hypothetical
fixed price bC(z) that would be set by the principal in a long-term fixed-price contracts as
specified in proposition 1. This is done by first solving (3.7) to obtain the simulated cut-off
type θ̂∗(z):
4
[
1− α(right; κ̂)(1 + λ)−1]F (θ∗; µ̂(z), σ̂2)(β̂2γ̂1 + β̂1γ̂2 + 2β̂2γ̂2θ∗)
= [4β̂22θ
∗2 + 4β̂2(β̂1 − γ̂1)θ∗ + (β̂1 − γ̂1)2]f(θ∗; µ̂(z), σ̂2).
Next, the fixed price b̂C is simulated according to (3.6)
b̂C = − (β̂1 − γ̂1)
2
4(β̂2 + γ̂2)
+
β̂1γ̂2 + β̂2γ̂1
β̂2 + γ̂2
θ̂∗ +
β̂2γ̂2
β̂2 + γ̂2
θ̂∗2i + z
′β̂3.
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Let SWR and SWC denote the social welfare of the contracts under renegotiation and
commitment, respectively.
SWR(z) = S − (1 + λ)TR(z) + α(right;κ)UR(z),
SWC(z) = S − (1 + λ)TC(z) + α(right;κ)UC(z),
where TR(z) and TC(z) are subsidy (tax) under renegotiation and commitment, respec-
tively, and UR(z) and UC(z) are their informational rent (profit) counterparts. The defi-
nition of these objectives are included in the appendix. Consequently, the welfare gains
from the commitment is
∆SW (z) ≡ SWC(z)− SWR(z) = α(right;κ)[UC(z)− UR(z)]
−(1 + λ)[TC(z)− TR(z)]
= α(right;κ)∆U(z)− (1 + λ)∆T (z), (3.39)
where the first and second terms on the R.H.S. of the last line are difference of weighted
informational rent and social cost, respectively between two contracts. By integrating out
the covariates z, we obtain the average social welfare gain ∆SW =
∫
z∈Z ∆SW (z)dG(z),
where G(z) is the cdf of z. To compute the average welfare gain ∆SW , we plug the
previously estimated and simulated parameters into its definition.
3.4.3 Results
Table 3.2 reports the estimates of parameters for both cost and disutility functions.
The estimates suggest that the realized cost is convex in the size of the firms’ innate cost,
thus providing strong empirical evidence against the linear cost assumed in existing liter-
ature. An important implication is that firms enjoy increasing returns to scale in the cost
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it induces, which provides less efficient firms with incentives to exert more effort. The
disutility function is also estimated to be convex, though the coefficient of the quadratic
term is not statistically significant. This implies that the marginal disutility of exerting
cost-reducing effort is increasing in the level of effort.
Table 3.2: Regression results of cost and disutility
(1) (2)
Functions Variables
CC
contracts
FF+CF
contracts
CC
contracts
FF+CF
contracts
8*Cost Ineff.
9.815***
(3.444)
9.815***
(3.444)
9.361***
(2.579)
9.361***
(2.579)
Ineff. × Ineff. 0.005(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.003)
Labor fee
0.892***
(0.085)
0.985***
(0.078)
0.801***
(0.064)
0.946***
(0.077)
Network size
6.046***
(0.769)
6.874***
(0.979)
5.531***
(0.586)
6.316***
(0.953)
Right
651.7***
(112.6)
-1756.0***
(308.4)
799.1***
(87.7)
-1474.0***
(309.1)
Connex
-171.9
(122.7)
-1795.9***
(421.5)
Agir
-1038.5***
(97.6)
-1407.4***
(519.9)
Tran
134.701
(268.6)
-1601.6***
(351.6)
2*Disutility Effort
48.19
(57.89)
48.19
(57.89)
88.75**
(43.37)
88.75**
(43.37)
Effort × Effort 0.003(0.041)
0.003
(0.041)
0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
N 174 369 174 369
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 1000 times. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Not surprisingly, our results show that cost increases with labor fee and network size.
Specifically, the marginal cost of labor fee is close to unit under both CR and FP schemes.
This reinforces that the transport industry is labor intensive and further justifies our usage
of employee number as a measurement for innate cost. The marginal cost of network size
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is similar between FP and CR regimes: one additional kilometer network will incur about
6K cost. If the local government is right-wing the cost will be higher under CR regime,
and lower under FP regime. The reason for this opposite effect might be due to the right-
wing government’s favor of the higher-power incentive of FP contracts over CR contracts.
Finally, there is strong empirical evidence that group fixed-effects exist for both CR and
FP contracts, which suggests heterogeneous managerial structures of different groups.
The estimated dependence of the two cut-off types on the covariates z is presented
in Table 3.3. We observe from the results that two cut-off types are dependent on the
characteristics of firms and contracts differently: the first cut-off type θ∗1 is mainly affected
by the network size, which varies at the contract-level, whereas the second one θ∗2 relies
on both contract and firm-level variables. Recall that firms with θ < θ∗1 and θ > θ
∗
2 are
most and least efficient segments, respectively. Thus the estimates suggest that the firms
in the most efficient segment are similar, whereas those in the least efficient segment are
more heterogeneous. We also estimate the intertemporal weight r to be 0.919 with the
standard deviation being 0.150, which implies that firms pay most attention to the profit of
the first-period.
Table 3.4 shows the estimates of the distribution of innate cost and the bargaining
power. The main determinant of the mean of innate cost µ is the group effect. Specifi-
cally, Tran group has the largest average innate cost, implying that firms owned by Tran is
least efficient on average. Such a result may be due to the fact that Tran is a semi-public
group and hence less efficient while others are privately owned and more efficient. The
bargaining power for leftists and rightists are estimated to be close to each other (1.261 for
leftists versus 1.298 rightists), which indicates that both left-wing and right-wing authori-
ties weigh similarly the firms’ profits when evaluating the social welfare.
The results on the welfare comparison between contracts under renegotiation and com-
mitment are as follows. First, our estimate of the subsidy under commitment (TC , $
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Table 3.3: Estimates of cut-off types
Parameters θ∗1 θ
∗
2
Labor -0.055 0.464***
(0.104) (0.127)
Network size 0.420*** 1.890***
(0.096) (0.165)
Connex 33.85 33.86
(23.80) (698.23)
Agir 47.50 47.50
(30.30) (4418.0)
Tran 6.027 12775.3***
(22.065) (4456.8)
Constant 0.304*** 1.366***
(0.103) (0.149)
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 1000 times.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
407,000) is about 9 percent less than that under renegotiation (TR, $443,000), suggesting
that taxpayers are welfare gainers under commitment. Second, the profit of firms under
commitment (UC , $65,800) in our model is about 60 percent larger than under renegoti-
ation (UR, $41.200), implying that firms are also gainers of welfare. This well explains
the lobbying effort of firms into extending contract length or equivalently seeking contract
offered by the principal under commitment. Third, the total welfare gains by switching
from negotiation to commitment (∆SW ) are 78.7 million, which is substantial. More
importantly, our results show that sixty percent of the gains ((1 + λ)∆T/∆SW ) would
accrue to taxpayers (the principal) and the firms obtain the remaining forty percent.
Our results reinforce the finding in [18] that switching from contracts under renegotia-
tion to that under commitment leads to substantial welfare gain. Nevertheless, our empir-
ical results suggest that both firms and taxpayers are welfare gainers under commitment
while taxpayers would loss about 22 percent of welfare in [18]. Furthermore, we find a
much larger total welfare gains (78.7 million) than [18] (2.1 million). The discrepancy
of social welfares is mainly attributed to both the theoretical implication by convexity of
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Table 3.4: Estimates of the distribution of innate cost and bargaining powers
Parameters Estimates
Bargaining power for Leftist 1.261***
(0.404)
Bargaining power for Rightist 1.298*
(0.735)
S.t.d. of innate cost (σ2) 265.43*
(157.27)
12*Mean of innate cost (µ) Labor 0.948
(1.178)
Network size -2.129
(5.256)
Connex -6.583*
(3.856)
Agir -122.94***
(5.033)
Tran 35.62***
(4.391)
Constant -12.07***
(3.965)
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped 1000 times.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
firms’ cost function and the empirical implications by comparisons of cut-off types under
two mechanisms. On the one hand, As stated in the theoretical model, when cost function
is convex, the marginal benefit of effort is increasing in innate cost. Hence, those ineffi-
cient firms (with higher innate costs) have stronger incentives to exert cost-reducing effort
if they choose FP contracts. On the other hand, we draw the average cut-off types and
firms’ choices of contracts for both mechanisms based on our estimates, as is illustrated in
Figure 3.1, there is a larger portion of firms choose FP contracts under commitment than
under negotiation. Specifically, the figure shows that θ∗1 < θ
∗ < θ∗2 and θ
∗
2 − θ∗ < θ∗ − θ∗1.
Note that under commitment, all the firms with θ ∈ [θ, θ∗] choose FP contracts, whereas
under negotiation those firms with θ ∈ [θ, θ∗1] and θ ∈ [θ∗1, θ∗2] choose FP contracts in
both periods and the second period, respectively. Considering the empirical result that that
θ∗2 − θ∗ is much smaller than θ∗− θ∗1 , it is most likely that if we take both periods into ac-
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count, there would be more firms exerting cost-reducing effort under commitment, thereby
producing more welfare gains by combination with the theoretical implication above. De-
spite the quantitative difference of welfare gains in this paper and [18], both results are
qualitatively identical in the sense that the renegotiation and/or transaction cost associated
with contracts under renegotiation is substantial in the public transport procurement in
France.
 
  
 
*
1 
FF CF CC 
*
2
Fixed-price contract Cost-plus contract 
Commitment 
Renegotiation 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of firms’ choice
3.5 Conclusion
We provided a rigorous econometric analysis of the two-period FPCR contracts under
both renegotiation and commitment, where we generalize the widely used identity cost
function to a convex one and allow for a heterogeneous disutility function of effort. We
proved that the model is nonparametrically identified if firms exert effort and the result of
identification can be applied to a large class of contracts with and without incentives. If we
include the firms without exerting effort, the model is semi nonparametrically identified.
Based on the identification argument, we propose a feasible procedure to estimate the
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model primitives. Using the public transport procurement contracts in France, we found
that cost function of firms are convex and the convexity has important implications for
the welfare analysis: if the contract is switched from renegotiation to commitment, both
taxpayers and firms would benefit and the major gains of social welfare would accrue to
taxpayers.
58
4. NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF
CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES
4.1 Introduction
Due to the fundamental role of asymmetric information in economic relations, during
the past decades contracts have flourished and dedicated to how the information asym-
metry and incentives induce strategic behavior among economic agents in a number of
directions (see [15]; and [16]). One branch of contracts focuses on bilateral contract be-
tween one principal and one agent, in which the agent’s hidden information and hidden
action lead to the adverse selection and moral hazard problems, respectively. For example,
[2] propose a contract model to combine adverse selection and moral hazard in procure-
ment and regulation, and [3] establish the nonparametric identification and estimation in
an extended model with adverse selection and moral hazard.
The second branch of of bilateral contracts between one principal and multiple agents
emphasizes the externalities generated by the dependence of one agent’s payoff on other
agents’ contracts, while the first branch of contracts involves no externalities due to the
setting of one principal and one agent. This paper considers the contracting with exter-
nalities developed by [7]. In the model, the principal simultaneously makes one offer to
each agent, and then agents simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject their own
offers. Because those offers are private in the sense that each agent only observes his own
offer, it is a dynamic incomplete-information game. In actuality, the model has found wide
applications in various economic situations, including vertical contracts in which profits
of downstream firms depend on all downstream firms’ contracts with the upstream firm
([9]); exclusive dealing in which payoffs of agents rely on the number of agents who sign
exclusive contracts with the principal ([10]; [11]); network externalities ([12]; [13]); and
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among others. Despite the wide use of contracting with externalities in various sectors
such as medical device industry and publishing industry, there are few empirical studies
on the incomplete-information contracting game with externalities. This paper constitutes
the first effort on the rigorous econometric analysis of contracting with externalities.
First, we show the existence of equilibrium in the model under two out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, respectively. Due to the essence of incomplete information implied by the privacy
of contracts, different out-of-equilibrium beliefs often induce different equilibrium out-
comes. Although arbitrary beliefs can be assigned following the out-of-equilibrium offer,
there are two widely used out-of-equilibrium beliefs (i.e., passive beliefs and symmet-
ric beliefs) in the theoretical literature. When receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer, with
passive beliefs the agent believes that other agents still receive equilibrium offers, while
with symmetric beliefs the agent adjusts his initial beliefs about other agents’ offers by the
same deviations. As expected, the equilibrium outcomes are different between passive and
symmetric beliefs.
Next, we establish the nonparametric identification of structural elements, including
the principal’s cost function, the agent’s payoff function, bargaining power, and the joint
distribution of agents’ shocks, under passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs, respectively.
Nonparametric identification is valuable in terms of providing which information in the
data allows identification of each unknown function and avoiding potential parametric
misspecifications. Given the observed quantity and payment in the contract, the nonpara-
metric identification strategy relies on the one-to-one mapping between the quantity vector
of contracts and the shock vector of agents. The one-to-one mapping is key to identifying
incomplete-information games such as auctions in [34], in which the bidder’s private value
and his bid are analogous to the agent’s shock and the quantity in the contract. Besides
the unobservability of the agent’s shock, the main difficulty for identification arises from
the multiple unknown functions given only two observed variables in the contract. For the
60
goal of identification, we will explore mild restrictions on the joint density of the shock
vector, the payoff function, and the variation of agents’ characteristics.
In addition, we propose a multi-step nonparametric estimation procedure and establish
the rates of uniform convergence of nonparametric estimators, including sieve estimators
and kernel estimators. The convergence rate relies on the recent literature on sieve esti-
mators. [39] propose sieve estimators of multiple functions by using conditional moment
conditions, and establish the rates of uniform convergence under regular conditions. Our
convergence results build on [39] by providing primitive sufficient conditions.
Lastly, we apply the model to coronary stents contracts between the manufacturer and
hospitals in the United States, and find that passive beliefs fit the dataset better than sym-
metric beliefs. More relevantly, the counterfactual result shows that if the bargaining
power of hospitals increases, under passive beliefs the stent’s price decreases by some
reasonable amount, while under symmetric beliefs the decrease of price is unreasonable.
4.1.1 Preview of the Model, Identification, and Estimation
The model builds on the seminal work of [7] by allowing for a positive bargaining
power of agents in the determination of payment in the offer, instead of an extremely zero
bargaining power of agents. The contracting game proceeds as follows. In the beginning,
each agent’s shock is jointly drawn by Nature and is common knowledge to all players.
Next, the principal simultaneously makes an offer of quantity to each agent, and each agent
has some beliefs about other agents’ offers of quantities according to his offer. Based on
his beliefs, both the principal and the agent expect that they use Nash bargaining solution
to determine the corresponding monetary payment from the agent to the principal. The
payment for each agent is simultaneously determined through Nash bargaining solution.
Due to the incomplete-information implied by the fact that each agent can not observe any
other agents’ offers, this paper provides the existence of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
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in the contracting game with two widely used out-of-equilibrium beliefs–passive beliefs
and symmetric beliefs, though [7] considers only passive beliefs under the extreme bar-
gaining assumption. When receiving an out-of-equilibrium outcome, with passive beliefs
the agent does not update his initial belief and believes that other agents still receive equi-
librium offers, while with symmetric beliefs the agent adjusts his initial beliefs about other
agents’ offers by the same deviation of quantity in the offer. We find that the equilibrium
outcomes are different between passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs.
The identification of contracting with externalities proceeds the estimation. We show
that the equilibrium conditions implied by the model, together with some functional re-
strictions on the joint density of shocks, the payoff function, and the variation of agents’
characteristics, enable us to nonparametrically identify the model primitives from the joint
distribution of quantities and payments in the offers. The model primitives include the
principal’s cost function, the agent’s payoff function, bargaining power, and the joint dis-
tribution of agents’ shocks. The identification argument under passive beliefs is readily
carried over to symmetric beliefs.
Our identification argument takes several steps. First, we provide mild restrictions
on the joint density of the shock vector, the payoff function, and the variation of agents’
characteristics to identify the payoff function. The identification builds on the influential
work [40] who provides a general identification result on the identification of nonparamet-
ric simultaneous equations. In order to apply her result to the present model, we explore
the one-to-one structural link between the shock vector and the quantity vector, and the
rank condition on the matrix involving the payoff function and the joint distribution of
shocks. Second, we use the result in [40] to identify another one-to-one mapping between
the aggregate shock and the aggregate quantity. Then by utilizing the variation of agents’
characteristics, we recover the cost function. Based on these two identified objects, we can
back out each agent’s shock according to the equilibrium condition, and hence identify the
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joint distribution of the shock vector. Third, we use the payment equation to identify the
bargaining power since it can be expressed as a function of all the identified objects above.
Given the positive identification result, we propose nonparametric estimators of model
primitives and establish the rates of uniform convergence of these estimators under reg-
ular conditions. First, we use the sieve minimum distance method proposed by [41] to
estimate the cost function, bargaining power function, and the first derivative of payoff
function according to the conditional moment condition in the payment equation. To al-
low for the potential correlation between the agent’s shock and the payment error, we use
the instrument variable to construct the conditional moment condition for the sieve esti-
mation. Following [39], we provide primitive conditions to establish the rates of uniform
convergence of those sieve estimators. Second, we use the kernel estimator to estimate the
remaining part of the payoff function and show its rate of of uniform convergence. Third,
we propose the kernel estimator of the joint distribution of the shock vector by using the
pseudo shock vector. The prior estimation results imply the rate of uniform convergence
of the pseudo shock vector. By combining the uniform convergence result on the kernel
estimator of the multivariate distribution with the true shock vector, we establish the rate
of uniform convergence of the kernel estimator of the shock vector’s distribution.
4.1.2 Preview of Empirical Findings
We apply our model to study the coronary stents contracts between manufacturers and
hospitals in the United States. The objective of the empirical study is to test which belief
fits the dataset better and compare the counterfactual price effect of bargaining power
between two beliefs. Although typical linear or nonlinear specifications are consistent with
conditions for nonparametric identification, our empirical analysis is based on a parametric
approach since the test method applies to parametric specifications and the sample size in
our dataset is limited.
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Specifically, we first estimate the model parameters and then based on the estimates,
we use the nonnested test method to test for the asymptotic equivalence of two belief sys-
tems. The test result rejects the null hypothesis of asymptotic equivalence in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that the model with passive beliefs fits the data better than symmet-
ric beliefs. More relevantly, the counterfactual result shows that if the agent’s bargain-
ing power increases, under passive beliefs the stent’s price decreases by some reasonable
amount, while under symmetric beliefs the decrease of price is unreasonable.
4.1.3 Relation to Existing Literature and Contributions
First of all, this paper is related to identification of nonparametric functions with non-
separable errors. A growing literature on the identification of a system of simultaneous
nonseparable equations has attracted more attention in the past decade. [40] provides pos-
itive identification results for a fully nonparametric simultaneous model. Based on this
identification result, [42] further shows the identification of the simultaneous equations
with exogenous regressors without requiring large support conditions on the observable
exogenous regressors. For the particular class of triangular models with nonseparable
errors, recent literature includes [43], [44], [45], [46], and among others. Besides, it is
also related to the identification of the single nonseparable function. For example, [47]
proposes various normalizations to identify a nonseparable nonparametric function with
monotonicity, while [48] establish that in the absence of monotonicity, the quantiles iden-
tify local average structural derivatives of nonseparable models.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide sufficient conditions to nonparametri-
cally identify contracting with externalities. First, based on the identification result in [40],
the paper imposes mild functional restrictions on the joint density of the shock vector, the
payoff function, and the variation of agents’ characteristics, to identify the agent’s payoff
function. By exploring the one-to-one mapping between the shock vector and the quan-
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tity vector, we obtain a similar result as in [40]. Then, we provide sufficient conditions
on the joint density of the shock vector, the large support of agents’ characteristics, and
the additively separability of payoff functions to identify the first part of payoff function
under . Those first two conditions are mild and adopted by [40] for the identification of
nonparametric simultaneous equations model with a linear index structure. Instead of fully
identifying the functions themselves, however, [40] establishes the identification of some
features of the functions in terms of a rank condition. Hence, we show the identification
of the first part of payoff functions by using the additively separability of payoff functions.
Besides, we use [40] to identify a one-to-one mapping between the aggregate quantity be-
tween the aggregate shock and hence the second part of payoff functions. Thereby, we
recover the cost function. To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to apply the result
in [40] to the identification of economic theories.
Second, this paper contributes to the uniform convergence of nonparametric estimators
of model primitives in games. One typical game is auctions because the bidder’s value in
auctions is analogous to the agent’s shock in contracting with externalities. [34] establish
the rate of uniform convergence of kernel estimators of distribution of independent values
in auctions, and [49] extend the uniform convergence result in auctions with affiliated pri-
vate values. This paper also establishes the rate of uniform convergence of nonparametric
estimator of joint distribution of agents’ shocks. However, it is more challenging to obtain
the uniform convergence in the present paper because it is built upon the convergence rate
of sieve estimator of unknown cost function and payoff function (e.g., [41]; [39]), while
the rate in the literature on auctions relies only on the convergence rate of kernel estimator
of the known distribution of observed bids. Another related game is bargaining models.
[50] propose consistent estimators in a stochastic sequential bargaining model. We not
only provide the consistent estimation in contracting game with externalities, more impor-
tantly, we establish the rate of uniform convergence because it is crucial for recovering the
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shape of model primitives ([34]).
Third, this paper contributes to a fast-growing empirical analysis on various contract-
ing circumstances with externalities. Although the theoretical literature has been very ac-
tive, there are few empirical analysis of contract models. This may arise from he difficulty
of accessing data on contracts because many contracts are private. During the past decades
it is more likely for researchers to obtain data on contracts, and thereby, the empirics on
contracts has made much progress. For example, in a mall where anchor stores (depart-
ment stores) generate positive externalities by drawing customer traffic to other stores,
[51] show that mall rental contracts are designed to efficiently price the net externality
of each store. [52] use the dataset on magazine distribution to analyze how an upstream
firm (publisher) determines the size of its distribution network of downstream firms (retail
outlets). [53] evaluates the foreclosure effect of exclusive distribution arranges on com-
petition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. However, the existing empirical literature
does not explicitly refer to the incomplete information in contracting with externalities.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically analyze the dynamic incomplete-
information contracting with externalities for which the specification of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs affects equilibrium outcomes and hence empirical resutls. Using data on contracts
in the coronary stent industry, we estimate the model and and find that passive beliefs
explain the dataset better than symmetric beliefs. Moreover, the counterfactual analysis
shows that the price effect of bargaining powers is more reasonable under passive beliefs
than under symmetric beliefs, suggesting the empirical relevance of passive beliefs in the
stent industry in the United States.
4.1.4 Roadmap
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model of contracting with
externalities. Section 3 showes the nonparametric identification. Section 4 proposes non-
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parametric estimators and establishes their rates of uniform convergence. Section 5 is the
empirical application. Section 6 concludes. Proofs, figures and tables are collected in the
appendix.
4.2 The Model
This paper considers a two-stage incomplete information contracting game in which
a risk-neutral principal wishes to trade with N ≥ 2 risk-neutral agents.1 The agents’s
shocks of payoff are drawn by the nature, and are common knowledge. In the first stage
the principal simultaneously makes one quantity offer qi to each agent i ∈ N (with a slight
abuse of notation, N will represent the set as well as the number of agents), where qi ∈ Q
is the quantity of trade,Q is a compact subset of the set R+ of nonnegative real numbers. In
the second stage, agent i has some beliefs about other agents’ offers of quantities according
to his quantity offer. Based on his beliefs, both the principal and agent i expect that they
use Nash bargaining solution to determine the corresponding monetary payment pi ∈ R
from agent i to the principal. The payment for each agent is simultaneously determined
through Nash bargaining solution. The contracting game is incomplete information due to
the privacy of offers {(qi, pi)}Ni=1 in the sense that each agent only observes his own offer.
Externalities among agents arise whenever each agent’s payoff depends on other agents’
trades. This paper considers a particular class of contracting with externalities. The payoff
of agent i is assumed to be qi[u(x) + i]− pi, where x ≡
∑
i∈N qi is the aggregate quantity
of the trade vector q = (q1, · · · , qN)′, u(·) can be interpreted as the deterministic marginal
revenue function. The random variable i captures agent i’s unobserved factors (by re-
searchers) which affect his payoff, such as demand shock or unobserved characteristics of
agent i (e.g., see [54]; [55]; and [56]). For ease of exposition hereafter we call i as shock.
The shock vector  = (1, · · · , N)′ is assumed to be drawn from a cumulative distribu-
1We shall use feminine pronouns for the principal and masculine ones for the agent.
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tion function F prior to that the principal makes simultaneous offers, and it is common
knowledge to all parties but not observed by researchers.2 The payoff of the principal is
assumed to be y − c(x), where y ≡ ∑Ni=1 pi is the aggregate payment of the payment
vector p = (p1, · · · , pN)′, and c(·) is the principal’s cost function.
The specification of payoff function is general in theory, there exists empirical evidence
from the related literature. As for the theory, this specification includes both the vertical
contracting games studied by [9] and the insurance models with moral hazard studied by
[57] and [58] as special cases. As for the empirics, the reimbursement rate (the major
source of hospital’s profit) from patient’s insurer to hospital depends on the aggregate
demand of hospitals in the United States ([59]; [60]). For the goal of investigating timing
incentives of commercial radio stations, [61] specifies the payoff of one station to depend
on the proportion of other stations who choose the same action. For the inference of
interaction effects in discrete simultaneous games, [62] specify the payoff of each player
to rely on the aggregation of all other players’ actions.
The specification of out-of-equilibrium beliefs is critical to perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria (PBE) of incomplete-information games since arbitrary beliefs can be assigned fol-
lowing the principal’s out-of-equilibrium offers, which gives rise to different equilib-
rium outcomes. To consider the principal’s incentive to deviate from an equilibrium out-
come {(q∗i , p∗i )}Ni=1, according to the existing literature, there are two widely-used out-
of-equilibrium beliefs: passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs.3 When agent i receives an
out-of-equilibrium offer qi 6= q∗i , passive beliefs imply that he believes that other agents
still receive their equilibrium offers {q∗j}j 6=i and pay the corresponding equilibrium pay-
2Although we assume the common knowledge of , this game is incomplete-information due to the
privacy of offers. Allowing for private random shocks (i.e., i is known only to agent i) introduces the
second source of incomplete information and complicates the theoretical analysis, which beyonds the scope
of this paper.
3Here we can not use Bayesian rule to update belief on out-of-equilibrium paths because there is no prior
incomplete information and hence no prior belief.
68
ments {p∗j}j 6=i, while symmetric beliefs imply that he believes that other agents receive
the same deviation offers. Since there is neither general agreement nor empirical evidence
on which belief is more appropriate, we will analyze the equilibrium of contracting with
externalities under passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs, respectively.4
4.2.1 Passive Beliefs
Passive beliefs have been intensively employed in the contracting game with one prin-
cipal and multiple agents, including [63], [9], [7], [64], and among others. When agent
i receives an out-of-equilibrium offer qi 6= q∗i , under passive beliefs he does not expect
multilateral deviations and continues to believe that all other agents still receive their equi-
librium offers {q∗j}j 6=i associated with the corresponding equilibrium payments {p∗j}j 6=i.
As [65] state, one rationale for passive beliefs is that in such a Cournot-like context, the
quantity actually sold to one agent does not directly affect the payoff the principal derives
from other contracts.
We start with the determination of payment in the out-of-equilibrium offer (qi, pi).
[7] assumes that the principal has all the bargaining power, and hence pi = qi
[
u
(
qi +∑
j 6=i q
∗
j
)
+ i
]
, which implies that the agent’s payoff is zero. However, agents may have
positive bargaining power, of which the source includes asymmetric preferences of the
agents and the principal, their different beliefs regarding the possibility of a breakdown,
and some determinants of economic environments ([66]; [58]), and hence the agent’s pay-
off is positive. In the vertical contracting literature some papers analyze the equilibrium
when downstream firms have some bargaining power (e.g., [67]). Indeed, [63] adopt the
Nash bargaining solution in bilateral negotiations with one upstream firm and two down-
stream firms by allowing for symmetric bargaining powers between two parties. Due to
4In the related literature, the third type of beliefs is wary beliefs proposed by [9]. However, the solution of
wary beliefs is theoretically challenging in our model due to the nonparametric form of structural functions,
and we do not consider wary beliefs in the paper.
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the theoretical attractions, Nash bargaining solution has been widely used in empirical
analysis on bilateral negotiations with externalities (e.g., [68]; and [69]).5 To make more
realistic predictions in the sense that the agent’s payoff is positive, this paper also nests the
Nash bargaining solution in the contracting game to determine the payment in the devia-
tion offer qi given the equilibrium contracts {(q∗i , p∗i )}Ni=1 and qi.6 Note that here the Nash
bargaining solution applies because it is solved given the believed offers {(q∗i , p∗i )}Ni=1 un-
der passive beliefs and the deviation trade qi, though the model as a whole is incomplete
information.
Specifically, given the equilibrium contracts {(q∗j , p∗j)}j 6=i and the deviation trade qi,
the Nash bargaining solution for pi is given by
pi = argmax
p˜i≥0
{
qi
[
u
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j
)
+ i
]
− p˜i
}γ {
p˜i +
N∑
j 6=i
p∗j − c
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j
)}1−γ
,
together with the disagreement point (0, 0), where γ ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining
power of agent i in negotiation with the principal. Then, the Nash bargaining solution for
pi is
pi = γc
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j
)
+ (1− γ)qi
[
u
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j
)
+ i
]
− γ
N∑
j 6=i
p∗j .
Note that pi = qi
[
u
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i q
∗
j
)
+ i
]
when γ = 0, which implies that the general
Nash bargaining solution includes [7] as a special case.7 Thus, the principal’s payoff from
5This solution abstracts away the details of the bargaining process and considers only the set of out-
comes that satisfy certain ‘reasonable’ axioms. [70] and [66] show that the Nash bargaining solution in a
bilateral setting corresponds to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic complete-information
alternating offers game. [63] nests a Nash bargaining solution within a Nash equilibrium without a complete
non-cooperative structure.
6See the use of the Nash bargaining solution in related contracting games with private negotiations in
[67].
7Although the results on Nash bargaining solution in [70] and [66] apply to complete-information games,
the relevance of Nash bargaining solution in the model is that given agent i’s beliefs, both the principal and
agent i can consider the subgame as complete-information. Therefore, they may participate in the traditional
complete-information alternating offers game to determine the payment given agent i’s beliefs about other
agents’ quantities.
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making deviations q is
pi1(q, q
∗, γ|) ≡
N∑
i=1
{
γc
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j
)
+ (1− γ)qi
[
u
(
qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j
)
+ i
]}
−c
(
N∑
i=1
qi
)
.
The equilibrium concept implies that the principal has no incentive to deviate from {(q∗i , p∗i )}Ni=1,
that is, q∗ ∈ argmax
q∈Q×···×Q
pi1(q, q
∗, γ|). Thus, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium can be char-
acterized below.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (q∗(),p∗()) ≡ {(q∗i (), p∗i ())}Ni=1 constitutes a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium under passive beliefs if and only if for any ,
q∗() ∈ argmax
q()∈Q×···×Q
pi1(q(), q
∗(), γ|).
The following lemma provides a set of sufficient conditions for the unique existence
of equilibrium of contracting with externalities under passive beliefs.
Lemma 6. (uniqueness of equilibrium under passive beliefs) Suppose that (a)  is dis-
tributed according to F with a continuously differentiable density f on its support EN ≡
[e, e]N , (b) (c, u) ∈ H1, where H1 denote the set of functions (c, u) such that (i) u ≥ 0
and c ≥ 0; (ii) both u and c are triple continuously differentiable and u′(·) > 0; (iii)
pi1(q, q∗, γ|) is concave in q for any . Then, there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (q∗(),p∗()) ≡ {(q∗i (), p∗i ())}Ni=1 under passive beliefs.
Condition (a) imposes standard smoothing conditions on the distribution of  and func-
tions (u, c). The compactness of the support of  is required by the compactness ofQ used
for the existence of equilibrium whenever there exists some regular one-to-one mapping
between  and Q (One exception is the trigonometric function such as tangent. However,
this class of one-to-one mappings requires a heuristic support such as [−pi/2, pi/2], which
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is usually implausible for most datasets). Condition (b)-(i) is implicitly assumed in the
model, condition (b)-(ii) impose standard smoothing conditions on the functions u and c,
and condition (b)-(iii) is an important condition in the fixed point theorem used for the
existence of PBE, and it tends to hold under standard primitive conditions, e.g., c′′ > 0
and u′′ < 0.
Proof of Lemma 6 As in [7], the existence of equilibrium immediately follows Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem under the conditions in Lemma 6. Next, we prove the uniqueness
of the equilibrium by showing that there is a one-to-one mapping between the optimal
quantity vector and the shock vector. To do so, we first show the one-to-one mapping
between the aggregate trade x∗ and aggregate shock ξ ≡ ∑Ni=1 i. Specifically, under the
conditions on differentiability of u and c, the first-order condition and the second order
condition are i = c′(x∗) − u(x∗) − q∗i u′(x∗) and Nc′′(x∗) − 2Nu′(x∗) − x∗u′′(x∗) > 0,
respectively, for any i ∈ N . Hence, ξ = Nc′(x∗) − Nu(x∗) − x∗u′(x∗) ≡ s(x∗) and
s′(x∗) = Nc′′(x∗) − 2Nu′(x∗) − x∗u′′(x∗) + (N − 1)u′(x∗) > (N − 1)u′(x∗) > 0.
Combining the above results implies the unique (q∗,p∗) for a given .
4.2.2 Symmetric Beliefs
In contrast to passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs mean that when an agent receives an
out-of-equilibrium offer, he believes that other agents receive the same offer. Symmetric
beliefs have been widely employed in the private contracting game such as [9], and in
related contracting games such as [71] and [72]. As [72] argue, one rationale for symmetric
beliefs is that the agent believes that the principal has the incentive to make the same
deviation on other contracts.
We redefine symmetric beliefs by allowing for the heterogeneities of agents repre-
sented by their respective shocks, while those two justifications for the original symmetric
beliefs are plausible under the assumption that agents are identical. In practice, it is com-
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mon that different agents receive different contracts. Specifically, when agent i receives an
out-of-equilibrium offer qi, he believes that the quantity agent j receives is B(qi, q∗i , q
∗
j ),
where B(qi, q∗i , q
∗
j ) = q
∗
j + (qi− q∗i ). The first term q∗j captures the heterogeneity of agents
because equilibrium quantities depend on shocks; the second term (qi − q∗i ) follows the
rationale that agents interpret relative deviations as trembles by the principal and assume
that those trembles are perfectly correlated, that is, agent i believes that the quantities
received by other agents change by the same relative deviation. In short, with symmetric
beliefs agent i revises his initial belief about other agent’s offer by adding the same relative
deviation (qi − q∗i ).
Our symmetric beliefs does not only satisfy the consistency requirement of the PBE,
it is also important for the well-defined Nash bargaining solution with symmetric beliefs
because the Nash bargaining solution with symmetric beliefs is more complicated than
passive beliefs. Under passive beliefs pi is obtained by solving the single equation given
the equilibrium contracts {(q∗j , p∗j)}j 6=i and the deviation trade qi. However, for the calcu-
lation of pi with symmetric beliefs it is necessary to specify the way in which agent i’s
belief about other agent j’s payment is determined. To this end, we assume that both the
principal and agent i anticipate that other agent j’s payment is also determined through
Nash bargaining solution (see [63]), and that agent i believes that agent j reasons the same
way. The latter assumption implies that agent i’s belief about agent k’s trade given agent
i’s received trade qi should be equal to agent j’s belief about agent k’s trade given agent
j’s believed tradeB(qi, q∗i , q
∗
j ), that is,B(qi, q
∗
i , q
∗
k) = B(B(qi, q
∗
i , q
∗
j ), q
∗
j , q
∗
k), which holds
with our specification of symmetric beliefs.8
Under the above assumptions we can obtain the Nash bargaining solution of pi as well
as agent i’s belief about other agents’ payments by solving a well-defined system of N
8However, the polynomial specification, B(qi, q∗i , q
∗
j ) = q
∗
j +
∑K
k=1 λk(qi − q∗i ), does not satisfy this
implication unless λk = 0 for all k = 1, · · · ,K.
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simultaneous payment equations. Let
qi ≡ [B(qi, q∗i , q∗1), · · · , B(qi, q∗i , q∗i−1), qi, B(qi, q∗i , q∗i+1), · · · , B(qi, q∗i , x∗N)]′,
be agent i’s believed trade vector. Then, the Nash bargaining solution of pi is
pi =
1− 2γ +Nγ
(1− γ)(1− γ +Nγ)
[
γc(xi) + (1− γ)qi(u(xi) + i)
]
− γ
(1− γ)(1− γ +Nγ)
∑
j 6=i
{
γc(xi) + (1− γ)[q∗j + (qi − q∗i )][u(xi) + j]
}
,
where xi =
∑N
j=1 q
i
j = x
∗ + N(qi − q∗i ), and x∗ ≡
∑N
i=1 q
∗
i . Then, {(q∗i , p∗i )}Ni=1 can be
sustained in equilibrium under symmetric beliefs if and only if
q∗ ∈ argmax
q∈Q×···×Q
pi2(q, q
∗, γ|),
where
pi2(q, q
∗, γ|)
≡ 1
(1− γ)(1− γ +Nγ)
N∑
i=1
{
(1− 2γ +Nγ) [γc(xi) + (1− γ)qi(u(xi) + i)]
−γ
∑
j 6=i
[
γc(xi) + (1− γ)[q∗j + (qi − q∗i )](u(xi) + j)
]}− c( N∑
i=1
qi
)
.
Under similar conditions with Lemma 6, the lemma below provides a set of sufficient
conditions for the unique existence of equilibrium of the contracting with externalities
under symmetric beliefs.
Lemma 7. (uniqueness of equilibrium under symmetric beliefs) Under the conditions (a)
in Lemma 6, (b) (c, u) ∈ H2, where H2 denote the set of functions (c, u) such that (i)
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u ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0; (ii) both u and c are triple continuously differentiable, u′(·) > 0, and
c′′(·) > 0; (iii) pi2(q, q∗, γ|) is concave in q for any . Then, there exists a unique Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (q∗(),p∗()) ≡ {(q∗i (), p∗i ())}Ni=1 under symmetric beliefs.
Proof of Lemma 7 The proof is the similar to that of Lemma 6 with exception that we need
the additional condition that c′′(·) > 0 to guarantee that there is a one-to-one mapping
between the aggregate trade x∗ and aggregate shock ξ ≡ ∑Ni=1 i by combining the first
order condition i = c′(x∗) − u(x∗) −Nq∗i u′(x∗) and the second order condition [N(1 −
γ)]−1[1− γ(N2 −N + 1)]c′′(x∗)− 2u′(x∗)− x∗u′′(x∗) > 0.
By comparison it is clear that the equilibrium outcome under passive beliefs differs
from that under symmetric beliefs. Suppose that both u and c are first continuously dif-
ferentiable, the first-order condition with respect to the optimal trade vector under passive
beliefs is i = c′(x∗)−u(x∗)−q∗i u′(x∗) for each i ∈ N , while under symmetric beliefs it is
i = c
′(x∗)−u(x∗)−Nq∗i u′(x∗). Accordingly, the optimal payment vector differs between
passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs. Similar results on the dependence of equilibrium
outcomes on passive beliefs or symmetric beliefs can be found in other papers. For exam-
ple, in a contracting game consisting of a monopoly manufacturer and two independent
and competing retailers, [9] show that the manufacturerŠ’s profit is higher with symmetry
beliefs than with passive beliefs.
4.3 Identification
This section presents the identification of the contracting with externalities under pas-
sive beliefs and symmetric beliefs, respectively. Hereafter, we use capital letters to in-
dicate random variables and small letters for their realizations. Denote by {(Qi, Pi)}Ni=1
the observed contracts generated under the same equilibrium. Denote by Z˜ the homo-
geneous characteristics of agents. Since Z˜ may vary across observations, our identifica-
tion arguments should be interpreted as conditional on Z˜, and hence the model primitives
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conditional on Z˜ = z˜ are Sz˜ ≡ [u(·, z˜), c(·, z˜), γ(z˜), F|Z˜=z˜(·)]. In what follows, for a
generic multivariate function a(·), we denote the first and second derivative with resect
to its first component by a′(·) and a′′(·), respectively, and denote the inverse function of
a(·) with respect to its first component by a−1(·). Let Z˜ ≡ (Z,Z0) with the support
Z˜ = (Z,Z0) ⊂ Rdz˜ . Since our identification argument holds regardless of the dimension
of Z, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that dz = 1 in this section. And, Z = [z, z]
with −∞ < z < z <∞. Now we make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.  is independent of Z, conditional on Z0.
Assumption 5 guarantees that, conditional on Z0, the distribution of  is the the same
for any value of Z. The conditional independence implies that it allows for the dependence
between  and Z, and also requires that Z0 involves richer -related information than Z.
Note that the any primitive function in Sz˜ is not necessarily a function of the vector z0,
though we explicitly write z0 as an argument of these functions. Since the following as-
sumptions and identification results can be interpreted as conditional on Z0, the inclusion
of Z0 does not add any complication to our identification. Hence, for ease of exposition,
we will omit Z0 from the model, and rewrite the model primitives conditional on Z = z
as Sz ≡ [u(·, z), c(·, z), γ(z), F(·)]. And, we assume both u and c are triple continuously
differentiable on its support X × Z , and the density f(z) > 0 for any z ∈ Z .
4.3.1 Identification of u(·)
As shown in the proof of Lemma 6, there is a one-to-one mapping between aggregate
trade X ≡∑Ni=1 Qi and aggregate shock ξ ≡∑Ni=1 i,
ξ = Nc′(X, z)−Nu(X, z)−Xu′(X, z) ≡ s(X, z), (4.1)
where s′(X, z) > 0. Hence, X = s−1(ξ, z) and s−1′(·, z) > 0.
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We focus on the identification the function u(·, z) by recovering some features of a
system of simultaneous equations. Substituting s(X,Z) into (4.1) gives rise to the system
of simultaneous equations
 ≡ m(Q, Z) = (m1(Q, Z), · · · ,mN(Q, Z))′, (4.2)
where i ≡ mi(Q, Z) = N−1s(X,Z) + N−1Xu′(X,Z) − Qiu′(X,Z). We will provide
a lemma which shows the identification of features of the above simultaneous system,
which is important to establish the identification of u(·), since the primitive function u(·)
can be viewed as a feature of the simultaneous system m(·). This lemma is built upon
[40, 42] who provide the nonparametric identification of features of a system of simulta-
neous equations with nonadditive unobserved random errors, though not focusing on the
identification of the system itself. The identification is defined in terms of the definition
of observational equivalence. Roughly, the main idea is to explore the restrictions that in-
dependence between X and Z2 imposes on any function m˜, and further, those restrictions
can be expressed in terms of rank conditions.
Let us introduce some notations used in the statement of the lemma below. Let Γ be
the set of functions (u, c) in H1 and F be the set of distributions F such that both sets
satisfy Assumption 5. Consider another possible observationally equivalent function m˜,
i.e., m˜i(Q, Z) ≡ N−1s(X,Z) + N−1Xu˜′(X,Z) − Qiu˜′(X,Z) for another function u˜.
For all (q, z), let ∂m˜(q,z)
∂q
and ∂m(q,z)
∂z
be the Jacobian matrices with respect to q and z,
respectively, and ∂log(f(m(q, z))/∂ be the N × 1 gradient of log(f(m(q, z))) with
respect to , evaluated at  = m(q, z). Also, define
∆q(q, z; ∂m, ∂
2m, ∂m˜, ∂2m˜) ≡ ∂
∂q
log
(
det
(
∂m(q, z)
∂q
))
− ∂
∂q
log
(
det
(
∂m˜(q, z)
∂q
))
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∆z(q, z; ∂m, ∂
2m, ∂m˜, ∂2m˜) ≡ ∂
∂z
log
(
det
(
∂m(q, z)
∂q
))
− ∂
∂z
log
(
det
(
∂m˜(q, z)
∂q
))
,
Lemma 8. Suppose that (m, F) ∈ Γ × F and m˜ ∈ Γ. There exists F˜ ∈ F such that
(m˜, F˜) is observationally equivalent to (m, F) if and only if for all q, z, the rank of the
matrix
(
∂m˜(q,z)
∂q
)′
∆q(q, z; ∂m, ∂
2m, ∂m˜, ∂2m˜) +
(
∂m(q,z)
∂q
)′
∂log(f(m(q,z)))
∂(
∂m˜(q,z)
∂z
)′
∆z(q, z; ∂m, ∂
2m, ∂m˜, ∂2m˜) +
(
∂m(q,z)
∂z
)′
∂log(f(m(q,z)))
∂
 (4.3)
is N .
Next, we impose additional restrictions on the functional form of u in terms of additive
separability of only characteristics z, and on the distribution of  as well as normalizations
on u and c.
Assumption 6.
(i) u(x, z) = u1(x) + u2(z).
(ii) For arbitrary q ∈ QN , there exists z0(q) ∈ Z such that
∂f(m(q, z0(q)))
∂i
= 0 ∀i ∈ N and ∂u2(z)
∂z0(q)
6= 0,
(iii) u1 ≡ u1(x), u1 = u′1(x).
Condition (i) requires that there exists at least one element of Z satisfying the additive
separability in u. It simply assumes that there exists at least one characteristic variable
satisfying the additive separability, and it still allows for the general cases that other char-
acteristics interact with the aggregate quantity in some unknown way because our identi-
fication arguments can be interpreted as given other characteristics, though based on the
variation of z. It is worth noting that even though all characteristics are additively separa-
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ble, it still captures the heterogenous marginal revenue because u is the marginal revenue
function.
The first condition in (ii) impose restrictions on the distribution of f, which is also
used for the identification of a demand and supply model by [40], and the second condition
is generally satisfied since it requires that the principal’s marginal cost is not equal to
agent’s marginal effect of u′2(z) at z = z
0(q). Condition (iii) is the normalization on the
value of functions u at the lower bound x = x.
Proposition 4. Suppose (u, c) ∈ Γ and F ∈ F. Under Assumptions 5-6, u1(·) is non-
parametrically identified.
The identification strategy takes several steps. First, based on the lemma 8 we identify
the ratio u′′1/u
′
1 by combining conditions (i)-(ii) in Assumption 6, and hence identify
u(x, z) under additional normalization (iii).
4.3.2 Identification of u2(·), c(·, z) and F(1,··· ,N )(·)
The identification of s(·, z) is key to the identification of structural elements u(·, z)
and c(·, z). Suppose that s(·, z) is identified. Then, c(·, z) can be identified if u(·, z)
is identified. However, without more information, s(·, z) is identified up to a monotone
transformation, as shown in [47]. In this view, [47] proposes some normalizations on
s(·, z) to identify it. However, those normalizations are very restrictive in this model be-
cause s(·, z) is not the structural element, and the traditional linear specifications of u(·, z)
and c(·, z) do not satisfy those normalizations. Indeed, those normalizations impose some
functional relationship between u(·, z) and c(·, z). Since u(·, z) relies on the competi-
tion among agents while c(·, z) relies on the principal’s productivity, it is not plausible to
impose functional relationship between these two functions.
We will identify s(·, z) by using the identification results in [40, 42]. By exploring the
(conditional) independence between Z and ξ and strictly monotonicity of s(·, z), we can
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identify the first partial derivative s′(·, z),9 and then recover s(·, z) under some normaliza-
tions on u(x, z) and c(x, z).
Assumption 7.
(i) Z is an agent-specific variable such that c(x, z) = c(x),
(ii) u2 ≡ u2(z), c ≡ c(x), c′ ≡ c′(x), c′′ ≡ c′′(x).
Condition (i) is plausible because the cost function represents the productivity of the
principal while Z affects the marginal revenue of the agent. Condition (ii) is normaliza-
tions on u2(·) at z = z, and c(·), c′(·) and c′′(·) at x = x.
Proposition 5. Suppose (u, c) ∈ Γ and F ∈ F. Under Assumptions 5-7, u2(·), c(·) and
F(·) are nonparametrically identified.
4.3.3 Identification of γ(z)
Based on the identified functions u, c, and F, we aim to identify the bargaining power
function γ(·). According to the optimal condition (4.1), the optimal payment for each
i ∈ N is
Pi = Qiu(X, z) +
γ(z)
1− γ(z) +Nγ(z)
[
c(X, z)−Xu(X, z)−
∑
j 6=i
Qjj
]
+
1− 2γ(z) +Nγ(z)
1− γ(z) +Nγ(z) Qii,
Denote by Y ≡∑Ni=1 Pi the aggregate optimal payment, we have
Y = (1−γ(z)+Nγ(z))−1
[
γ(z)Nc(X, z) + (1− γ(z))
(
Xc′(X, z)− u′(X, z)
N∑
i=1
Q2i
)]
,
(4.4)
9See the formal proof in [40]. The identification is defined in terms of observational equivalence.
Roughly, the main idea is to explore the restrictions that independence between X and Z imposes on s(·, z),
and further, those restrictions can be expressed in terms of rank conditions.
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In reality, the observed payment in the contract may deviate from the optimal pay-
ment int he sense that the observed payment P˜i = Pi + ηi for each agent i, where ηi
is a random term unknown to all players. One reason for the deviation is that ηi may
represent the measurement error which is more plausible for the survey data. In addi-
tion, ηi could incorporate corruption, side payment, or political capture ([3]). Indeed, the
deviation of observed payment from optimal payment is used not only in the nonpara-
metric/semiparametric identification of contracts such as a contract model with adverse
selection and moral hazard in [3], it is also adopted in the empirical analysis by using
contract data. For example, [18] use the French transportation contracts to evaluate the
renegotiation cost. Below we follow the same line in the identification of contract models
to identify the bargaining power function γ(z).
Assumption 8. The observed payment P˜i = Pi+ηi withE(ηi|Z = z) = 0 for each i ∈ N .
The assumption is relatively weak in the sense that we do not impose any restrictions
on the correlation between i and ηi and hence allows for the correlation between i and ηi.
In particular, in some developing countries or emerging industries, there maybe some tacit
collusion between the upstream firm and the downstream firms due to their institutional
weakness, thus suggesting the correlation between between i and ηi.
Under Assumption 8, Y˜ ≡ ∑Ni=1 P˜i = Y + ζ with E(ζ|Z = z) = 0, where ζ ≡
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∑N
i=1 ηi. Hence, we can identify γ(z) by γ(z) = a1(z)
−1a2(z), where
a1(z) ≡ E
{
(N − 1)Y −Nc(s−1(ξ, z), z) + s−1(ξ, z)c′(s−1(ξ, z), z)
−[u′(s−1(ξ, z), z)]−1
N∑
i=1
[
c′(s−1(ξ, z), z)− u(s−1(ξ, z), z)− i
]2 ∣∣∣∣Z = z},
a2(z) ≡ E
{
s−1(ξ, z)c′(s−1(ξ, z), z)
−[u′(s−1(ξ, z), z)]−1
N∑
i=1
[
c′(s−1(ξ, z), z)− u(s−1(ξ, z), z)− i
]2 ∣∣∣∣Z = z}.
Now we summarize the identification result under passive beliefs.
Theorem 4. Under the conditions in Lemma 6 and Assumptions 5-8, the model structure
with passive beliefs Sz ≡ [u(·, z), c(·, z), γ(z), F(·)] is nonparametrically identified.
The identification strategy applies to symmetric beliefs since the optimal conditions
are similar for both beliefs.
Theorem 5. Under the conditions in Lemma 7 and Assumptions 5-8, the model structure
with symmetric beliefs Sz ≡ [u(·, z), c(·), γ(z), F(·)] is nonparametrically identified.
4.4 Nonparametric Estimation
In this section, we propose the nonparametric estimators of the primitive functions
by following the constructive nonparametric identification strategy, and then show the
uniform consistency of these estimators under regular assumptions. Assume that the
dataset {Qt,Pt}Tt=1 is generated by the same equilibrium, where Qt = (Qt,1, · · · , Qt,N),
Pt = (Pt,1, · · · , Pt,N), and T is the sample size. As in the identification, the estimation
procedures under both belief structures are similar and without loss of generality, we focus
on the estimation under passive beliefs.
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4.4.1 Nonparametric Estimators
The nonparametric estimation takes two steps. First, we adopt the sieve method to
estimate c(·, ·), u′(·, ·) and γ(·) based on the equation of optimal payment Y . Second,
we estimate the pseudo random shock vector  and thereby estimate the joint distribution
function F.
Recall that Y˜ = Y + ζ implied by Assumption 8, the identification of bargaining
power function is obtained under the weak exogeneous condition E(ζ|Z) = 0 without
imposing stronger condition E(ζ|Q, Z) = 0. To my knowledge, under E(ζ|Q, Z) 6= 0
there is no existing literature on the consistent estimators of (u, c, γ, F). Hence, we adopt
the sieve method to solve the potential endogeneity of Q by assuming that there exists an
instrumental vectorZq ∈ Zq ⊂ RN such thatE(ζ|V ) = 0, where V ≡ (Z ′, Z ′q)′ ∈ Z×Zq,
and Z × Zq is a compact subset of Rdz+N . In our used data on stents, one plausible
instrument vector is the quantity of the balloon-tipped catheter of each hospital. During
the process of an angioplasty the doctor threads a balloon-tipped catheter from a peripheral
access point to the heart, and hence it is reasonable to assume that the quantity of catheters
is to a large extent correlated to the quantity of stents while it is uncorrelated to the payment
error of stents. 10
Following [41], we consider a typical space of smooth functions, the Hölder space, to
which the unknown true functions belong. For any generic vector w ∈ W ⊂ Rdw with
dw > 0, let a = (a1, · · · , adw)T and denote the (a1 + · · ·+ adw)th derivative of g(w) by
∇ag(w) ≡ ∂
a1+a2+···+adwg(w)
∂wa11 · · · ∂wadwdw
.
10A balloon catheter is a type of “soft” catheter with an inflatable “balloon” at its tip which is used
during a catheterization procedure to enlarge a narrow opening or passage within the body. The deflated
balloon catheter is positioned, then inflated to perform the necessary procedure, and deflated again in order
to be removed. Some common uses include: angioplasty or balloon septostomy, via cardiac catheterization
(heart cath); tuboplasty via uterine catheterization; pyeloplasty using a detachable inflatable balloon stent
positioned via a cystocopic transvesicular approach.
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The Hölder space Λι(W) of order ι is a space of functions g : W 7→ R such that the
first ι derivative is bounded, where ι denote the largest integer satisfying ι > ι, and the ι
derivative are Hölder continuous with the exponent ι− ι ∈ (0, 1], i.e.,
max
a1+a2+···+adw=ι
|∇ag(w)−∇ag(w′)| ≤ const.(||w − w′||E)ι−ι
for all w, w′ ∈ W , where || · ||E denotes the Euclidean norm. Furthermore, the Hölder
space becomes a Banach space with the following Hölder norm
||g||Λι = sup
w∈W
|g(w)|+ max
a1+a2+···+adw=ι
sup
w 6=w′
∇ag(w)−∇ag(w′)
(||w − w′||E)ι−ι .
The Hölder space denoted by Λι(W) incurs a Hölder ball Λιb(W) ≡ {g ∈ Λιb(W) :
||g||Λι ≤ b < ∞}. It is known that power series, Fourier series, splines and wavelets all
can approximate functions in Λιb(W) well. Let W = (X,Z ′)′ andW = X ×Z . For some
integer ι > (1 + dz)/2, we assume the unknown true functions $0 = (u′0, c0, γ0) belong
to the set of functions F ≡ C × U ×Υ, where
C ≡ {c(·) : c(·) ∈ Λιb(X ) and Assumption 6 holds}
U ≡ {u′1(·) : u′1(·) ∈ Λιb(X ) and Assumption 6 holds}
Υ ≡ {γ(·) : γ(·) ∈ Λιb(Z)}.
Then, we use the sieve method to estimate the unknown primitive functions with a
univariate B-spline of order r > ι given by
Br(u) =
1
(r − 1)!
r∑
i=0
(−1)iCir[max(0, u− i)]r−1,
to construct a spline-wavelet sieve basis {2k/2Br(2kWl − i) : i = 0,±1,±2, · · · , k =
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0, · · · , KT} for each l = 1, · · · , dw to approximate functions in Λι(X × Z), where KT is
the smoothing parameter depending on the sample size T . 11 In the sieve approximations,
we will replace the space F with the finite-dimensional space FT ≡ CT ×UT ×ΥT , where
CT ≡ {c(x, z) = pKT (x)′δc for all δc such that c ∈ C}
UT ≡ {u′1(x) = pKT (x)′δu for all δu such that u′1 ∈ U}
ΥT ≡ {γ(z) = pKT (z)′δγ for all δγ such that γ ∈ Υ}.
By assuming the homoscedasticity of ηt,i (t = 1 · · · , T , i = 1, · · · , N ), the sieve minimum
distance (SMD) estimators of (cˆ(·), uˆ′(·), γˆ(·)) are defined as
(cˆ(·), uˆ′1(·), γˆ(·)) = argmin
$≡(c(·),u′1(·),γ(·))∈FT
1
T
T∑
t=1
m̂(Vt, $)
′m̂(Vt, $), (4.5)
where m̂(v,$) is the sieve estimator of m(v,$) ≡ ∫ ρ(y˜, q, z;$)dFY˜ ,Q|V=v(y˜, q),
ρ(Y˜ ,Q, Z,$) ≡ Y˜ − Nγ(Z)
1− γ(Z) +Nγ(Z)c(X)−Xc
′(X)
1− γ(Z)
1− γ(Z) +Nγ(Z)
+
(1− γ(Z))
1− γ(Z) +Nγ(Z)u
′
1(X)
N∑
j=1
Q2j ,
and
m̂(V,$) =
T∑
t=1
ρ(Y˜t,Qt, Zt, $)p
KT (Vt)
′(P ′P )−1pKT (Vt),
where P ≡ (pKT (V1), · · · , pKT (VT ))′. Indeed, the sieve estimator m̂(V,$) is simply the
ordinary least square estimation by regressing ρ(Y˜t,Qt, Zt, $) on pKT (Vt)′ and hence it
can be interpreted as a GMM or nonlinear 2SLS estimator (see [41]).
11Suppose the smoothing parameter is KxT for c(x) and u1(x) and is KzT for γ(z). Since dz can
be greater than 1, we employ a tensor-product linear sieve basis that is simply the product of univariate
sieves such that the constructed tensor-product sieve basis for γ(z) is K1zT × 1 vector pK1zT (Z) with
K1zT = (2
KzT )dz . For simplicity, we assume that K1zT = KxT = KT , though this can be easily relaxed.
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In the second step, we propose the nonparametric estimators of u(x, z) and F(·). Since
ξ = Nc′(X,Z) − Nu1(X) − Nu2(Z) − Xu′1(X), under the assumption that E[i|Z =
z] = 0, we obtain the kernel estimator of u2(z). The conditional zero mean assumption
is plausible when u(·) is interpreted as the average marginal revenue in the market. Let
K : Rdz → R be a kernel function and hT is the bandwidth depending on the sample size
T . Then
û2(z) =
[
T∑
t=1
[ĉ′(Xt)− û1(Xt)−N−1Xtû′1(Xt)]K
(
Zt − z
hT
)][ T∑
t=1
K
(
Zt − z
hT
)]−1
.
Therefore, we can construct a sample of pseudo random vector through ̂t,i = ĉ′1(Xt) −
û1(Xt)− û2(Zt)− û′1(Xt)Qt,i, for each t = 1, · · · , T and i = 1, · · · , N .
Finally, we propose the kernel estimator of joint distribution f by using the sample of
pseudo random vectors. Let e = (e1, · · · , eN) ∈ S, where S is a bounded set excluding
the boundary of EN , f̂(e) = (ThN )−1
∑T
t=1
∏N
i=1 k
(
ei−̂t,i
h
)
, where k(·) is a PDF, and
h is the bandwidth depending on the sample size T .
4.4.2 Uniform Consistency
In this subsection we first establish the uniform consistency of ĉ(x, z), û′(x, z), and
γ̂(z), under the following sufficient assumptions.
Assumption 9. The data {(Qt,Pt, Zt)}Tt=1 are i.i.d..
This i.i.d. condition can be easily relaxed for the results on consistency and rate of
convergence ([41]).
Assumption 10. (i) V is a compact connected subset ofRN+dz with Lipschitz continuous
boundary, and fV is bounded and bounded away from zero. (ii) max
1≤k≤KT
E[|pk(V )|2] ≤
const., and the smallest eigenvalue of E[pKT (·)× pKT (·)′] is bounded away from zeros for
all KT . (iii) There is a sequence of measurable functions {ρT (Y,Q, Z)}∞T=1 and a finite
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constantM1 > 0 such that |ρ(Y˜ ,Q, Z; ΠT$0)| ≤ ρT (Y˜ ,Q, Z) andE[ρT (Y˜ ,Q, Z)2|V ] ≤
M1, and there is pKT (V )′pi such that E{[m(V,ΠT$0)− pKT (V )′pi]2} = O(K−2ι/(N+dz)T ).
(iv) KT = o(T 1/2).
Assumption 10-(iv) requires a relatively large sample size or a relatively small dimen-
sion of Z.
Assumption 11. E[m(V,$)′m(V,$)] is continuous at $0 under the sup norm.
Assumption 12. (i) KT <∞ and KT →∞ as T →∞. (ii) Assumptions 6 hold for $ in
a neighborhood of $0 in the sup norm || · ||s.
Assumption 12-(ii) guarantees that F is compact under the sup norm.
Lemma 9. Let (cˆ(·), uˆ′(·), γˆ(·)) defined in (4.5) be the SMD estimator. SupposeE[η2t,i|V ] =
σ2ηI with ση > 0, Assumptions 9-12 hold, then sup
(x,z)
|cˆ(x) − c0(x)| = op(1), sup
(x,z)
|uˆ′1(x) −
u′1,0(x)| = op(1), and sup
z
|γˆ(z)− γ0(z)| = op(1).
Given the uniform consistency result, we restrict our attention to a shrinking || · ||s
neighborhood around $0. Let
Fs ≡ {$ ∈ F : ||$ −$0||s ≤ µ, ||$||s ≤M2, } and FsT ≡ Fs ∩ FT
for some positive finite constantsM2, and a sufficiently small positive µ such that Pr($̂ /∈
Fs) < µ. For the purpose of establishing a rate of convergence under the sup norm, we
treat Fs as the new space and FsT as its sieve space. We introduce the pseudometric on Fs
that could be weaker than || · ||s. Let the first pathwise derivative in the direction [$−$0]
evaluated at $0 as
dm(V,$)
d$
[$ −$0] ≡ dE[ρ(Y,Q, Z, (1− τ)$0 + τ$)|V ]
dτ
∣∣∣
τ=0
,
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and
||$1 −$2||2 ≡ E
[(
dm(V,$0)
d$
[$1 −$2]
)′(
dm(V,$0)
d$
[$1 −$2]
)]
Assumption 13. (i) Fs and FsT are convex, and there is a finite constant M3 > 0 such
that ||$ − $0|| ≤ M3||$ − $0||s for all $ ∈ Fos. (ii) There are finite constants
M4,M5 > 0 such that ||$ − $0||2 ≤ M4E[m(V,$)′m(V,$)] holds for all $ ∈ FosT ;
and M5E[m(V,ΠT$0)′m(V,ΠT$0)] ≤ ||ΠT$0 −$0||2.
Assumption 13-(i) implies that the pseudometric ||$−$0|| is weaker than ||$−$0||s.
(ii) implies that the weaker pseudometric ||$ −$0|| is Lipschitz continuous with respect
to the population criterion function E[m(V,$)′m(V,$)] for all $ ∈ FsT .
Proposition 6. Let (cˆ(·), uˆ′1(·), γˆ(·)) defined in (4.5) be the SMD estimator. Under the
same assumptions in Lemma 9 and Assumption 13, then sup
(x,z)
|cˆ(x, z)− c(x, z)| = Op(aT ),
sup
(x,z)
|uˆ′1(x)−u1,0(x)| = Op(aT ), and sup
z
|γˆ(z)−γ(z)| = Op(aT ), where aT = a1T +a2T ,
a1T = (KT )
−ι/(1+dz), a2T = sup
$∈FosT :||$−ΠT$0||≤max{δm,T ,||$0−ΠT$0||}
||$ − ΠT$0||s with
δ2m,T = max
(
T−1KT , K
−2ι/(N+dz)
T
)
The proof follows Theorem 4.1 in [39] and omitted.
Second, we prove the uniform consistency of û2(z) and ̂t,i under standard smoothing
conditions of the density of z.
Assumption 14. (i) The density fZ is differentiable and u2(z) is twice differentiable, and
that the derivative functions all satisfy the Lipschitz condition |a(z)−m(z′)| ≤ C1|z− z′|
for some C1 > 0, where a(z) = u′′2(z) or f
′
Z(z). (ii) inf
z∈Zint
fZ(z) ≥ δ > 0, where Zint
exclues the boundary range of Z . (iii) The kernel K(·) is symmetric, bounded, and has
compact support. Define Hl(z) = |z|lK(z), we assume that |Hl(z)−Hl(z′)| ≤ C2|z− z′|
for some C2 > 0 for all 0 ≤ l ≤ 3. (iv) As T →∞, hT → 0 and ThT (lnT )−1 →∞.
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Assumption 14 are standard assumptions on uniform convergence of kernel estimators.
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumptions in proposition 6 and Assumption 14 hold. Then,
sup
z∈Zint
|û2(z)− u(z)| = Op(bT ) = op(1), where bT = ln(T )1/2(ThT )−1/2 + h2T .
Let
u˜2(z) =
[
T∑
t=1
[
c′(Xt)− u1(Xt)−N−1Xtu′1(Xt)
]
K
(
Zt − z
hT
)][ T∑
t=1
K
(
Zt − z
hT
)]−1
.
Then
sup
z∈Zint
|û2(z)− u(z)| ≤ sup
z∈Zint
|û2(z)− u˜(z)|+ sup
z∈Zint
|u˜2(z)− u(z)| = Op(aT+bT ) = op(1).
where the first rate aT follows proposition 6, and the second rate bT follows the standard re-
sult on kernel estimators An immediate consistency result of Proposition 7 is sup
t,i
|̂t,i − t,i| =
Op[max(aT , bT )] = op(1) because ̂t,i = ĉ′(Xt)− û(Xt, Zt)− û′1(Xt)Qt,i, for any t and i.
Assumption 15. (i) The bounded kernel k ∈ L1 satisfies |k(e) − k(e˜)| ≤ C|e − e˜|
for all e, e˜ on EN with some constant C > 0; (ii) The bandwidth h → 0 such that
ThN (lnT )
−1 →∞ and (aT + bT )T (lnT )−1 → 0 as T →∞
Proposition 8. Under Assumptions in proposition 7 and Assumption 15, we have
sup
e∈S
∣∣∣f̂(e)− f(e)∣∣∣ = Op {(aT + bT )h−N + [(ThN )−1lnT ]1/2 + h2} = op(1).
4.5 Empirical Application
We now apply our method to the coronary stents contracts in the United States. As in
the theoretical model, the manufacturer of stents negotiate with each hospital, specifying
the payment for a given quantity of stents in each bilateral contract. Due to the secrecy
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of contracts and the competition among hospitals, this unique dataset is particularly suit-
able for our model. Our empirical findings show that passive beliefs fit the dataset better
than symmetric beliefs. More relevantly, the counterfactual result shows that if the agent’s
bargaining power increases, under passive beliefs the stent’s price decreases by some rea-
sonable amount, while under symmetric beliefs the decrease of price is unreasonable.
4.5.1 Data and Background on Coronary Stent
The coronary stent is a critical medical device used in angioplasty to treat the coronary
artery disease (i.e., blockages in the arteries surrounding the heart) which might cause
heart attack or even death. The traditional “bare metal stent” (BMS) has the drawback
that scar tissue growth can lead to significant renarrowing of the artery. For this reason,
the “Drug-eluting stent” (DES) was introduced in the early 2000s as an improvement over
BMS by coating the stent with a drug that discourages scar tissue growth and significantly
reduces the incidence of renarrowing. The global sales of coronary stents was $8.1 billion
in 2014 and is expected to grow to roughly $10.6 billion in 2019, and the North American
market reached $3.1 billion in 2014 and is expected to grow to $4.4 billion in 2019.12
The dataset is from Millennium Research Group’s (MRG) MarketTrack survey of hos-
pitals in US from 2006 to 2014, and its goal is to provide representative estimates of
market shares and prices by US region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West). The dataset
consists of quantities and prices as well as hospital’s characteristics (census region, teach-
ing/nonteaching, public/private) at the product-hospital-month level.13 The stent market
12Source: BCC Research 2015, “Stents: Technologies and Global Markets.”
13The four regions are based on the regional divisions used by the US Census Bureau. A teaching hospital
is a facility that is associated with a medical school and provides clinical training for health care profession-
als. A public hospital is a facility that is funded by the state or federal government, while a private hospital
is funded by patients and insurers. Note that a private hospital can be for-profit or not-for-profit. Non-profit
hospitals are mostly funded by charity, religion or research/educational funds. The hospital industry in the
United States includes a mix of ownership forms. Non-profit hospitals are the most common type, but for-
profit and government hospitals also play substantial roles. Nonprofit hospitals do not pay federal income or
state and local property taxes, and in return they benefit the community. For-profit hospitals, or alternatively
investor-owned hospitals, attempt to garner a profit for their shareholders. Because public hospitals are pub-
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is dominated by four firms: the Abbott Vascular (formerly Guidant) division of Abbott
Laboratories, Boston Scientific, Johnson and Johnson’s Cordis division, and Medtronic.14
The monthly sample can be representative of the contracting game despite the monthly
frequency. The sample pool consists of 160 hospital labs. Because the identities of hos-
pitals vary in each month’s observation in the dataset, the sample provides substantial
variations of contracts, suggesting the representativeness of the sample. Indeed, the goal
of the dataset by MRG is to produce representative estimates of the distribution of market
shares and prices in the stent market.
The empirical analysis will focus on the subsample of the northeastern region in terms
of the intensity of competition among hospitals in these four regions. On the one side,
the area of northeastern region is much smaller than other three regions and patients are
very sensitive to travel time ([60]; [73]). On the other side, Figure 4.1 shows that the
market share of quantities in northeastern region is comparable to other three regions on
a monthly basis. Hence, the most competitive northeast region is most relevant to our
model. Actually, the dataset collected by MRG is to produce representative estimates
of the distribution of market shares and prices by region, which is the relevant unit of
observation for this study.
4.5.2 Descriptive Analysis
Figure 4.2 provides the basic patterns of two key variables quantities and prices. As
the left panel indicates, during 2006 the DES market size decreased dramatically while the
BMS market size increased moderately. This is caused by a study concerning the safety of
DES, though one year later it became clearer that DES were not as dangerous as the study
suggested. Since 2007, Both DES and BMS total quantities are relatively stable over time,
licly funded and not for profit, they are usually a lot more affordable than private hospitals (see more details
at http://www.npinstitute.com/public-vs-private-hospitals-s/1852.htm).
14Because the dataset used in this paper is sold as market research to the device manufacturers, hospitals
are anonymous, which might prevent other analysis involving the identities of hospitals.
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Figure 4.1: Market shares of quantities for each region over time
though the BMS market size is slightly decreasing from 2013.
Based on the right panel, average prices of BMS and DES have a markedly decreasing
trend, and in particular, DES price decreased by about 30 percent over time, which maybe
explained by a more competitive stent market over time. During the sample period more
manufacturers entered the stent market, resulting in decreasing prices.15 In addition, the
price of DES is much higher than BMS due to the advantages of DES over BMS. There-
fore, we will use type-month detrended prices in the empirical analysis to control for both
the effect of stent types on prices and the effect of competition among manufacturers on
prices, where detrended prices are obtained from a regression of prices on dummy for
types and time trend. Accordingly, detrended prices can match the model well in the sense
that the four manufacturers can be considered to behave as a single manufacturer.
We will show the relevance of the dataset to our model in terms of competition among
hospitals and negotiated prices, respectively. First, hospitals compete for patients with
15See “Positive Studies Boost Stent Manufacturers as Market Competition Heats Up” at
http://www.mddionline.com/article/positive-studies-boost-stent-manufacturers-market-competition-heats.
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Figure 4.2: Total quantities and average price trend over time
coronary artery diseases by increasing the quality of service. Using data in Pennsylvania
during the years 1995-2004, [73] measure the degree of competition among hospitals for
patients with coronary artery diseases in terms of predicted market shares, and find that
hospitals in more competitive markets achieved lower mortality among severely ill patients
by increasing the quality of service.
Second, the variation of type-month detrended prices of coronary stents is still sub-
stantial across hospitals due to the following reasons. As Figure 4.3 displays, there is
a large variation of detrended prices across hospitals, with a standard deviation of $125
and mean of $1, 212, for a coefficient of variation of 0.10. Further, the regression of de-
trended prices on dummies for hospitals indicates that hospital fixed effects explain about
one half of price variation, with an adjusted R2 = 0.488. One explanation is that since
the payment in the contract is a lump-sum for all quantities of stents and the payment is
nonlinear in the quantity and thus the average price varies with the quantity ([74]). More-
over, the quantity varies with the unobserved marginal revenue term  and there seems
large variation of marginal revenue across hospitals.16 Hence, the large variation of de-
trended prices maybe due in part to the large variation of hospitals’ marginal revenues.
16There is a considerably large variation of margin for the cardiac valve replacement surgery across hos-
pitals in U.S. ([75]). Also see the large variation of operating margin across hospitals in New Hampshire at
https://www.nh.gov/insurance/lah/documents/umms.pdf
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of detrended prices across hospitals
Another explanation is from the heterogeneous bargaining powers across hospitals. Since
the characteristics of hospitals is different in the dataset, in which the bargaining power
may depend on those characteristic, heterogeneous bargaining power could also contribute
to the substantial variation of detrended prices. In reality, the price of stents is determined
through private negotiation between a hospital administrator and a representative of the
manufacturer, and different hospitals negotiate different prices for the same stent at the
same point of time.17 It is worth noting that even though hospitals typically have limited
information regarding other hospitals’ past contracts,18 they can not observe the current
contracts of other hospitals. In addition, those limited information would reduces the un-
17Hospitals typically rely on the service of group purchasing organizations (GPOs) to negotiate contracts
for many products. In terms of the degree of involvement of GPO, there are two dominant models for hospital
engagement with GPOs. The high involvement of GPO implies that hospitals primarily use the GPO prices
to purchase medical devices while the low involvement of GPO implies that hospitals use GPO prices as a
starting point for direct hospital-manufacturer negotiations. For physician preference items hospitals usually
use GPO prices as a starting point for direct hospital-manufacturer negotiations, where physician preference
items are those products whose demand is determined in large part by preferences of brand-loyal physicians.
Accordingly, [76] adopts the direct hospital-manufacturer negotiation in the coronary stent market.
18Policy-makers have concerned the secrecy of contracts in medical device industry. In 2014, Senator
Angus King of Maine added an amendment to a tax bill that would increase price transparency for medical
devices.
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certainty in the manufacturer’s cost or bargaining parameter, thus implying the realistic
assumption of common knowledge.19
The specification of payoff of agent in the model fits the dataset well. First, because
the major source of hospital’s revenue comes from the reimbursement rate from patient’s
insurer to hospital, and these rates depends on the aggregate demand of hospitals in the
United States ([59]; [60]), the specification of u(x) makes sense. Second, i represents
the unobserved marginal revenue, which is affected by various factors, including the het-
erogenous reimbursement policies ([79]; [80]; [78]; [81]),20 the unobserved quality of
hospital i’s service ([60]), the unobserved hospital i’s cost-related terms ([81]), and the
patient characteristics ([82]). Third, it is plausible that E[ηi|Q, Z] = 0 needed for the
identification of parametric specifications for the following reasons. In our survey dataset
ηi could be interpreted as the measurement error; and the reimbursement rate of the stent-
related surgeries does not depend on the use of stents in the coronary stent industry ([76]),
thus suggesting that the risk of potential collusion between the manufacturer and hospitals
might be ignorable in the coronary stent market.
4.5.3 Empirical Strategy
The two primary goals of our application are (1) to test for the equivalence of pas-
sive beliefs and symmetric beliefs by using the estimates of the parameters in the cost
function, marginal revenue function, and bargaining power function under two belief sys-
tem, respectively; (2) to assess the cut-down of prices that would be achieved if hospitals’
19Based on the claim by [77] that the HMO knows as much (and often more) about the target hospital’s
cost structure as the hospital’s management, [59] assume that both the hospitals and the HMO know the
profitability of different networks and the cost structures of all hospitals (see similar assumptions in [78]).
Similarly, in the manufacturer-hospital negotiation [76] assumes that both the hospitals and the manufacturer
know the profitability of different hospitals and the manufacturer’s cost function. This paper follows this line
in the health care market, i.e., the common knowledge of  among hospitals and manufacturers.
20Since the reimbursement negotiated rates between the hospital and its insurer are determined by the het-
erogenous bargaining power of hospitals ([79]; [80]), i is affected by hospital i’s unobserved idiosyncratic
terms related to the hospital’s bargaining power ([81]). Usually the reimbursements from private insurers
are generally negotiated as a markup on Medicare rates across all procedures performed at the hospital.
95
bargaining powers increase by the same amount through relevant policies, as well as the
heterogeneous effect of increasing bargaining power on the decrease of prices. Recall that
the identification argument in Section 3 is presented explicitly conditional on given char-
acteristics Z = z and by suppressing the vector W1. Since in our data W1 could be the
dummy vector for four regions in US, to be consistent with the identification strategy, in
this section we allows for heterogeneity Z = z among hospitals conditional on the north-
west region. Acknowledging the limited sample size, we adopt a parametric specification
of model primitives to make estimation feasible.
It is worth noting that in this data, the unobservable  may capture monthly variation
in demand occurs due to changes in doctor preferences (as new studies are released and
device salespeople spread the word), changes in unobserved patient characteristics ([80];
[76]), or the component of marginal cost of hospitals([78]). In addition, the assumption
that disagreements of hospitals and manufacturer are zero is plausible in two ways. Due
to brand-loyalty of physicians in the stent market ([76]), profits of non-stent treatment (
typically a suggested diet and exercise regimen) can be normalized to be zero. The market
breakdown assumption can be a good approximation based on the fact of DES scare in
2006 which is caused by a study concerning the safety of DES resulted in less DES usage
and less stenting overall, though one year later it became clearer that DES were not as
dangerous as the study suggested.21
Recall that in Section 4 we presented a nonparametric approach to estimate the prim-
itive functions (u, c, γ). A practical issue of such a nonparametric approach in our ap-
plication is that a large sample size is required due to the slow rate of convergence of
nonparametric estimators. Therefore, we take an alternative approach by parameterizing
the model primitives.22
21See “Embers still smoldering from the 2006 ESC firestorm, as experts mull DES safety and efficacy” at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/708137.
22In the coronary stent industry one plausible variable used in the nonparametric identification is the pop-
96
We specify hospital i’s revenue function by taking account into their characteristics
pih ≡ Qi(α0 + α1X + α2X2 + Z ′iα3 + Z ′iα4X + i)− Pi,
where Qi and Pi are, respectively, the quantity and payment in hospital i’s contract for
each i ∈ N , X ≡ ∑Ni=1Qi is the aggregate quantity, Zi is the vector of hospital i’s
characteristics. The manufacturer’s cost function is specified as
pim ≡
N∑
i=1
Pi − (β0 + β1X + β2X2).
Note that these specifications are consistent with the identification conditions in terms of
α1 > 0 and β2 ≥ 0. To meet the normalization that the hospital’s bargaining power lies on
(0, 1), the hospital i’s heterogeneous bargaining power is specified as
γ(Zi) =
exp(γ0 + Z
′
iγ1)
1 + exp(γ0 + Z ′iγ1)
∈ (0, 1).
In the parametric model, α ≡ (α0, α1, α2, α′3, α′4)′, β ≡ (β0, β1, β2)′, and γ ≡ (γ0, γ′1)′ are
unknown parameter vectors.
The relevance of these specifications is reinforced based on the related empirical litera-
ture. First, besides the general arguments in section 2, the specification that each hospital’s
ulation growth because the population growth may affect the marginal revenue in the treatment for patients
with coronary heart disease. For example, [83] argue that the population affects the number of hospital
entry, and an intensified competition shrinks the profit margin in the coronary heart disease market. Ac-
knowledging this, the negotiated reimbursement rate may depend also on the population growth, not only on
the current population. An alternative variable is the population age, which may affect the marginal cost of
the treatment with coronary stents. As [84] find, there is relatively large impact of population ageing on the
marginal treatment cost for patients with coronary stent disease in Australia, because the per-unit treatment
costs may depend on the severity of the patient’s illness and severity generally increases with age. However,
we do not need such variables for the identification of parametric specifications. Even though we add them
into our model, this does not affect the estimates of the parameters in the payment equation as well as the
the counterfactual effect of bargaining power on the payment reduction because the payment equation does
not include these variables given the additively separability of population growth in the model specification,
which is consistent with the condition of nonparametric identification.
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revenue depends on the aggregate demand X is supported by the closely related empiri-
cal literature including [78] in which the reimbursement rate transferred from insurers to
hospitals depends on the hospitals’ market demand since the hospital’s revenue is mainly
generated through the reimbursement from patient’s insurer to hospital. Second, hospi-
tal’s bargaining power may depend on hospitals’ characteristics such as on the status of
for-proft (or ownership) and teaching status ([81]).
We obtain the regression model under passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs, respec-
tively, by substituting the parametric specifications into the optimal payment equation
P˜t,i =
γtγt,i
1− γt,i
[
c(Xt)−Xtc′(Xt) +
N∑
j=1
Q2t,ju
′(Xt, Zt,j)
]
+Qt,ic
′(Xt)−Q2t,iu′(Xt, Zt,i) + ηt,i, (4.6)
P˜t,i =
γtγt,i
1− γt,i
[
c(Xt)−Xtc′(Xt) +N
N∑
j=1
Q2t,ju
′(Xt, Zt,j)
]
+Qt,ic
′(Xt)−NQ2t,iu′(Xt, Zt,i) + ηt,i, (4.7)
where γt =
(
1 +
∑N
i=1
γt,i
1−γt,i
)−1, and γt,i ≡ γ(Zt,i). Clearly, the estimation procedures
are similar between passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs, without loss of generality, we
focus on the estimation with passive beliefs. Let λ ≡ (α, β, γ) with λ1 = λ/ {α0, α3}
and λ2 = {α0, α3}. Under the conditional mean zero E(ηt,i|Qt, Zt,i) = 0, where Qt =
(Qt,i, · · · , Qt,N)′, the system nonlinear least square estimator of λ1 is obtained by
λ̂1 = argmin
λ1
(NT )−1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
η2t,i = (NT )
−1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
(
P˜t,i − Pt,i
)2
.
Similarly, based on the optimal quantity equation we obtain the second regression model
ξt = Nc
′(Xt) −
∑N
i=1 u(Xt, Zt,i) −
∑N
i=1Qt,iu
′(Xt, Zt,i). Under the assumption of con-
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ditional mean zero of ξt, we obtain the ordinary least square estimator λ̂2 by plugging
λ̂1.23
To test for the equivalency of passive beliefs and symmetric beliefs, we use the nonnested
test method proposed by [85] who generalize the seminal work [86] to a broad class of
estimation methods including nonlinear least squares. Under the null hypothesis that
model 1 associated with passive beliefs and model 2 associated with symmetric beliefs
are asymptotically equivalent, the test statistic is TS =
√
TN
σ̂
{Q1 − Q2} d→ N(0, 1),
where Qk = 1
TN
∑T
t=1
∑N
i=1(η̂
k
t,i)
2 with η̂kt,i for model k ∈ {1, 2}, the standard error
σ̂ =
{
1
TN
∑T
t=1
∑N
i=1[(η̂
1
t,i)
4 + (η̂2t,i)
4 − 2(η̂1t,i)2(η̂2t,i)2]
}1/2
.
4.5.4 Empirical Results
Table 4.1 reports the estimation results of structural parameter under passive beliefs
and symmetric beliefs, respectively. Based on these estimates, the statistic TS = -8.21
implies that at 1% significance level, we reject H0 in favor of the hypothesis that passive
beliefs fit the data better than symmetric beliefs. Moreover, the estimates under passive
beliefs are consistent with the identification argument in section 3 as the marginal revenue
function is strictly increasing and the cost function is strictly convex. Under symmetric
beliefs, however, marginal revenue function is not necessarily increasing, depending on
the total quantity of stents. More exactly, the marginal revenue is increasing only if the
total quantity is very large (at least 3115).
According to the test results, we will focus on the analysis of estimation results under
passive beliefs. First, marginal revenues for teaching hospitals are about $1,000 more
than nonteaching hospitals. The higher marginal revenue of teaching hospitals may arises
from their competitive advantage due to better facilities and service, as they prefer to
concentrate on research ([87]; [60]). As found by [80], the indicator of teaching hospital
23The feasible GLS method introduces additional estimation bias even though the feasible GLS is asymp-
totically efficient. Given the limited sample size, the OLS method seems more appropriate.
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is positively and significantly related to market share. Using the dataset in 1997, [88] find
that the average profit per coronary artery bypass graft surgery in New York state hospitals
is $2,000, which is larger than our estimates $481.24 The difference could be ascribed
to the constantly increasing competition among hospitals over the past two decades. In
addition, the marginal cost of manufacturer is about $1,000 when the market size is not
large, which is reasonable in the sense that it is smaller than the approximately average
detrended price $1,300.
Second, the hospital’s bargaining powers is heterogeneous, depending on the public
status of hospital. Specifically, the bargaining power of public hospitals is lower than that
of private ones. This can be explained by the fact that public hospital concerns community
interest more than profit ([60]), suggesting lower bargaining power due to less effort than
private hospitals. In addition, the teaching status is insignificant in the bargaining power
function which is consistent with [81].
Besides the heterogeneity, the bargaining power is very small for any characteristics
of hospitals. To be specific, the bargaining power is 0.072 for private and nonteaching
hospitals, 0.006 for private and teaching, 0.004 for public and nonteaching, and 0.0002
for public and teaching. Two common sources for the extremely small bargaining pow-
ers are market power of manufacturers and competition among hospitals. Furthermore,
one important reason in the medical device industry is the substantial influences of doc-
tor’s brand-loyalty on the hospital’s bargaining power because the primacy of physician
preference in determining demand for stents has limited hospitals’ bargaining ability in
negotiation with suppliers. Therefore, the influence of doctor’s brand-loyalty on the bar-
gaining power may explain the policy of advocating gainsharing programs in cardiology
and cardiac surgery by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of In-
24For the comparability, we use type-adjusted price to calculate the average profit per stent instead of
type-month detrended price.
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spector General, which will be analyzed in terms of the counterfactual results below.
Table 4.1: Estimates of structural parameters
Parameters Passive belief Symmetric belief
Est. Std. Est. Std.
Marginal
Revenue
constant 991.2*** 33.31 204.48*** 8.244
total quant. -0.140 0.680 -0.218*** 0.072
total quant. × total quant. 0.0002*** 0.00003 0.00007*** 0.00001
public -73.02 100.3 -76.843*** 25.464
teaching 909.2*** 71.77 180.797*** 18.604
public × total quant. 0.001 0.081 0.008 0.039
teaching × total quant. -0.647 0.618 -0.052 0.048
Cost constant 1645.2*** 57.321 3188.8*** 0.544
total quant. 963.8*** 52.066 15.484*** 1.960
total quant. × total quant. 0.077*** 0.014 0.325*** 0.090
Bargaining constant -3.099*** 0.029 -0.510*** 0.154
public -2.650*** 0.022 -7.251*** 0.232
teaching -2.548 233.939 -2.456 50.477
Standard errors are bootstrapped 500 times. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.5.5 Counterfactual Analysis
The price of medical devices is often considered as a source of the increasing costs
of healthcare ([89]). For example, the cost of hospital supplies and devices is estimated
to account for 24 percent of the dramatic growth in inpatient hospital costs in nine states
between 2001 and 2006 ([90]). Many interventions aim to lower these costs by increasing
the bargaining power of hospitals in negotiation with suppliers. Since 2005 the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General has issued a handful
of advisory opinions permitting additional gainsharing programs in cardiology and car-
diac surgery, in which physicians receive cash payments for reducing hospital spending.
The empirical evidence suggests that gainsharing program reduces the price of coronary
stents, possibly as a result of the increased bargaining power of hospitals in negotiation
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with suppliers ([91]).25
To assess of the price effect of hospital’s bargaining power, we will show price reduc-
tion obtained by continuously improving the bargaining power by the same amount (say,
0.01) for all hospitals. Increasing the bargaining power by the same amount seems more
relevant than increasing it to the same level since it seems unrealistic for interventions to
keep all hospitals with the same bargaining power, unless the bargaining power is irrele-
vant to hospitals’ characteristics. Even if the bargaining power was homogeneous across
hospitals, the magnitude of price changes might vary across hospitals because prices also
depend on the heterogeneity of hospital revenue. More exactly, as equation (4.6) shows,
average prices rely on the interaction of bargaining power and marginal revenue, sug-
gesting the counterfactual result may depend on hospitals’ characteristics through revenue
functions.
For the purpose of evaluating the heterogeneous price effect of increasing bargaining
power, we will calculate the average decrease of prices across hospital and over time as the
bargaining power increases by the same amount, given each value of characteristics (public
status and teaching status) of hospitals. Specifically, given the characteristic Z = z, we
obtain the benchmark price p0 ≡ (TN)−1∑Tt=1∑Ni=1 p̂0t,i, where the fitted price is defined
as p̂0t,i ≡ P̂t,i/Qt,i, and P̂t,i is the fitted value of payment P˜t,i. Suppose the bargaining
power is increased J times. For each j = 1, · · · , J , let γjt =
(
1 +
∑N
i=1
γjt,i
1−γjt,i
)−1, where
γjt,i = γ̂t,i + 0.01, γ̂t,i is obtained by replacing γ = (γ0, γ1) with γ̂ = (γ̂0, γ̂1) in γ(Zi). Let
P̂ jt,i =
γjtγ
j
t,i
1− γjt,i
[
ĉ(Xt)−Xtĉ′(Xt) +
N∑
j=1
Q2t,jû
′(Xt, Zt,j)
]
+Qt,iĉ
′(Xt)−Q2t,iû′(Xt, Zt,i),
25In contrast to group purchasing organizations (GPOs) or merger among hospitals through which the
collective bargaining power increases to increase aggregate profits by deceasing prices, one advantage of
the gainsharing program lies in the fact that it can show show the way how the individual price (and hence
profit) of each hospital change with its own bargaining power since in the former counterfactuals, it is not
clear how to split the incremental aggregate profit among the group of hospitals.
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where ĉ(Xt) = c(Xt; β̂), ĉ′(Xt) = c′(Xt; β̂), û′(Xt) = u′(Xt; α̂), Then, we obtain the
counterfactual prices pj ≡ (TN)−1∑Tt=1∑Ni=1 p̂jt,i, where p̂jt,i ≡ P̂ jt,i/Qt,i, and hence the
decrease of price is pj,0 ≡ pj − p0. Therefore, we obtain the series of the cut-down of
prices {pj,0}Jj=1 for each of all four values of the binary vector Z.
Figure 4.4 shows the trend of price changes when the bargaining power increases con-
tinuously for each characteristic of hospitals and each of two beliefs. First, the price de-
creases as the bargaining power increases, for any hospital’s characteristics and for either
passive beliefs or symmetric beliefs. More importantly, under passive beliefs decreases
of prices are more reasonable than under symmetric beliefs. As Figure 4.3 shows, the
highest price is around $1,700, suggesting that the reasonable counterfactual price reduc-
tion should be less than $1,700. In Figure 4.4, price reductions under passive beliefs are
less than $500, whereas price reductions under symmetric beliefs are mostly larger than
$1,700. Therefore, those counterfactual results are not only consistent with results of be-
lief tests, they also provide empirical support for the relevance of beliefs test because in
the counterfactual analysis symmetric beliefs tend to lead to unreasonable and misleading
policy implications.
Second, we focus counterfactual results under passive beliefs and compare the price
effect of bargaining power between different hospitals’ characteristics. In the upper panel
of Figure 4.4, it indicates that private hospitals benefit more price reduction than public
hospitals. One plausible explanation for the difference is due to higher bargaining power of
private hospitals than public hospitals because public status is significantly negative in the
bargaining power function. Note that price reduction also depends on the heterogeneous
marginal revenue function in some nonlinear way, as Figure 4.4 shows, the overall effect of
both bargaining power and heterogeneous marginal revenue determines the slightly non-
linear trend of price reductions as bargaining power increases. Similarly, in the lower panel
of Figure 4.4, nonteaching hospitals benefit more price reduction than teaching hospitals.
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Since the marginal revenue function is increasing in the teaching status, nonteaching hos-
pitals might have more incentive to lower prices by increasing their bargaining powers in
order to pursue the similar revenue with teaching hospitals. As such, bargaining power
may have larger price effect for nonteaching hospitals.
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Figure 4.4: Price reductions under two beliefs in northeastern region
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented positive results in the identification of structural el-
ements in the canonical model of contracting with externalities under passive beliefs and
symmetric beliefs. Given the observed payments and quantities, the model structure con-
sisting of the principal’s cost function, the agent’s payoff function, the bargaining power
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function, and the distribution of the random shocks of agents can be point identified under
functional form restrictions on the density of shocks and on the large support of char-
acteristics. The identification strategy we have used in this paper relies crucially on the
structural one-to-one mapping between the quantity vector and the shock vector. We have
proposed nonparametric estimators for the primitives, including the sieve estimator of cost
function, the payoff function, and bargaining function, as well as the kernel estimator of
the joint density of agents’ shocks. Then, we have provided sufficient conditions to estab-
lish the rate of uniform convergence of these estimators.
We apply the model to analyze the dataset on the contracts of coronary stents between
manufacturers and hospitals in the United States, and find that the model under passive
beliefs fits the dataset better than symmetric beliefs. Further, the counterfactual analysis
shows that the results with passive beliefs are more reasonable than with symmetric beliefs,
which is consistent with our test results.
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5. CONCLUSION
First, we relax the assumption of identity cost function in the model of FPCR menu
and investigate how the performance of the optimal FPCR menu would be impacted by a
convex cost function. We provide an important observation for the optimal FPCR menu
when the agent’s innate cost is uniformly distributed: the performance of the optimal
FPCR contract relies crucially on the cost function: when the marginal cost (relative to
marginal disutility) is large, the performance is very close to that of the fully optimal
contract. On the other hand, if the marginal cost is small and firms’ innate costs are
dispersed then the performance of the optimal FPCR menu is arbitrarily close to a CR
contract. Our result is in contrast with that of [1], where the FPCR menu captures at least
three-fourths of the surplus that a fully optimal contract achieves. The main force that leads
to the discrepancy is that under a convex cost function, the optimal cost-reducing effort
exerted by an agent is strictly increasing in her innate cost and a cost function with higher
marginal cost induces larger cost-reducing effort for given innate cost. By contrast, an
identity cost function implies that the optimal cost-reducing effort is a constant, regardless
of the innate cost of the agent. Our finding suggests that in designing an optimal FPCR
contract it is important for the principal to take into account the cost structure of the agents:
when the marginal cost of agents is large, the FPCR menu is especially preferable. When
the marginal cost is small and agents’ innate costs are dispersed, the menu is less appealing
or even arbitrarily close to a CR contract.
Second, we provided a rigorous econometric analysis of the two-period FPCR con-
tracts under both renegotiation and commitment, where we generalize the widely used
identity cost function to a convex one and allow for a heterogeneous disutility function of
effort. We proved that the model is nonparametrically identified if firms exert effort and the
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result of identification can be applied to a large class of contracts with and without incen-
tives. If we include the firms without exerting effort, the model is semi nonparametrically
identified. Based on the identification argument, we propose a feasible procedure to esti-
mate the model primitives. Using the public transport procurement contracts in France, we
found that cost function of firms are convex and the convexity has important implications
for the welfare analysis: if the contract is switched from renegotiation to commitment,
both taxpayers and firms would benefit and the major gains of social welfare would accrue
to taxpayers.
Third, we have presented positive results in the identification of structural elements in
the canonical model of contracting with externalities under passive beliefs and symmetric
beliefs. Given the observed payments and quantities, the model structure consisting of the
principal’s cost function, the agent’s payoff function, the bargaining power function, and
the distribution of the random shocks of agents can be point identified under functional
form restrictions on the density of shocks and on the large support of characteristics. The
identification strategy we have used in this paper relies crucially on the structural one-
to-one mapping between the quantity vector and the shock vector. We have proposed
nonparametric estimators for the primitives, including the sieve estimator of cost function,
the payoff function, and bargaining function, as well as the kernel estimator of the joint
density of agents’ shocks. Then, we have provided sufficient conditions to establish the
rate of uniform convergence of these estimators. We apply the model to analyze the dataset
on the contracts of coronary stents between manufacturers and hospitals in the United
States, and find that the model under passive beliefs fits the dataset better than symmetric
beliefs. Further, the counterfactual analysis shows that the results with passive beliefs are
more reasonable than with symmetric beliefs, which is consistent with our test results.
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APPENDIX A
SIMPLE MENUS OF COST-BASED CONTRACTS WITH CONVEX COST
FUNCTIONS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let ∆ ≡ θ¯ − θ. Suppose that θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] is the cut-off type. By plugging the optimal
effort level e∗(θ) = βθ/(β + 1), the principal’s expected cost for the project is calculated
as
C(θ) =
[
H(θ − e∗(θ)) + ψ(e∗(θ))
]
F (θ) +
∫ θ¯
θ
H(θ)dF (θ) =
βθ2(θ − θ)
∆(β + 1)
+
β(θ¯3 − θ3)
3∆
,
with the first-order condition being:
C ′(θ) =
βθ
∆(β + 1)
[
(2− β)θ − 2θ].
The optimal effort level θ∗ is given by C ′(θ∗) = 0,
θ∗ = 0; or θ∗ =
2θ
2− β , β 6= 2.
When β ≥ 2 or γ ≤ 2/(2 − β), θ∗ = 2θ/(2 − β) /∈ (θ, θ¯). Thus the cut-off type is not
an interior point of the support [θ, θ¯] and it is necessary to compare C(θ) with C(θ¯) to
determine the optimal FPCR contract. Considering that
C(θ) =
β
3
(θ¯2 + θ¯θ + θ2); C(θ¯) =
β
β + 1
θ¯2.
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It is straightforward to verify that the ratio C(θ)/C(θ¯) is greater than one whenever γ ≤
2/(2 − β). Thus, cut-off type is θ¯ and the principal sets the fixed-price to be b = H(θ¯ −
e∗(θ¯)) + ψ(e∗(θ¯)) = βθ¯2/(β + 1) and all the firms choose the FP contract.
When 0 < β < 2(γ − 1)/γ, θ∗ = 2θ/(2 − β) ∈ (θ, θ¯). The second-order derivative
of C ′′(θ∗) = 2βθ/[(β + 1)∆] > 0. Hence θ∗ is an interior solution of the principal’s cost
minimization problem.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For the optimal contract in Laffont and Tirole (1986), the principal solve the following
optimization problem:
min
t(θ),e(θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
t(θ)dF (θ) (A.1)
s.t. U(θ|θ) ≥ 0
U(θ|θ) ≥ U(θˆ|θ)
θ − e(θˆ|θ) = θˆ − e(θˆ), (A.2)
where U(θˆ|θ) ≡ t(θˆ)−H
(
θ − e(θˆ|θ)
)
−ψ(e(θˆ|θ)) and (A.2) is due to the strictly mono-
tonicity of H(·). According to Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993), the level of cost reduction
chosen by the firm e(θ) is given by:
e(θ) = arg min
e≥0
{
H(θ − e(θ)) + ψ(e(θ)) + ψ′(e(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
}
. (A.3)
with the first-order condition being
H ′ (θ − e(θ))− ψ′(e(θ))− ψ′′(e(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
= 0. (A.4)
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Plugging the parametric form of H(·) and ψ(·) to the equation above, we have
β(θ − e)− e− (θ − θ) = 0⇒ (1 + β)e = (β − 1)θ + θ. (A.5)
Case 1. (β − 1)θ + θ ≤ 0, i.e., 0 < β < 1 and (1− β)θ ≥ θ then e = 0.
Case 2. (β − 1)θ + θ ≥ 0, i.e., β ≥ 1 or β < 1 and (1− β)θ ≤ θ, then e = (β−1)θ+θ
β+1
.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We first write down the surplus under the FPCR menu GF ,
GF ≡ C(θ)− C(θ∗) =
∫ θ¯
θ
H(θ)dF (θ)−
[
H(θ∗ − e∗(θ∗)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗))
]
F (θ∗)
−
∫ θ¯
θ∗
H(θ)dF (θ)
=

β
3
(
β−2
β+1
γ2 + γ + 1
)
θ2, 2(γ − 1)/γ ≤ β,
− β3(β−3)
3(γ−1)(β−2)2(β+1)θ
2, 0 < β < 2(1− γ)/γ,
(A.6)
Next, GO can be obtained according to its definition:
GO =

∫ θ¯
θ
H(θ)dF (θ)− ∫ θ¯
θ
{
H(θ − e∗(θ)) + ψ(e∗(θ)) + ψ′(e∗(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
}
dF (θ),
0 < β ≤ (γ − 1)/γ,∫ θ¯
θ
H(θ)dF (θ)− ∫ θ/(1−β)
θ
{
H(θ − e∗(θ)) + ψ(e∗(θ)) + ψ′(e∗(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
}
dF (θ)
− ∫ θ¯
θ/(1−β) H(θ)dF (θ), β > (γ − 1)/γ.
Based on the optimal effort level in Lemma 2, we discuss GO in two cases.
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Case 1: 0 < β < 1 and (1− β)θ¯ ≥ θ, i.e., 0 < β ≤ (γ − 1)/γ.
GO =
∫ θ¯
θ
H(θ)dF (θ)−
∫ θ/(1−β)
θ
{
H(θ − e∗(θ)) + ψ(e∗(θ)) + ψ′(e∗(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
}
dF (θ)
−
∫ θ¯
θ/(1−β)
H(θ)dF (θ)
=
∫ θ/(1−β)
θ
{
H(θ)−H(θ − e∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ))− ψ′(e∗(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
}
dF (θ)
=
β3θ3
3(1− β2)
1
θ¯ − θ =
β3θ2
3(1− β2)
1
γ − 1 . (A.7)
Case 2: 0 < β < 1 and (1− β)θ¯ ≤ θ, or β > 1; i.e., β > (γ − 1)/γ.
GO =
∫ θ¯
θ
H(θ)dF (θ)−
∫ θ¯
θ
{
H(θ − e∗(θ)) + ψ(e∗(θ)) + ψ′(e∗(θ))F (θ)
f(θ)
}
dF (θ)
=
∫ θ¯
θ
{
βθ2 − β
(
2θ − θ
1 + β
)2
−
(
(β − 1)θ + θ
1 + β
)2
− 2(β − 1)θ + θ
1 + β
(θ − θ)
}
dF (θ)
=
[(β − 1)θ¯ + θ]3 − (βθ)3
3(β2 − 1)
1
θ¯ − θ
=
1
3(1 + β)
{
(β − 1)2θ¯2 + (β + 2)(β − 1)θ¯θ + (β2 + β + 1)θ2}
=
(β − 1)2γ2 + (β2 + β − 2)γ + (β2 + β + 1)
3(1 + β)
θ2 (A.8)
The results in (A.7) and (A.8) allow us to obtain GF/GO as follows.
Case 1: 0 < β ≤ 1− 1/γ,
GF
GO
=
(β − 1)(β − 3)
(β − 2)2 = 1−
1
(β − 2)2 . (A.9)
Case 2: 1− 1/γ < β < 2(1− 1/γ),
GF
GO
= − β
3(β − 3)
(γ − 1)(β − 2)2[(β − 1)2γ2 + (β2 + β − 2)γ + (β2 + β + 1)] . (A.10)
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Case 3: 2(1− 1/γ) ≤ β,
GF
GO
= 1− γ
2 + 1− 2γ
(β − 1)2γ2 + (β2 + β − 2)γ + (β2 + β + 1) . (A.11)
It is easy to show that the ratioGF/GO is strictly decreasing in β for case 1 andGF/GO <
3/4 for any β in this case. On the other hand, the denominator of the second term on the
right-hand-side of (A.11) is increasing in β and equals zero when β = 2(γ − 1)/γ. As a
result,
d
dβ
GF
GO
> 0, if 2(1− 1/γ) ≤ β.
In addition, it is straightforward to verify that the limit of GF/GO is 1 as β approach
infinity, i.e, limβ→∞ GFGO = 1.
Parts (i) and (iii) of Theorem 1 state that for any given γ > 1 the function GF/GO is
decreasing in β ∈ (0, 1 − 1/γ] and increasing in β ∈ [2 − 2/γ),∞). The continuity of
GF/GO in γ implies there must be a minimum in the interval β ∈ (1− 1/γ, 2− 2/γ).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
For any given β ∈ (1− 1/γ, 2− 2/γ) ⊂ (0, 2), we consider the ratio GF/GO:
GF
GO
=
β3(3− β)
(γ − 1)(β − 2)2[(β − 1)2γ2 + (β2 + β − 2)γ + (β2 + β + 1)]
=
β3(3− β)
(β − 2)2
1
(γ − 1)[(β − 1)2γ2 + (β2 + β − 2)γ + (β2 + β + 1)] ,
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where the first term β3(3 − β)/(β − 2)2 is a positive constant. Thus we focus on the
denominator of the second term, denoted by ξ(γ, β). For a given β ∈ (1− 1/γ, 2− 2/γ),
dξ(γ, β)
dγ
= 3γ2(β − 1)2 − 2γ(β − 1)2 + 2γ(β2 + β − 2) + (β2 + β − 2) + (β2 + β + 1)
= 3γ2β2 + (6γ − 6γ2)β + 3γ2 − 6γ + 3.
It is easy to show that for any β > 1 − 1/γ, the quadratic form of β is positive, i.e.,
dξ(γ, β)/dγ > 0 for any β ∈ (1 − 1/γ, 2 − 2/γ). This completes the proof that GF/GO
is strictly decreasing in γ for any β ∈ (1− 1/γ, 2− 2/γ).
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APPENDIX B
ECONOMETRICS OF MULTI-PERIOD SIMPLE CONTRACTS
B.1 Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Proposition 2. Before proving Proposition 2, note that many of the theoretical
results under commitment carry over to the dynamic setting as below. For example, in
both periods ψ′(e∗(θ)) = H ′(θ− e∗(θ)), and 0 < e∗′(θ) < 1. The proof below follows the
arguments in [18]. Let ΘG ≡ [θ, θ∗1], ΘI ≡ (θ∗1, θ∗2], and ΘB ≡ (θ∗2, θ¯]. Denote respectively
by C01 = (b1, b
0
2), C
0
2 = (H(θ), b
0
3) and C
0
3 = (H(θ), H(θ)) the firm’s payments under
each scenario ΘG, ΘI , ΘB, and by C0 = (b1, b02, b
0
3) the overall menu of fixed prices.
Denote R˜ = (C˜2, C˜3) = (˜b2, b˜3) as a subsidy profile offered at the renegotiation stage
following an initial offer C0 and
b˜2 ≥ b02 and b˜3 ≥ b03. (B.1)
Lemma 10. (Renegotiation-proof) There is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis
to contracts of the form C = (b1, R) that come unchanged through the renegotiation
process, such that R = (b2, b3) maximizes the principal?s second period welfare subject
to the following acceptance conditions:
b˜2 ≥ b2 and b˜3 ≥ b3. (B.2)
Proof of Lemma 10: For any initial contract C0 and consider a renegotiated offer
R˜ = (˜b2, b˜3) that satisfies (B.1). Given the the agent’s conjecture about the renegotiated
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offer R = (b2, b3), the principal ?s expected welfare for date 2 becomes1
SW2(C
0, R˜, R) =
∫ θ∗1
θ
(
S − (1 + λ)˜b2 + α(˜b2 −H(θ − e∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ)))
)
dF (θ)
+
∫ θ∗2
θ∗1
(
S − (1 + λ)˜b3 + α(˜b3 −H(θ − e∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ)))
)
dF (θ)
+
∫ θ¯
θ∗2
(S − (1 + λ)H(θ)) f(θ)dθ (B.3)
Then the renegotiated offers R = (b2, b3) must solve
R = argmax
R˜
SW2(C
0, R˜, R) subject to (B.1). (R0)
Due to the arbitrary C0, it is easy to obtain that R also solves the following problem
R = argmax
R˜
SW2(C ≡ (b1, R), R˜, R) subject to (B.2). (R)
This completes the proof of Lemma 10.
Let us now characterize renegotiation-proof allocations by solving the problem R.
Lemma 11. A first-period menu of contracts C = (b1, b2, b3) is renegotiation-proof if and
only if the following two conditions hold:
θ∗2(b3) ≥ θ∗1(b1, b2, b3) (B.4)
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
[F (θ∗2)− F (θ∗1)] =
[H(θ∗2)− b3]f(θ∗2)
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
(B.5)
Condition (B.4) guarantees that the interval ΘI is non-empty.
Proof of Lemma 11. First note that the assumption α < 1+λ implies that the maximum
1Note that in SW2(C0, R˜, R), θ∗1 = θ
∗
1(b1, b2, b3) and θ
∗
2 = θ
∗
2 (˜b3) not θ
∗
2(b3).
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of the integral in (B.3) requires that (B.2) is binding. Assume that (R) is strictly quasi-
concave in b˜3. The first-order condition of the optimization problem (R) with respect to b˜3
at b˜3 = b3 is
0 =
dθ∗2
db3
{S − (1 + λ)b3 + α[b3 −H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))− ψ(e∗(θ∗2))]} f(θ∗2)
+
∫ θ∗2
θ∗1
(α− 1− λ)f(θ)dθ − dθ
∗
2
db3
[S − (1 + λ)H(θ∗2)]f(θ∗2)
=
dθ∗2
db3
(1 + λ)[H(θ∗2)− b3]f(θ∗2) +
∫ θ∗2
θ∗1
(α− 1− λ)f(θ)dθ,
where b3 = H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗2)) will be proved in (B.7) below. Note that 1 =
[H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))(1− e∗′(θ∗2)) +ψ′(e∗(θ∗2))e∗′(θ∗2)]dθ∗2/db3 = H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))dθ∗2/db3, we
obtain
(1 + λ− α)[F (θ∗2)− F (θ∗1)] =
(1 + λ)[H(θ∗2)− b3]f(θ∗2)
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
,
which completes the proof of Lemma 11.
Define now the principal’s intertemporal welfare when offering C = (b1, b2, b3) as2
SW (C) =
∫ θ∗1
θ
{S − (1 + λ)(rb1 + (1− r)b2) + α[rb1 + (1− r)b2
−H(θ − e∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ))]}dF (θ)
+
∫ θ∗2
θ∗1
{S − (1 + λ)(rH(θ) + (1− r)b3)
+α(1− r)[b3 −H(θ − e∗(θ))− ψ(e∗(θ))]}dF (θ)
+
∫ θ¯
θ∗2
[S − (1 + λ)H(θ)]dF (θ)
2Lemma (11) implies that θ∗2 = θ
∗
2(b3) in SW (C), and still θ
∗
1 = θ
∗
1(b1, b2, b3).
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The optimal renegotiation-proof menu solves the following optimization problem:3
max
C
SW (C) subject to (B.5). (PR)
Similar to the cut-off type θ∗ under commitment, the two cut-off types under renegotiation
satisfy
b1 +
(1− r)
r
(b2 − b3) = H(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗1)), (B.6)
b3 = H(θ
∗
2 − e(θ∗2)) + ψ(e(θ∗2)). (B.7)
Due to the fact that dθ
∗
1
db1
= r
1−r
dθ∗1
db2
by (B.6), it is easy to show that the first-order conditions
for b1 and b2 are the same, thus leading to the same optimal solution bR1 = b
R
2 ≡ bR.
Denote the optimal solution for b3 by b¯R. The first-order conditions with respect to b1 and
b3 leads to
r(1 + λ− α)F (θ∗1)
f(θ∗1)
=
(1 + λ)[rH(θ∗1) + (1− r)b¯R − bR]− ϑ
(
1− α
1+λ
)
H ′(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1, w))
,(
1− α
1 + λ
)
[F (θ∗2)− F (θ∗1)] =
[H(θ∗2)− b¯R]f(θ∗2)
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
− [rH(θ
∗
1) + b¯
R(1− r)− bR]f(θ∗1)
rH ′(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1))
+
ϑm(θ∗1, θ
∗
2, λ, r, α)
(1 + λ)(1− r) ,
where ϑ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the renegotiation-proof constraint (B.5), and
m(θ∗1, θ
∗
2, λ, r, α) =
(
1− α
1 + λ
)(
f(θ∗2)
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
− f(θ
∗
1)(r − 1)
rH ′(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1))
)
− [H
′(θ∗2)f(θ
∗
2) + (H(θ
∗
2)− b¯R)f ′(θ∗2)]H ′[θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)]
[H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))]3
+
H ′′[θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2)][1− e∗′(θ∗2)][H(θ∗2)− b¯R]f(θ∗2)
[H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))]3
3We assume (B.4) holds with strict inequality and (B.5) holds with equality as shown in Lemma 11.
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This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let (C˜, D˜1, D˜2, B˜
R
, B˜
R
) denote the endogenous variables under the
structure S˜. In actuality, the equivalence between S and S˜ can be obtained by taking a
linear transformation that θ˜ = ξ1θ without an intercept term, where ξ1 > 0. To do this, let
us first consider a general linear transformation that θ˜ = ξ0 + ξ1θ with (ξ0, ξ1) ∈ R2+, then
the distribution of θ˜ is F˜ (·) = F ((· − ξ0)/ξ1). To justify the observational equivalence,
we need to show that (D1, D2, C,B
R
, BR) = (D˜1, D˜2, C˜, B˜
R
, B˜
R
), and that the equality
(3.10) holds under the structure S˜. Let θ˜∗1 = ξ0 + ξ1θ∗1 and θ˜∗2 = ξ0 + ξ1θ∗2, then for any θ˜,
θ˜ ≤ θ˜∗1 is equivalent to θ ≤ θ∗1, which implies that D˜1 = D1. Similarly, we have D˜2 = D2.
Note that
ψ˜′(e˜∗) = H˜ ′(θ˜ − e˜∗)⇒ ψ′[(e˜∗ − ξ0)/ξ1] = H ′[(θ˜ − e˜∗)/ξ1],
which leads to e˜∗(θ˜) = ξ0 + ξ1e∗(θ). For those with FP contracts,
C˜ = H˜(θ˜ − e˜∗(θ˜∗)) = H[(ξ1θ − ξ1e∗(θ∗))/ξ1] = H(θ − e∗(θ∗)) = C,
B˜
R
= H˜(θ˜∗2 − e˜∗(θ˜∗2)) + ψ˜(e˜∗(θ˜∗2)) = H((ξ1θ∗2 − ξ1e∗(θ∗2))/ξ1) + ψ(ξ1e∗(θ∗)/ξ1) = BR,
B˜
R
= r[H˜(θ˜∗1 − e˜∗(θ˜∗1)) + ψ˜(e˜∗(θ˜∗1))] + (1− r)BR
= r[H(θ∗1 − e∗(θ∗1)) + ψ(e∗(θ∗1))] + (1− r)BR = BR.
For those associated with CR contracts, since C˜ = H˜(θ˜) = H(θ˜/ξ1) = H((ξ0 + ξ1θ)/ξ1),
then C˜ = C is equivalent to ξ0 = 0 by noting that C = H(θ). In what follows, we just
need to consider that θ˜ = ξ1θ. Since
f˜(θ˜∗j ) =
∂F˜ (θ˜∗j )
∂θ˜∗j
=
∂F (θ˜∗j/ξ1)
∂θ˜∗j
= f(θ˜∗j/ξ1)/ξ1 = f(θ
∗
j )/ξ1, j = 1, 2
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we have
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F˜ (θ˜∗2)− F˜ (θ˜∗1)
f˜(θ˜∗2)
= ξ1
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F (θ∗2)− F (θ∗1)
f(θ∗2)
= ξ1
H(θ∗2)−BR
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2, w))
and
H˜(θ˜∗2)− B˜
R
H˜ ′(θ˜∗2 − e˜∗(θ˜∗2))
=
H˜(θ˜∗2)− B˜
R
ψ˜′(e˜∗(θ˜))
=
H(θ∗2)−BR
ψ′(e∗)/ξ1
= ξ1
H(θ∗2)−BR
H ′(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2))
.
Hence,
(
1− α
1 + λ
)
F˜ (θ˜∗2)− F˜ (θ˜∗1)
f˜(θ˜∗2)
=
H˜(θ˜∗2)− B˜
R
H˜ ′(θ˜∗2 − e˜∗(θ˜∗2))
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that the strictly increasing property of H(·) leads to
θ(τ) = ej(τ) + H
−1(Cj(τ)) for any τ ∈ [0, 1], where θ(τ) denotes the τ−quantile of
F (·), ej(τ) denotes the τ−quantile of FE(·,W = wj), and Cj(τ) denotes the τ−quantile
of FCj(·). Hence, we obtain the compatibility condition
e1(τ) +H
−1(C1(τ)) = e2(τ) +H−1(C2(τ)), (B.8)
that is,
H−1(C1(τ)) = H−1(C2(τ)) + e2(τ)− e1(τ) = H−1(C2(τ)) + ∆e(τ), (B.9)
where ∆e(τ) ≡ e2(τ)− e1(τ). Taking the first derivative with respect to W in both sides
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of (3.4) and adding W back implies
ψ11(e
∗(θ,W ),W )e∗2(θ,W ) + ψ12(e
∗(θ,W ),W ) = −H ′′(θ − e∗(θ,W ))e∗2(θ,W ),
which implies that e∗2(θ,W ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θ, θ∗] due to the assumption ψ12(e∗(θ),W ) < 0,
and that e∗2(θ,W ) = 0 due to the normalization assumption ψ12(e
∗(θ),W ) = 0. The latter
result further implies that C1(0) = C2(0) ≡ c with the corresponding type θ for c due to
∆e(0) = 0 and θ(0) = θ. Therefore, e ≡ e1(θ0, w1) = e2(θ0, w2), and for τ ∈ (0, 1],
∆e(τ) > 0, H−1(C1(τ)) > H−1(C2(τ)), and in turn we obtain that C1(τ) > C2(τ), and
this proves Lemma 5.
Let some x ∈ [c, cH,1], where cH,1 ≡ H(θ∗2 − e∗(θ∗2, w1)) due to the fact that ∂C/∂θ =
H ′(θ − e∗(θ,W ))(1 − e∗1(θ,W )) > 0 and the assumption that w1 < w2. If x = c, then
H−1(c) = θ − e. If x ∈ (c, cH,1], based on the facts that C = H(θ − e∗(θ,W )) is strictly
increasing in θ and that C1(·) is continuous on [0, 1], there exists a unique τ0 ∈ (0, 1] such
that C1(τ0) = x. In particular, we obtain x = C1(τ0) > C2(τ0) > c. Similarly, there
exists a unique τ1 ∈ (0, τ0) such that C1(τ1) = C2(τ0). Continuing such a construction
gives rise to C1(τ1) > C2(τ1) > c, which in turn implies that there exists a unique τ2 ∈
(0, τ1) such that C1(τ2) = C2(τ1). Thereby, we have constructed a unique sequence such
that 1 ≥ τ0 > τ1 > · · · > τt > · · · > 0 with x = C1(τ0) > C2(τ0) = C1(τ1) >
C2(τ1) = C1(τ2) > · · · > C2(τt−1) = C1(τt) > · · · > c. Since the sequence {τt} is
strictly decreasing, {τt} converges to some τ ∈ [0, 1] as t → ∞. Also, the continuity of
Cj(·) on [0, 1] implies that limt→∞Cj(τt) = Cj(τ). Note that C2(τt) = C1(τt+1) implies
C2(τ) = C1(τ) and that C2(τ) = C1(τ) only for τ = 0, we obtain τ = 0. As a result,
limt→∞H−1(Cj(τt)) = H−1(τ) = θ for j = 1, 2 by the finiteness of the support of θ
and the continuity of H(·). By iterating (B.9) we obtain the following nonlinear dynamic
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relation
H−1(x) = H−1(C2(τ0)) + ∆e(τ0) = H−1(C1(τ1)) + ∆e(τ0)
= H−1(C2(τ1)) + ∆e(τ0) + ∆e(τ1)
= · · · = H−1(C2(τt)) + ∆e(τ0) + · · ·+ ∆e(τt).
BecauseH−1(x) is finite, it follows that
∑∞
t=0 ∆e(τt) must exist, thus leading toH
−1(x) =
θ − e + ∑∞t=0 ∆e(τt) = θ0 − e + ∑∞t=0 ∆e(τt) by using the normalization θ = θ0, i.e.,
H−1(·) and hence H(·) are identified on [c, cH,1] from the observed costs associated with
fixed-price contracts.
As stated in the text, the identification of H(·) is valid for the discrete W . Specifi-
cally, the corresponding modification of Assumption 4 is that in (ii) ψ1(e∗(θ, w1), w1) =
ψ1(e
∗(θ, w2), w2) for any (w1, w2) ∈W2, and that in (iii) if w2 > w1, then
ψ1(e
∗(θ, w1), w1) > ψ1(e∗(θ, w2), w2) for any θ ∈ (θ, θ∗2]. Under this modified assump-
tion, the relevant modification of the above proof is as follows. Using (3.4) leads to
ψ1(e
∗(θ, w2), w2)− ψ1(e∗(θ, w1), w1) = H ′(θ − e∗(θ, w2))−H ′(θ − e∗(θ, w1)),
which implies that e∗(θ, w2) > e∗(θ, w1) for θ ∈ (θ, θ∗] and that e∗(θ, w2) = e∗(θ, w1).
The remaining arguments hold without any modification.
B.2 Further Details for Empirical Application
We first provide some details of parametric identification. In the specification of cost
function (3.36), the parameters γ˜0, γ˜1 and γ˜2 can be expressed in terms of β1, β2, γ1, γ2 and
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σ2η as follows.
γ˜0 = (β2γ
2
1 − β21β2 − 2β21γ2 + 2γ1γ2β1 + 4β2γ22σ2η)[2(β2 + γ2)]−2,
γ˜1 = (β1γ
2
2 + γ1γ2β2)(β2 + γ2)
−2,
γ˜2 = β2γ
2
2(β2 + γ2)
−2,
ε2 = 2β2γ
2
2(β2 + γ2)
−2xη + (β1γ22 + γ1γ2β2)(β2 + γ2)
−2η,
where the composite error ε2 satisfies E[ε2|x, z] = 0. The parameters γ˜0, γ˜1 and γ˜2 are
directly estimated from data, then the equations above allows us to recover γ2 and γ1 under
Assumption 2:
γ1 = (β2γ2)
−1[γ˜1(β2 + γ2)2 − β1γ22 ],
γ2 = (β2 − γ˜2)−1(β2γ˜2 + β2
√
β2γ˜2).
By now, all the primitive parameters of the cost and disutility functions (β1, β2, β3, β˜3, γ1, γ2)
are identified.
Next, we present the parametric form of ρ0(·) and ρ1(·) in (3.37)
ρ0(z) = (β2 + γ2)
−1[β2γ2θ∗2(z˜)
2 + (β1γ2 + β2γ1)θ
∗
2(z˜)− (β1 − γ1)2/4],
ρ1(z) = (β2 + γ2)
−1 {β2γ2[rθ∗1(z)2 + (1− r)θ∗2(z)2]
+(β1γ2 + β2γ1)[rθ
∗
1(z) + (1− r)θ∗2(z)]− (β1 − γ1)2/4
}
.
Lastly, we give the definition of welfare related terms. TR(z) and TC(z) are subsidy (tax)
131
under renegotiation and commitment, respectively, defined as follows.
TR(z) = bRF (θ∗1(z);µ(z), σ
2) +
∫ θ∗2(z)
θ∗1(z)
[rH(θ, z) + (1− r)b¯R]dF (θ;µ(z), σ2)
+
∫ ∞
θ∗2(z)
H(θ, z)dF (θ;µ(z), σ2),
TC(z) = bCF (θ∗(z);µ(z), σ2) +
∫ ∞
θ∗(z)
H(θ, z)dF (θ;µ(z), σ2).
UR(z) and UC(z) are the informational rent (profit) counterparts.
UR(z) =
∫ θ∗1(z)
−∞
[bR −H(θ − e(θ), z)− ψ(e(θ))]dF (θ;µ(z), σ2)
+ (1− r)
∫ θ∗2(z)
θ∗1(z)
[b¯R −H(θ − e(θ), z)− ψ(e(θ))]dF (θ;µ(z), σ2)
UC(z) =
∫ θ∗(z)
−∞
[bC −H(θ − e∗(θ), z)− ψ(e(θ))]dF (θ;µ(z), σ2).
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APPENDIX C
NONPARAMETRIC IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF CONTRACTING
WITH EXTERNALITIES
C.1 Proof of Lemma 8
We complete the proof by verifying the assumptions in Theorem 3.3 of [40]. First, for
each z ∈ Z , the function m(q, z) is a one-to-one correspondence because for each (, z),
there is a unique q due to the relationship in (4.2) and s′(·, z) > 0. Second, for each (q, z),
the Jacobian determinant det(∂m˜(q, z)/∂q) > 0. Specifically,
∂m˜i(q, z)
∂qi
=
1
N
s′(x, z) +
1−N
N
u˜′(x, z) +
x
N
u˜′′(x, z)− qiu˜′′(x, z) ≡ b˜1(x, z)− qiu˜′′(x, z),
and for any j 6= i,
∂m˜i(q, z)
∂qj
=
1
N
s′(x, z) +
1
N
u˜′(x, z) +
x
N
u˜′′(x, z)− qiu˜′′(x, z) ≡ b˜2(x, z)− qiu˜′′(x, z),
where b˜2(x, z) = b˜1(x, z) + u˜′(x, z). It follows
det(∂m˜(q, z)/∂q) = [u˜′(x, z)]N−1s′(x, z) > 0
due to u˜′(·) > 0 and s′(·) > 0. Last, the definitions of Γ and F guarantee that m˜ is twice
continuously differentiable on its support. The proof is complete.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Since
log
(
det
(
∂m(q, N, z)
∂q
))
= (N − 1)log(u′(x, z)) + log(s′(x, z))
log
(
det
(
∂m˜(q, N, z)
∂q
))
= (N − 1)log(u˜′(x, z)) + log(s′(x, z))
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then
∆q(q, z; ∂m, ∂
2m, ∂m˜, ∂2m˜)
=
(
(N − 1)u′′(x, z)
u′(x, z)
− (N − 1)u˜
′′(x, z)
u˜′(x, z)
, · · · , (N − 1)u
′′(x, z)
u′(x, z)
− (N − 1)u˜
′′(x, z)
u˜′(x, z)
)′
,
and
∆z(q, z; ∂m, ∂
2m, ∂m˜, ∂2m˜) =
N − 1
u′(x, z)
× ∂u
′(x, z)
∂z
− N − 1
u˜′(x, z)
× ∂u˜
′(x, z)
∂z
= 0.
Let
b˜1 ≡ b˜1(x, z) = N−1s′(x, z) + (N−1 − 1)u˜′(x, z) +N−1xu˜′′(x, z),
b˜2 ≡ b˜2(x, z) = b˜1(x, z) + u˜′(x, z),
b˜3 ≡ b˜3(x, z) = N−1∂s˜(x, z)/∂z,
Let z = z0(q), under Assumption 6 (i)-(ii), (4.3) reduces to

b˜1 − q1u˜′′ · · · b˜2 − qN u˜′′ (N−1)u′′u′ − (N−1)u˜
′′
u˜′
b˜2 − q1u˜′′ · · · b˜2 − qN u˜′′ (N−1)u′′u′ − (N−1)u˜
′′
u˜′
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
b˜2 − q1u˜′′ · · · b˜1 − qN u˜′′ (N−1)u′′u′ − (N−1)u˜
′′
u˜′
b˜3 · · · b˜3 0

(C.1)
Note that the ranks of both matrix (C.1) and matrix
(
∂m˜(q,N,z)
∂q
)
are N due to
det(∂m˜(q, z)/∂q) > 0. According to Assumption 6 (iii), the zero element in the right
bottom of the matrix (C.1) implies that there exists one zero coefficient such that the last
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column is a linear combination of the other N columns. Hence,
u′′
u′
=
u˜′′
u˜′
.
Since u′′1/u
′
1 does not depend on z, u
′′
1/u
′
1 is identified. Now we can identify u
′
1(x) by
u′1(x) = u
′
1exp
(∫ x
x
u′′1(t)
u′1(t)
dt
)
,
and then identify u1(x) through
u1(x) =
∫ x
x
u′1(t) + u1.
The proof is complete.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Under Assumption 7-(i), it follows s(x, z) = s1(x)−Nu2(z), where s1(x) = Nc′(x)−
Nu1(x)−xu′1(x). According to [40], the ratio of first derivatives s2(x, z) ≡ s′1(x)/Nu′2(z)
can be identified. Under normalization (ii), s′1(x) = s2(x, z)s
′
1(x)/s2(x, z), where s
′
1(x) =
Nc′′ − (N + 1)u′1 − xu′′1(x). Hence, u′2(z) = N−1s2(x, z)/s1(x)′. Then, u2(z) =∫ z
z
u′2(t)dt + u2, and c
′′(x) = N−1[s2(x, z)Nu′2(z) + (N + 1)u
′
1(x) + xu
′′
1(x)]. Then
c′(x) can be identified as c′(x) =
∫ x
x
c′′(t)dt + c′, and hence c(x) =
∫ x
x
c′(t)dt + c. Now
we can back out the pseudo i for each i ∈ N by using the optimal condition (4.1) and
identify the distribution F(·).
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C.4 Proof of Lemma 9
Assumption 3.1(i) is satisfied under homoskedasticity, Assumption 3.1(ii) is not nec-
essary given the identification result in Section 3, Assumption 3.1(iii) is satisfied because
||$ − ΠT$||s = sup
(x,z)
|[c(x, z)− ΠT c(x, z)]|
+ sup
(x,z)
|[u′(x, z)− ΠTu′(x, z)]|+ sup
z
|[γ(z)− ΠTγ(z)]|
≤ c1(K1T )−ι/(1+dz) + c2(K1T )−ι/(1+dz) + c3(K1T )−ι/dz = o(1),
where the last equality is obtained from Assumption 12-(i). Assumption 3.2 is trivially
satisfied for the sieve minimum method. Under more primitive Assumptions 9 and 10,
Assumption 3.3 holds for our series LS estimator m̂(V,$) by Lemma C.2 in [39]. As-
sumption 12-(ii) guarantees that F is compact under the sup norm, which implies that
(12) in [39] is trivially satisfied. The proof is complete.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Given e = (e1, · · · , eN) ∈ S, define the kernel estimator of f with the true sample as
f˜(e) = (Th
N
 )
−1∑T
t=1
∏N
i=1 k
(
ei−t,i
h
)
,
sup
e∈S
∣∣∣f̂(e)− f(e)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
e∈S
∣∣∣f̂(e)− f˜(e)∣∣∣+ sup
e∈S
∣∣∣f˜(e)− f(e)∣∣∣
= sup
e∈S
∣∣∣∣∣T−1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
[
(̂t,i − t,i)h−N k′
(
e˜i − t,i
hi
) N∏
j 6=i
k
(
e˜j − t,j
hj
)]∣∣∣∣∣
+Op
{[
(ThN )
−1lnT
]1/2
+ h2
}
= Op
{
(aT + bT )h
−N
 +
[
(ThN )
−1lnT
]1/2
+ h2
}
= op(1).
where the second term in the first equality follows [92] who build on [93].
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